Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, General; The United Nations, Volume I

Policy Planning Staff Files

Report by the Policy Planning Staff

top secret
PPS/7

[Washington,] August 21, 1947.

Mr. Lovett: At the request of Mr. Dean Acheson, the Policy Planning Staff undertook to draw up recommendations on the broad pattern of future U.S. policy with respect to the atomic energy negotiations. It was understood that these recommendations would, if approved, serve as guidance for the State Department representative, Mr. Rusk, in the Executive Committee of the Regulations of Armaments Committee (RAC).

A draft paper along these lines is attached in Annex B. A summary of the main recommendations contained in this paper is attached in Annex A.

In drawing up these papers, the Policy Planning Staff has consulted with the following persons:

• Colonel Pierpont Hamilton, USA;
• Captain Page Smith, USN;
• Mr. John Hancock, Lehmann Brothers, New York;
• Mr. Frederick Osborn, U.S. Representative on the UN Atomic Energy Commission;
• Mr. Joseph Volpe, Deputy General Counsel, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission;
• Mr. Edmund A. Gullion;¹
• Mr. Dean Rusk; and
• Mr. Francis Russell.²

These gentlemen participated on a personal basis at various stages in the discussions, without engaging the responsibility of their respective organizations. While careful and sympathetic consideration was given to what they had to say, the attached paper may not coincide with their views in every particular. The interested Departments and agencies will, of course, have opportunity to present their views to the Regulation of Armaments Committee, and in the wider consultations proposed in this paper, before a final Government policy is evolved.

With your approval, this paper should be transmitted to Mr. Rusk for his guidance.

George F. Kennan

Approved: Robert A. Lovett³
Acting Secretary of State

Annex A

General United States Policy With Respect to International Control of Atomic Energy

(through and after the Submission of the Second Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council)

summary of recommendations

1. That the United States take no initiative at this juncture in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, in the Security Council, or in the General Assembly, to terminate negotiations looking toward international control of atomic energy.

2. That, notwithstanding the continuance of negotiations, it be announced by the President at the time of the submission of the next (second) report to the Security Council that this Government is obliged to take full account in its defense plans of the fact that no agreement has yet been reached with respect to the international control of atomic energy; and

that, accordingly, appropriate directives then be issued to all Government departments and agencies handling matters which would affect either the defense of this country against attack by atomic weapons or its power to retaliate in the face of such an attack.

3. That it also be announced by the President, at the time of the presentation of the second report, and by prior agreement with the two governments concerned, that this Government proposes to discuss with the British and Canadian Governments the situation resulting from the failure up to this point to achieve general international agreement on this subject, and

that, accordingly, invitations then be issued to the British and Canadian Governments along these lines.

4. That the U.S. Government Delegate to the UNAEC be instructed to recommend the inclusion in the forthcoming AEC report to the Security Council of an indication that in view of the failure of the Commission to agree on preceding items there will be limitations on the extent to which certain of the remaining items on the Commission’s agenda can be explored. (This refers particularly to the question of staging and of strategic locations.)

5. That a Board of Consultants, comprising as many as possible of the original membership of the group which drew up the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, be secretly convened as soon as possible to report whether in their opinion anything has been brought out in the United Nations debate, or in the progress of atomic science since their original report, which would call for any substantial modification in the original plan.

6. That measures be taken at once to acquaint the public with the significance of the lack of progress in the UNAEC and to prepare the public for the announcements which are to be made at the time of the presentation of the second report.

7. That it be accepted as a tentative plan of procedure, subject always to reconsideration in the light of later circumstances, that before the work of the UNAEC be allowed to break down entirely, this, Government should send to Moscow a qualified public figure whose task would be to see to it that Stalin and the members of the Politburo are given a true and complete picture of this Government’s objectives with respect to the international control of atomic energy, thus enabling us to be sure that the failure to agree in the UNAEC does not rest on the failure of subordinate Soviet organs to report our position correctly to those responsible for Soviet policy.

Annex B

General United States Policy With Respect to International Control of Atomic Energy

(through and after the Submission of the Second Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council)

i. the situation to date

After fourteen months of negotiations in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) the impasse continues. The United. States must consider how to make the reasons for this impasse clear to world opinion, and how best to safeguard its own security in the circumstance.

The Report which the Commission will submit to the Security Council prior to the next meeting of the General Assembly in September will reveal that the Commission has not succeeded in resolving the fundamental differences between the US and the majority of members of the Commission on the one hand, and the USSR and Poland on the other. The report will unquestionably clarify still further the scope and nature of the fundamental differences between the Soviet position and the position held by ourselves and nine other countries represented on the 12–man commission.

