Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, General; The United Nations, Volume I

SWNCC Files¹

Report by the Special Ad Hoc Committee to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee ²

[Extract]

top secret
SWNCC 360

[Washington,] April 21, 1947.

Policies, Procedures and Costs of Assistance by the United States to Foreign Countries³

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Annex “B” to Appendix “A”

general military aid program

Reference: Special Ad Hoc Committee Memorandum of request dated March 20 [17], 1947⁴

1. The close of World War II has left the world with only three, and perhaps only two, nations which are capable of producing modern complicated military arms and munitions in large quantities. These are the United States, the Soviet Union (with its satellites), and to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom. Other nations such as Sweden, France, Belgium and Canada have more limited capabilities. As a result, the smaller nations of the world, which could formerly procure their arms from a large number of munitions-producing countries, must now, for practical purposes, seek them in great part from the Soviet Union and its satellites, or the U.S. supplemented by Britain. The source of acquisition by such countries of military equipment will have profound military and political implications. If, through inability to obtain the equipment and supplies from the United States, they turn to the Soviet Union or its satellites they will provide the Soviet Union with a political leverage potentially dangerous to U.S. security interests. The same leverage, possessed by the United States, could be made to serve the interests of international peace and security. Procurement of military equipment and supplies by other nations will also give to the supplying nation long-term military advantages in the form of an increased capability for mobilization which derives from the existence and readiness of a larger domestic munitions industry.

2. For the purpose of maintaining internal security and a reasonable degree of security against attack, nations have legitimate needs for moderate, suitably trained and equipped military forces. Through well-considered military collaboration, standardization, and the provision, by sale or otherwise, of military equipment, the U.S. can promote its own security and other national interests by improving the military posture of various foreign nations listed in paragraph 5, by orienting their military forces toward those of the U.S., and by causing them to look to the U.S. for replacement, maintenance, service, and training in the use of U.S. types of equipment.

3. A comprehensive program must be developed, on the basis of a careful judgment and consideration of the many and complex U.S. interests, both military and political, involved. The actual execution of the program should receive the same careful judgment and consideration. The program should be in specific terms as to places, times, types and amounts of aid contemplated, and should be subject to continuing reexamination.

4. Military supplies and equipment provided to foreign nations by the U.S. must come from existing stocks or from new manufacture, both of which are subject to serious limitations. Before any substantial provision of equipment can be made, authorizing legislation is required. In nearly all cases this is now lacking. Appropriate financial arrangements will be required. Much of the equipment provided from existing surplus stocks will be transferred at nominal cost, and rehabilitation and transportation charges. In some cases, a part of the financing will require appropriations for loans or grants. Existing stocks will merely serve to initiate the programs, not to sustain them, nor even to provide in their entirety all the initial sets for which need is foreseen. For the program to remain vital and to serve effectively the national interest of the U.S. and the interests of the countries concerned, provision must be made for a moderate, though steady, re-supply from new manufacture. Careful planning is required in order that orders placed in private industry should not be subject to wide fluctuations.

5. As of this date, world-wide survey indicates that it is desirable in the U.S. interest to initiate, or to be prepared to initiate, programs involving provision of U.S. military equipment and assistance in the following countries:

a. Europe

• Italy
• France
• Austria
• Norway
• Spain (contingent)

b. The Western Hemisphere

• Canada
• Latin-American Republics

c. The Far East

• Korea
• China
• The Philippines

d. The Near and Middle East

• Greece
• Turkey
• Iran
• Remainder of Near & Middle East

Details as to the pertinent U.S. national interests involved in the case of certain European, Near and Middle East, and Far East countries are contained in Annexes “C” to “E”, pages 36 to 88.⁵

6. Requirements for U.S. military aid under national programs which have been developed to date are summarized as follows:

Italy

General. Provision of military equipment and supplies on an ad hoc basis.

Military Equipment & Supplies. Army—Surplus equipment to supplement, as necessary and feasible, equipment provided by British; Air Force—50 a/c (P–51) with maintenance equipment and spare parts for 3 years (probable); Navy—16 minesweepers and spare parts therefor (probable).

Arrangements for Financing. Equipment to be transferred at scrap prices; for air equipment, Italians will pay packing, crating, and transporting costs.

