Department of State Atomic Energy Files
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edmund A. Gullion, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)
secret
[Washington,] September 10, 1947.
At the Secretary’s request Mr. Gullion today consulted Mr. Bernard Baruch at his hotel concerning PPS/7 (General United States Policy with Respect to International Control of Atomic Energy.)1
Taking up the recommendations of the Planning Staff paper in order:
- 1.
- Mr. Baruch agrees that the United States should take no steps at this time to terminate UNAEC negotiations; he does not believe that we should ever close the door on such negotiations.
- 2.
- His first reaction to the idea of a Presidential statement on UNAEC’s failure to produce results was that too much had been said already. In the margin of the page on which this recommendation occurs he immediately wrote “Why say anything?”. However, when [Page 646] he had finished reading the paper he agreed that a statement should be made about the impasse and its implications. A great deal would depend upon the actual content of the statement and he would have to see it before expressing a firm opinion; something would also have to be said in the General Assembly.
- 3.
- Mr. Barueh’s opinion about consultations between Britain and the US would depend upon the content of the proposed conversations between the United States and Britain. He had many reservations about handing over any information to the British. He thinks that once the information is given it will then be public property, because he thinks the British would turn it over to other countries. He mentioned that the British were committed to France in this respect. His principal reservation has to do with financial assistance to Britain. He believes that it is entirely inconsistent that we should be aiding the British while they are stockpiling uranium and withholding it from our use.
- 4.
- Mr. Baruch agrees that the point should be made that the US plan is a whole and that implementation of any part of it depended upon acceptance of the main principles of the whole. He was not clear as to what advantage might be gained by stressing the future difficulty in discussing staging. He pointed out that the question of the veto was also fundamental in the whole discussion. My general impression, however, is that he agrees with recommendation No. 4.
- 5.
- He agrees with the convening of the Board of Consultants but believes strongly that it should not address itself to the basic Acheson-Lilienthal Report but to the original American proposals to the Commission which he presented on June 14, 1946, which were more complete than the Acheson–Lilienthal Report.
- 6.
- He agrees that something could and should be done to inform the public more effectively of the UNAEC issues and the lack of progress.
- 7.
- He agrees strongly with the recommendation of an interview with Stalin and believes that the President might make some reference to it. He confirmed that it was probable that Gromyko was not giving the Politburo the true picture of our proposals.
[Here follows an annex, “Personal Views Expressed by Mr. Baruch in conversation with Mr. Gullion on September 10, 1947.”]