The US position, although perhaps susceptible of modification in regard to details, cannot, it is believed, be altered in any important respect without endangering our national security. On the other hand no modifications in detail can, under present circumstances, conceivably make the proposals of the majority acceptable to the USSR.

Since the submission of its First Report on December 31, 1946, the Atomic Energy Commission has been laboring to iron out the differences with the Soviet Union and at the same time to draft specific proposals. Committee 2 of the Commission has worked out in detail a series of papers describing the functions and attributes of an international control authority. In these negotiations the US Representative has made a special and successful effort to let other countries assume the initiative. Representatives of the Soviet Union have not really contributed to these negotiations. They have attended only as observers. According to the United States Representative on the Commission, their presence has served only to delay the negotiations as long as possible through the raising of questions of a merely procedural nature.

Another committee (the Working Committee) has been considering the twelve so-called Soviet “amendments” to the year-end report. Substantive consideration of these proposals on their merits has proved difficult. The other members of the committee have found it impossible to induce the Soviet representatives to define with any precision the exact meaning of their “amendments” or proposals, particularly those which relate to the scope of the inspection function under an international control authority.

Several basic differences divide the Soviet Union and Poland from the other ten members of the AEC. While these differences include, of course, the mechanics of inspection and the relation of the veto to the use of sanctions, there are two points of disagreement which are basic and which have become even more significant:

• First, the majority believes that outlawry of atomic weapons should be accomplished only as part of an international agreement providing for the development, by stages, of an adequate system of control, with safeguards necessary to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, evidently does not intend to abandon its insistence on the destruction of atomic bomb stocks before adoption of an international control convention, or at least before it can become reasonably effective.
• Second, the United States and most other UNAEC countries believe that an international control plan would afford no security unless it envisaged an atomic development authority endowed with broad powers over practically all operations connected with the production of atomic energy. Its powers would be those which, in Western nomenclature at least, are usually subsumed in the term ownership. The Soviet Union has repeatedly rejected the idea of such an authority, claiming to see in it an instrument for interference with the internal affairs of sovereign states.

Without a settlement on these two points it appears impossible for the United States, even though it continues to seek a solution, to agree with the USSR on a plan for the international control of atomic energy.

The United States could not agree to destroy its bomb stocks except in terms of the security provided by an agreed international convention. The Russians have heretofore been willing to agree only to immediate destruction, provision for security being left to later negotiation.

An international authority endowed by international agreement with some of the controls usually exercised by sovereign states is indispensable to security in an atomic world. Unless the international control authority has plenary powers in its field, secular nationalistic rivalries would still operate and conduce to conflict behind the screen of lesser forms of control. Meanwhile world opinion would be lulled into a false sense of security. Moreover, the problem of inspection without a strong authority would be of unmanageable proportions. Since the processes for the production of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and for explosives are similar and inseparable throughout most of their courses, the inspectors would have to investigate not only atomic energy operations but also the motives of the operators.

The United States believes that international ownership or its equivalent is the only answer to these problems.

Unfortunately ownership or beneficial control of important industrial facilities within the territory of the Soviet Union by any other authority than the Soviet state is incompatible with all known Soviet ideology and practice.

ii. basic requirements of future u.s. policy

In the face of these fundamental differences the United States must begin to develop a policy which does not appear to place all our eggs in the UN Atomic Energy Commission basket.

The best estimates indicate that the Soviet Union will have effective use of the atomic bomb within—^* years.

A due regard for United States security does not permit us to stand idly by while the Soviet Union continues its filibuster in the UNAEC. The Russians are using delaying tactics in the Commission while they pursue specific objectives outside the meeting hall. These include:

a) Hastening their own development of atomic bombs;

b) Dividing opinion in other United Nations, particularly those having atomic energy resources or skills;

c) Infiltration of research and control programs in any or all other countries;

d) Breaking down existing secret US arrangements for procurement of raw materials outside the United States;

e) Extension of their area of effective political domination by infiltration or direct pressure.

This enumeration demonstrates that we cannot consider the debate in the AEC as taking place in a vacuum. The extent to which Soviet strategic and diplomatic objectives are furthered by delay in the Commission is obvious, and too pat for mere coincidence. We must consider Soviet tactics in the AEC as part of the Kremlin’s general strategy; and we must be able to recognize the end of the line when we come to it.

We are now faced with the basic fact that under present circumstances the effort to achieve international control affords less hope for protecting our national security than other means. We must begin, therefore, to take alternative measures which, while they would not provide as high a degree of security as effective international control, would at least materially improve the United States position in a world in which others possess atomic weapons.