Canada

General. Joint Canadian-U.S. adoption of common designs and standards in arms, equipment, organization and training methods; assistance to Canada in the procurement of standardized equipment.

Military Equipment & Supplies. Any equipment required by Canada (as yet undetermined).

Arrangements for Financing. All costs for equipment, supplies, and services provided to Canada to be borne by Canada.

Latin-American Republics (for breakdown by countries, see pages 23 to 32, SWNCC Memorandum for Information No. 78.⁵)

General. Maintenance of military missions; training of Latin-American personnel in U.S. service schools; and provision of military equipment and supplies.

Military Equipment & Supplies. Under W. Hemisphere Defense Program, equipment for 28 divisions; 1530 a/c (and 31 base units and 34 communication groups); 4 light cruisers, 25 destroyer escorts, 34 patrol and other types; (this is an interim plan and subject to review). Under Interim Allocation Program, equipment for 3 divisions; 576 a/c (and 25 base units and 25 communication groups); 84 patrol and other naval craft.

Arrangements for Financing. U.S. to pay costs of maintaining missions and training personnel in U.S. service schools; financing of provision of initial equipment is as yet undetermined; costs of non-excess equipment and supplies and costs of maintenance to be borne by Latin-American countries.

China

General. Maintenance of a U.S. military advisory group; provision of equipment and supplies; and training of key Chinese personnel.

Military Equipment and Supplies. Initial equipment and supplies for 8% air groups (4 fighter, 2 troop carrier, 1 medium bomber, 1 heavy bomber group; 1 photo recon squadron) (transfer of military type items for this program has been suspended); equipment shortages (expected to be food, petroleum products, and medical supplies) and supplies for Chinese occupation forces for Japan (about 15,000); initial total of 130 vessels and craft, including 4 destroyer escorts, and mine, patrol, auxiliary and amphibious types.

Arrangements for Financing. Cost of 8⅓ air group program to be borne by China; occupation force cost to be borne by China; training in U.S. carried out at Chinese expense; naval vessels and craft to be given to China without cost, subject to reimbursement for rehabilitation and transportation.

The Philippines

General. Maintenance of a U.S. military advisory group; provision of equipment and supplies; and training of key Philippine personnel.

Military Equipment & Supplies. Initial equipment for a Philippine Army ground and service force of approximately 33,000; initial equipment and 3 to 5 years maintenance for Philippine Naval Patrol of approximately 1800, equipped with minor patrol and amphibious craft; initial equipment and 3 to 5 years maintenance for 1 composite group (2 fighter, 1 troop carrier, 1 liaison and training squadron) of approximately 2000.

Arrangements for Financing. Initial military equipment and supplies to be furnished without cost; arrangements for costs of services and additional munitions have not been worked out; arrangements for financing assistance in the maintenance and supply of the Philippine Army, and training of Philippine Army personnel at U.S. military schools are undetermined.

Greece (Tentative and Preliminary)

General. Maintaining U.S. military personnel in an advisory capacity, provision of military supplies and equipment, and training of key personnel.

Military Equipment & Supplies. Partial equipment for and partial maintenance of Army of 115,000; Gendarmerie of 50,000; and Pioneer force of 5,000; maintenance of Navy of small craft, strength 13,000; partial equipment for and maintenance of one composite group (1 transport, 2 fighter, and 1 recon squadron) numbering 5,000.

Arrangements for Financing. For fiscal year 1948, entire amount (estimated at $150,000,000) to be borne from U.S. funds (expected to be a grant); arrangements thereafter undetermined.

Turkey

General. Nature and extent are as yet undetermined.

Military Equipment & Supplies. Details are as yet undetermined.

Arrangements for Financing. For fiscal year 1948, entire amount (some part of $400,000,000—possibly $150,000,000) from U.S. funds (expected to be a grant). Arrangements thereafter undetermined.

Iran

General. Maintenance of a military and a constabulary mission; training of Iranian military personnel; and provision of military supplies and equipment.

Military Equipment & Supplies. Non-combat material in reasonable quantities; non-aggression combat material (excludes such items as bombers and medium tanks) with limits of a $10,000,000 credit.

Arrangements for Financing. Financing of the cost of the missions and the cost of training undetermined; cost of non-aggression combat equipment to be met from credit ($10,000,000), not yet arranged; arrangements for other equipment undetermined.

