501.BC Atomic/8–2647: Telegram
The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
top secret
us urgent
us urgent
New York, August 26,
1947—1 p.m.
777. For Acting Secretary and Rusk from Osborn and Gullion. Will Department please relay urgently to London if approved. Reurtel
- 1.
- British Embassy reports that Cadogan has been instructed to indicate that British Government gives general support to views of the majority in the UNAEC. (In the main these are fully satisfactory to us and will form main body of the Commission’s second report to the Security Council). He will take position that these proposals afford the basis of a scheme of control which will be effective, whereas the alternative proposals put forward by the Soviet will not.
- 2.
- However, Cadogan will also apparently be instructed to reserve the British position with respect to three points, (a) they are not convinced that the residual powers conferred on the international agency in respect to ownership are, in fact, necessary. (b) they may also indicate reservations with respect to extent to which research by individual nations can or ought to be restricted. This reservation may turn on definition of “dangerous quantities” which cannot now be made, (c) they have some doubts about necessity of vesting exclusive right of research on atomic weapons in the agency.
- 3.
- In view of the above would you please inform Foreign Office promptly of the following:
- 4.
- In US view the forthcoming report should be an interim report by the majority which would include the working papers approved in [Page 616] their present form presenting general considerations and specific proposals covering items through A (2) in the approved subject list.1 Report will include a summary of the discussion on the Soviet amendments showing no agreement has been reached on them, and a summary of the discussion on the Soviet proposals of June 11, recently concluded, plus a resolution voted by the Commission on August 152 which states that the Soviet proposals as thus far elaborated are inadequate and do not constitute a basis for the future work of the Commission. The foreword of this interim report will state that the AEC is continuing its work under recommendations previously received from the Council to develop specific proposals on the items remaining on the subject list—these proposals being based on the general findings and recommendations of the first report which are to be reaffirmed. It is proposed that foreword should also state that work on remaining items rendered difficult by lack of Soviet agreement on specific proposals contained in the report.
- 5.
- US Government deems it necessary that the report should be presented in a form that will evidence the agreement of the majority on the proposals developed under items through A (2) of AEC/C.2/16 and should also reveal with unmistakable clarity the grave and fundamental differences between the position taken by the Soviets on the atomic energy control and that of the US and nine other members of the Commission. US sees no way to do this without a clear-cut expression of support by the delegations of the majority.
- 6.
- In view of these differences, Department is of opinion that time has arrived when US-UK-Canada ought to resume consultations as to next steps in development of humanitarian and peaceful uses of atomic energy. Desirability of such consultations is now being considered urgently on high level with other Departments and we hope soon to be able to give more concrete indications to British. Although it is unfortunate that decision can apparently not be reached before Commission acts on its report, we think British should bear this in mind in considering their course in the UNAEC.
- 7.
- The idea of such consultations had received impetus from increasing recognition of the fact that UNAEC negotiations have provided little positive result thus far. We are thus in a position to say that the project is more concrete and imminent than at any time in the past. The British will recall that we have always pointed out that real decision on the future on US-UK-Canadian cooperation in this field was bound up with the assessment of the position to be made in September.
- 8.
- We believe it would be most unfortunate if at this stage the [Page 617] British should introduce any separate reservation or amendment. We had thought that clarification of the meaning of ownership contained in AEC/C.2/44,3 particularly the recognition that its scope and powers would be specifically limited in the treaty, had substantially eliminated main divergencies between US and UK. Indeed the AEC document in reference contains certain restrictive language concerning meaning of ownership submitted by UK Delegation.
- 9.
- We feel that independent reservations by the British would open the door to further reservations by other powers of which we and the British have some foreknowledge. An accumulation of such reservations would seriously jeopardize basic concepts of effective international control. We believe that any reservation specifically labelled as British would give Russians opportunity to say that the majority confronting them was not in fact united.
- 10.
- We assume, moreover, that the British have not overlooked the fact that dilution of the powers of the ADA is one of the prime Soviet objectives. For example, there is nothing the Russians would like more than to be permitted to do research on “dangerous” activities and nothing more calculated to rob an international control plan of real effectiveness, or for that matter, of any chance of acceptance by the majority. [Osborn and Gullion.]
Johnson