This means that we turn a corner in our thinking and this turning-point must soon be made unmistakable to the peoples of the United States, the Soviet Union and the rest of the world.

This does not mean, however, that there is any necessity for terminating the work of the Commission at this point. On the contrary it is desirable that the door be left open to further negotiation with the Russians subsequent to the taking of these alternative measures. For although the measures would be taken primarily in the interests of our own security, they might just possibly have some effect in inclining the Russians toward the plan of the other UNAEC nations. This is so for the following reasons:

The Russians are trained to reason dialectically. Their diplomatic history shows that they seldom approach an objective along one course without at the same time having in reserve an alternative and sometimes entirely dissimilar course. In pressing their own demands, they are quick to take into account the extent to which their opponent has alternatives to the acceptance of their demands. If they think he has no acceptable alternative, they are insistent and intractable.

Thus far, we have not demonstrated to the Russians that we have any alternative to the present course of basing our future atomic security on general international agreement. On the contrary, we have tended to labor the point that there is no effective means of defense against atomic weapons. The Russians have probably concluded from this that we see no alternative to international agreement. This has put them in a position where they feel at liberty to stall the negotiations indefinitely, believing that as long as they refuse to reach agreement with us their basic security position will not deteriorate, because little will be done here to reduce our vulnerability and to increase our retaliatory power in the face of atomic attack.

The Russians are probably negotiating under the impression that this country has not taken, nor even seriously contemplated, any serious measures of civilian defense. This being the case, the possibility of being able, in the event of a military conflict, to cause great damage and panic by a surprise attack must be an appealing one to them. It must put a premium, in their minds, on the possibility that they may some day be able to use the weapon against us.

There is no intention here to make light of the damage which can be done by the atomic weapon or the difficulties of defense against it. Nor is there any disposition to minimize the importance of the planning for atomic warfare and defense which has already been done in the military establishments. But there must be degrees in vulnerability to atomic attack; and there are certainly degrees in determination and effectiveness of retaliatory force.

If it were clearly established in the Russian mind that there was no possibility of this country’s being a push-over in the face of surprise atomic attack—that there existed in this country mechanisms which would enable us to recuperate with relative promptness and to impose swift retribution, even in the face of the heaviest blow; and that we were ready to depart from traditional American policy in the direction of effective international understandings which increase our retaliatory power—then there could be no doubt that the prospect of the atomic age would take on a somewhat different color to Russian eyes.

It cannot be said with any assurance that the effect thus achieved would be strong enough to overcome the inhibitions on the Russian side which stand in the way of Soviet acceptance of our atomic energy proposals. Indeed, the odds are probably rather on the other side. But the possibility that their attitude might be affected to some extent by such a state of affairs is a strong one; and unless that possibility had been explored before the work of the Atomic Energy Commission was permitted to come to a final end, it would not be possible for us to say that we had exhausted every possibility of bringing the Russians near to our point of view.

For this reason we should not allow the AEC to be torpedoed before we have taken measures to convince the Russians that we are going to maintain as firm a posture as possible in the face of atomic attack.

While expressing our belief that negotiations should continue, we should make it clear that they can do so only on an altered basis; that hopes of constructive agreement on the remaining items of the agenda have been compromised by the failure to reach agreement on the preceding items. The order of the items in the present work schedules of the AEC is progressive. It was conceived, for example, that a phasing plan for the transition from national to international control should grow out of, and depend upon, agreement as to the functions and powers of the international control agency.

Had agreement been reached on the basic features of a control authority, it would have been relatively easy for the United States to agree to a phasing plan, or even to a plan on strategic location. The task has now become much more difficult as the disagreement crystallized and as Soviet-US relations have deteriorated across the board. The safeguards which the US public would now have to require in the way of international control, of inspection, of undertakings by the Soviet Union go far beyond anything that would have been asked in the early days of the Atomic Energy Commission. Yet Russians have become increasingly outspoken in refusing to accept that minimum abatement of national sovereignty which a successful control plan would require.

If possible the report to the Council should include some clear acknowledgement that the Commission will have difficulty in discussing questions of staging or strategic location (and possibly some of the other remaining items) in face of the failure to agree on the subjects already considered.

Such a statement would serve as a caveat or advance disclaimer of responsibility for the difficulties which are bound to develop when such things as stages come up for discussion. Otherwise, if we failed later to discuss stages at all, the Russians could claim that we had never had any intention of handing over our present quasi-monopoly, gradually or otherwise. If, as appears probable under the circumstances, only a truncated or rudimentary staging plan could be offered, we might also be effectively accused of bad faith by Soviet propaganda, unless we gave some preliminary warning of the poor results to be expected in the present atmosphere and allotted the blame correctly.