7. Potential requirements for U.S. military aid, under national programs which it may prove desirable or necessary to initiate, are in broad and preliminary estimate, as follows:

France

General. Provision of equipment and supplies.

Military Equipment and Supplies. Maintenance and replacement equipment and supplies for seven U.S. equipped divisions; possible spare parts replacement (short term only) for 269 U.S. type aircraft; transfer of lend-lease amphibious and patrol craft (243).

Arrangements for Financing. Undetermined.

Austria

General. Provision of equipment and supplies; maintenance of small training mission.

Military Equipment and Supplies. Initial equipment and maintenance for ground force of 50,000 including six mountain regimental combat teams; initial equipment and maintenance for air force of 5,000 (90 a/c).

Arrangements for Financing. Undetermined.

Norway

General. Provision of equipment and supplies.

Military Equipment and Supplies. Minor specific ground items; possible maintenance and replacement supplies and equipment for 104 U.S. type aircraft; transfer of ten U.S. vessels now on loan.

Arrangements for Financing. Ground items to be paid for by Norway. Other arrangements undetermined.

Spain (military assistance to the present Spanish Government would be contrary to current U.S. policy).

General. Provision of military supplies, equipment, and technical advice.

Military Supplies and Equipment. Nucleus of a tactical air force, details undetermined; possibly, limited specific items of naval equipment.

Arrangements for Financing. Undetermined.

Korea

General. Maintenance of a constabulary advisory mission; provision of equipment and supplies.

Military Equipment and Supplies. Small arms and ammunition and a limited number of radios, vehicles, and spare parts for a police-type force of about 25,000.

Arrangements for Financing. Provided without costs as available from local theater stocks declared surplus.

Near and Middle East (less Greece, Turkey and Iran)

General. Provision of equipment and supplies.

Military Equipment and Supplies. Amounts undetermined (probably not substantial).

Arrangements for Financing. Undetermined.

8. The general situation as to availability is:

a. Availability is limited generally by lack of legislative authority, lack of funds, reluctance of private manufacturers to accept orders, shortage of materials and tools, lack of balanced sets of equipment, deterioration of stocks in storage, disposal of munitions, inaccessible location and lack of transportation.

b. Although a large portion of any reasonable foreign program, particularly if of emergency nature and given a sufficiently high priority, can within the immediate future be filled from existing stocks, shortages will exist in certain critical fields, including trucks, batteries, radios, and equipment spare parts.

c. Full assurance cannot be given for manufacture, procurement, and availability of replacement and maintenance matériel.

d. Commitments under the programs indicated in paragraph 6 above can be met from existing stocks approximately as follows:

(1) Philippines—85%

(2) China: Air—undetermined; Army—100%; Navy—95%

(3) Western Hemisphere—85% of military type munitions

(4) Italy—100%

(5) Greece, Turkey, Iran—To a limited extent only, without interfering with other programs (other nations, U.S. establishments and civilian components).

(6) Possible other programs—very little available from existing stocks and no balanced availabilities.

9. A system of priorities as among these nation-programs is needed. This system should be developed in necessary detail and adjusted as appropriate by the SWNCC Committee on Rearmament within the framework of the priority guidance in paragraph 10. This priority guidance is based on the following general considerations:

a. One call on U.S. resources comes from the equipment shortages and other military deficiencies of foreign military forces which result in present inability on the part of these countries to resist foreign penetration and coercion, and hence endanger the existence of the nation and its institutions.

b. A second call comes from the requirements of constructive programs aiming at development of sound military forces as a foundation for national, regional, and international security in the future.

c. The first necessity is the more pressing. However, the second type of program is generally more efficient. It helps a nation avert wars of subversion, such as that in Greece, by developing a respectable military posture, and thus avoid the consumption of resources in continuing civil strife and disorder.

d. Since the object of the emergency type of aid is to stop political aggression, any threatened nation which, with U.S. help, can reasonably be expected to survive has a valid claim on U.S. resources. Because of the immediacy of the threat, these nations will probably be found along the “iron curtain”. For the second purpose, the order of priority derives from the importance in terms of military strategy and the positive contribution that the nation, if so aided, will make to U.S. security.

e. The pressure of urgent requirements should not preclude the initiation and orderly development of foreign military forces under the constructive long-term programs referred to above.

