Department of State Disarmament Files
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Special
Political Affairs (Rusk) to the Under Secretary of
State (Lovett)
secret
[Washington,] July 31, 1947.
Subject: Today’s meeting with Mr. Ralph A. Bard.
At the meeting which you have arranged for this afternoon Mr. Bard will
present his interim plan for regulation of armaments on which he desires
Government approval. I am attaching a paper giving the most important facts
bearing on this problem.
As you may recall, Mr. Bard saw the Secretary in June and presented an early
version of this plan.1 The
Bard proposal has not received any official clearance in the State, War, or
Navy Departments although it has been discussed in the Executive Committee
on the Regulation of Armaments. I understand that Mr. Bard talked yesterday
with Admiral Leahy who expressed his belief that the plan had considerable
merit and promised that he would endeaver to obtain JCS clearance.
Also attached for your information is a copy of Mr. Bard’s proposal, RAC D–9/1a.2
[Annex]
i. the problem
To establish a U.S. position in the CCA
in connection with Item 4 of the Plan of Work.3
ii. facts bearing on the problem
- 1.
- Present U.S. policy is not to agree to any plan for the regulation
and reduction of armaments until satisfactory conditions of
international security have been established, for example, the peace
treaties have been signed, Article 43 agreements have been
implemented, and international control of atomic energy has been
agreed to.
- 2.
- The General Assembly Resolution of December 14, 1946, and the
Security Council Resolution, Feb. 13, however, have committed us to
a discussion of regulation and reduction of
armaments without qualification.
- 3.
- The first four items of the CCA
plan of work, accepted by the SC on
July 8, 1947, are as follows:
- (a)
- A consideration of what weapons properly fall within the
jurisdiction of the CCA.
- (b)
- A consideration of basic principles applicable to a
program of regulation.
- (c)
- Development of an effective system of safeguards against
violations of the treaty.
- (d)
- Development of a plan for the regulation and reduction of
armaments.
- 4.
- If the U.S. view should prevail that the above items should be
considered in the order listed there is a good chance that an
impasse would be reached with the Soviet Union before Item 4 comes
up for consideration.
- 5.
- Inasmuch as there is no guarantee that this order will be followed
or that some one will not introduce a plan at any time (the British
and French have already intimated they might introduce one in the
not too distant future), the U.S. Representative faces the following
alternatives:
- (a)
- Presenting no plan and therefore forfeiting a possible
U.S. position of leadership.
- (b)
- Presenting a plan and possibly gaining a position of
leadership for the U.S.
- 6.
- At the present time, the U.S. has no approved plan.
- 7.
- The Deputy U.S. Representative on the CCA, Mr. Bard, has suggested a plan which he believes
would enable the U.S. to assume leadership in the CCA. Its main elements are:
- (a)
- To permit participating states to establish their own
levels on armaments.
- (b)
- To require a periodic reporting of information on such
armaments.
- (c)
- To provide for a system of verification of the
reports.
The plan would contemplate a reduction and more comprehensive regulation
of armaments at a later date.
iii. Discussion
- 8.
- The Bard plan has been criticized because:
- (a)
- It is contrary to the U.S. position outlined in (1) above,
since it would be implemented before “suitable” conditions
of international peace and security had come into
effect.
- (b)
- It would call for information on armaments which present
U.S. policy says must not be given except in connection with
carrying out an “over-all” plan.
- (c)
- The act of providing the general information contemplated
by this plan would morally obligate the U.S. to go further
and supply detailed information on weapons which we possess,
including atomic weapons.
- (d)
- It would place the U.S. in an unfavorable propaganda
position because the Soviets could use the plan to prove
that the U.S., a typical capitalist state, was not prepared
to take any genuine steps toward disarmament.
- (e)
- It would represent no real gain since it would not lead to
the regulation and reduction of armaments and would impair
the strength of the U.S. demand that conditions of peace and
security are a prerequisite to disarmament.
- 9.
- In favor of the Bard plan, it has been said that:
- (a)
- It would give the U.S. a position of leadership in the
CCA.
- (b)
- It might prevent this Government’s having to fight a
rear-guard action against a less acceptable plan put forth
by another Government and acted upon by the CCA in default of a U.S.
plan.
- (c)
- It would not sacrifice any important element of the
present U.S. position or of U.S. security.
- (d)
- It would gain for the U.S. a propaganda advantage.
- (e)
- It might gain for the U.S. valuable information which it
does not currently possess.
- (f)
- It would help to establish the confidence necessary for
more advanced steps in regulating armaments by testing the
willingness of governments to accept a system of inspection
and verification.
- 10.
- In proposing his plan, the U.S. Deputy Representative is not
requesting that he be given the authority to introduce his plan
regardless of circumstances. The plan would not be advanced at a
time when Soviet obstructive tactics would make any further
constructive action of the CCA
impossible. Nor would it be put forward after long debates on other
plans had taken place. It would be presented only at a time which
would gain the maximum advantages for this Government.
iv. conclusions
In the light of the foregoing facts, the present U.S. position should be
re-examined to discover whether it should be modified to permit the U.S.
Deputy Representative’s plan to be introduced into the CCA at an appropriate time in connection
with Item 4 of the Plan of Work.