Our object should not be to drive the Russians out of the AEC at this time. And we should avoid giving them an opportunity to put the onus for an open break upon this country. In particular, if we announce now that we envisage any international consultations outside the AEC, we must try to insure that these consultations have little as possible the aspect of a mutual assistance pact against the Soviet Union at a time when UNAEC negotiations are still in progress.

It is probable that the Russians have too much respect for the bomb and too much appreciation of the peculiar uses to them of the AEC forum to isolate themselves by walking out on the negotiations.

Nevertheless we cannot dismiss the possibility that they may do this at the time the reorientation of our policy is made known. And this should be accepted as a considered risk.

If they do walk out, we need not take it too tragically. Their action would most probably not be approved by most states. It would in no way alter the premises underlying our policy. It might even be to our advantage in a number of ways: it would dramatize for world opinion as nothing else could the issues between the Soviet bloc and the rest of the AEC; it would occur at a time when the solidarity of the other AEC countries was still intact; it would put an end to the filibuster and give us a freer hand in making our defense preparations; and it would forestall the next stage of the AEC discussion which promises to be very difficult for us.

iii. presentation and implementation of the reorientation of policy

Before the United States can proceed to seek security along the alternative courses represented by alliances or by military preparation, it must first effectively mobilize public opinion in this country and in other countries in support of its position. To the public the discussions in the UNAEC have tended to appear esoteric and philosophical. The continuing problem is to make the differences between the Soviet Union and the other members of the UNAEC stand forth clearly as something more than mere debating propositions. The issue with respect to international ownership of atomic facilities must be made at least as vivid and concrete as, for example, the issue with respect to the Greek northern frontier.

To do this will require a program of appeal to public opinion, geared to the UN deliberations but more imaginative and active than anything which has gone before. The process of public enlightenment by a planned campaign should begin as soon as possible, if the ground is to be prepared for a policy statement of real importance.

Such a statement should be made by the President and would be most effective if made at the psychological moment afforded by the presentation of the Second Report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council in September. (A tentative outline of a proposed address has been prepared by Mr. Gullion and can be made available if this paper is approved.)

In essence this declaration would (a) reaffirm the bases of US foreign policy; (b) review the disappointing course of the UNAEC so far; (c) isolate the major points of disagreement; (d) make it clear that this country would henceforth have to take carefully into account in questions of national defense the fact that no agreement had yet been reached over a year and a half after the Moscow declaration; and (e) announce that this Government proposed to discuss with the United Kingdom and Canada, the two countries which joined with us in pioneering atomic energy and in first seeking a scheme of control to ensure its use for beneficent purposes only, the situation resulting from the failure to reach agreement up to this time in the AEC. (The President’s announcement of these discussions should be worded in such a way as to avoid the appearance of conflict with the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 relating to exchange of information with other nations.)

Reasons already exist for initiating consultation with the UK and Canada other than those arising from the course of the UNAEC debate as developed in this paper. Certain secret war-time agreements between the three powers appeared to envisage that cooperation in the development of atomic energy for industrial uses would continue after the war. Canada and the UK, particularly the latter, have been pressing us to honor what they conceive to be commitments on our part. (No public reference would of course be made to these agreements at this time.) Britain is desperately eager to bolster its peaceful production with new sources of industrial energy.

The stagnation of discussions with the British and Canadians not only is damaging to US-UK-Canadian relations; it inhibits exploration of the possibilities of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. It may increasingly affect our ability to secure as much raw materials as we require for our own domestic program of atomic energy development.

These consultations might possibly be followed up eventually by others with other nations which have indicated general agreement with the principles of international control of atomic energy accepted by the majority of the UN Atomic Energy Commission Countries. The basis and extent of their participation might vary as their needs and their economic, political and strategic situations indicated. We and the British are under commitment to furnish Belgium, which supplies the bulk of the raw material for our atomic energy program, with information about industrial uses when this becomes practical. Presumably we shall have to admit Belgium eventually into consultation with the US, UK and Canada; but in view of her relatively exposed position on the continent she may not want her affiliation publicly announced. Our policy vis-à-vis Belgium would thus require special consideration.