10. Priority Guidance

a. Where requirements are to be filled from existing stocks and such stocks are inadequate in some items, first priority should be given to minimum lists of equipment required to stabilize a situation against active attempts at penetration and coercion. This may be done by transfer or by ear-marking or setting aside supplies which are not required prior to the latter phases of the program. From stocks remaining after the setting aside, of emergency requirements, the requirements of long-term constructive programs should be filled in a secondary priority, and the provision of such of these materials as are available should be initiated without delay.

b. Where uncertainty exists as to the duration of emergency programs or as to their total requirements, it will be necessary (in order to proceed with long-term constructive programs) to make a somewhat arbitrary assumption as to the total provision for such emergency programs, which should be made from existing stocks. If it becomes evident that this provision will in fact probably prove inadequate it will be necessary either to revise the long-term programs downward or to fill additional requirements from new manufacture.

c. If new manufacture is available to augment existing stocks, first priority must be given on a month by month basis to meeting the requirements of emergency programs, and any remaining equipment will be utilized for the long-term programs.

d. Within the emergency category priority should be given on the basis of immediacy and gravity of the threat to the country concerned, together with the ability of the country in question to withstand the threat with and without the contemplated aid. On his basis the present priority as between countries where such a threat exists or might quickly arise is as follows:

(1) Greece

(2) Turkey

(3) Italy—Iran

(4) Korea (police, constabulary, and coast guard)

(5) France

(6) Austria

(These priorities are [subject] to continuing revision in the light of changing circumstances)

e. With respect to the long-term constructive programs of military development, priorities are as follows:

(1) Western Hemisphere (1—Canada; 2—Latin-American Republics) and the Philippines.

(2) Near and Middle East—Europe.

(3) Far East (less the Philippines)

f. These priorities must remain subject to modification as to detail. Such modifications include the following:

(1) Materials not practicable to move should be disposed of locally.

(2) Long-term programs should be initiated, with at least moderate quantities of equipment, without regard to priority.

(3) Opportunities which may arise from time to time for provision of assistance or support in the U.S. interest, at little or no expense, and not directly related to the programs indicated herein, should be considered on an ad hoc basis and not automatically ruled out on the basis of the priorities indicated herein.

11. Additional governmental implementing actions of a procedural nature are required for most of these nation-programs. Among these are:

a. Legislative Authority: For the transfer of U.S. owned munitions, legislative authority initially necessary is contained in the following:

(1) Naval Ordnance material. A bill to authorize the sale, loan, exchange, or gift of U.S. naval ordnance material to foreign governments (HR 1357) (80th Congress).

(2) China. A bill to provide military advice and assistance to the Republic of China (HR 6795) (79th Congress).

(3) Western Hemisphere. The Inter-American Military Cooperation Bill (HR 6326) (79th Congress)

(4) Greece and Turkey. HR 2616, now pending (80th Congress).

Additional legislation is required to authorize the War and Navy Departments to accept reimbursement for procurement, manufacture, rehabilitation, storage, or maintenance of munitions intended for a foreign nation.

b. Operational policy. The actual implementation of the programs will require continuing policy guidance and adjustment within the framework of broad national policy. The SWNCC subcommittee for Rearmament is considered to be the proper agency to examine and recommend as to these matters.

1. Lot 52M45, the files of the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee which are located in the National Archives under the administration of the Department of State.
2. This document was the interim report of an ad hoc committee instructed by the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee on March 20 to investigate the question of foreign assistance. SWNCC took this action in response to letters from Dean Acheson, Acting Secretary of State, to the Secretaries of War and Navy, March 5, stating that it was in the interest of the United States to try to anticipate the further need to extend foreign assistance along the lines of the Greek-Turkish aid program. The conclusions of this report were tentatively approved by the three departments. For the text of the letter of March 5, see Vol. iii, p. 197. For other portions of the text of SWNCC 360 and for information on subsequent action taken in its regard, see Ibid., pp. 204–220.
3. For documentation on United States policy with respect to the economic crisis in Europe, see Vol. iii, pp. 197 ff.
4. For partial text, see Vol. iii, p. 198.
5. Not printed.
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