A public invitation at this time to a broader circle of other nations to join in consultations outside the UNAEC would be undesirable for the following reasons:

(a) Such multilateral arrangements would presumably involve, as a sine qua non, the disclosure by this country of some of its knowledge of atomic energy processes. So long as the Soviet Union is not a member of the club, the war potential of atomic energy will take precedence over peaceful uses. The revelation of classified technological information to a relatively large number of small states, militarily weak, geographically vulnerable, and politically unstable, is plainly undesirable;

(b) Such proposals would be gravely embarrassing to certain countries, e.g., Sweden or Belgium, who exist on the margin of Russian power;

(c) Most of these other countries would have little strength to contribute and would be liabilities rather than assets;

(d) Their cooperation could be assured by other means which would not give the Russians a chance to say that they were hitched to our chariot;

(e) In a middle power such as France, such an invitation might split the country politically, resulting in upheavals which might not be in our interest;

(f) Such a move might complicate an eventual amelioration of Soviet-American relations; and

(g) The cohesive force binding together principal partners with common interests and of comparable strength would be dissipated in a hopeless quest for universalism.

The mode and timing of a policy statement on the foregoing lines require careful planning. When the AEC Report is introduced into the Security Council, the United States representative at the Seat of the United Nations might review the report to make clear the areas of disagreement, refer to the difficulties of the next step of the negotiations and to the grave implications of continued disagreement, and announce that the President of the United States would speak to the people on this subject on that evening.

Obviously the policy outlined above will require wide clearance within the Executive Branch of the Government, and it is essential that the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy be fully informed.

In view of the content of the President’s message, it would obviously be necessary to consult beforehand with other members of the UNAEC, particularly the UK and Canada. If the British Government has received answers to the questions which it recently put to the Russians on their atomic energy policies, the President’s announcement might be synchronized with some similar British Government pronouncement underlining the negative results of UNAEC thus far.

iv final precautions

(a) Review of basis of our policy.

It is obvious that the course of action outlined above is predicated on the assumption that the plan for international control to be presented in the forthcoming report to the SC (which is substantially the original US proposal) is not susceptible of any important modification. Certainly before discussions in the UNAEC are adjourned, or before we decide to place no more reliance on them, we should be absolutely certain that this, to the best of our knowledge, is so. We should be sure that full study has been given to all possible new proposals and to every possible accommodation of conflicting views and that nothing has occurred in the past year and a half to invalidate any of the premises of the original Acheson-Lilienthal report, on which our policy has been based.

Consequently a group should be constituted, similar to the Board of Consultants which drew up the original Acheson-Lilienthal proposals, to reexamine the US position with a view to determining what, if any, changes are possible and to report to the Secretary of State as soon as possible. It would be unrealistic to suppose that such a study could be launched entirely de novo, especially since time is of the essence. Fortunately the main elements in any plan for international control are sufficiently well known not to require it. A feasible and satisfactory plan would be to convene quietly as many as possible of the original consultants and to ask them merely to judge whether, since their report was originally prepared, anything has been brought out in the UN debate or in the progress of atomic science which would dictate or permit any real modifications in the original plan.

It is desirable that this be done without publicity, at the time. The results of their reexamination could be made known at a later date, if need arose.

(b) Final High Level Approach to Soviet Government.

All possibility of misunderstanding as to terms or definitions or of the bases on which the delegates are negotiating should be eliminated before the ultimate breakdown be allowed to occur. The proposed review by the Special Consultants group should help to accomplish this check in so far as this country is concerned. However, we have no grounds for certainty that Stalin himself has any detailed understanding of the negotiations so far, or that he grasps the implications of continued failure to reach agreement. The record shows that, purposely or accidentally, Stalin’s few utterances on the subject have not been consistent with Gromyko’s or Molotov’s stand of the moment.

If the recommendations contained in this paper are adopted it will presumably be some time before there will be any complete break of the negotiations in the Commission. It would therefore be premature to make final plans now as to what we should do just before the final break. This would have to be judged in the light of circumstances.

It should be tentatively recognized as desirable, however, that before negotiations die out entirely a qualified public figure representing this Government should proceed to Moscow and talk with Stalin on this subject, in order to make sure that the latter fully understands our position and to ascertain whether there is any last possibility of a change in the Soviet attitude. It is absolutely essential that whoever is chosen to confront Stalin have an intimate knowledge of the subject, as well as of the wider issues of US–USSR relations. He must be able to speak with assurance on these matters, and to state his case strongly and bluntly enough to prevent Stalin from taking the usual refuge in dialectical generalities.

1. Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State.
2. Director of the Office of Public Affairs.
3. In a memorandum for the record, September 9, Rusk stated that Lovett had indicated that he approved the paper as a planning guide within the Department of State, not as a final position for immediate action (Policy Planning Staff Files).
4. To be supplied. [Footnote in the source text.]