Policy Planning Staff Files1
The Under Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas)
Dear Lew: Your cable 3353 of June 19 states precisely what we expect from your conversations with the British in regard to their intention to introduce a new plan for international control of atomic energy into the United Nations discussions. I hope that you personally make clear to Bevin, informally, that our strong reluctance to see any such diversionary proposals presented is tied up with our apprehensions about Russian foreign policy and tactics in UNAEC.
It is difficult, if not impossible, at this stage to synthesize all the impressions of the Russians held by various persons who deal with them or work on the Soviet Union problem in the Department, UN, the War and Navy Departments, and in our Missions abroad, and to peg that composite as an official government estimate of Russian policy. I should think that the British would understand this difficulty.
What I am about to describe is merely the climate of opinion here, more or less reflected in official thinking, as in the so-called “Ridgway” memorandum (SC 210—“Objectives of USSR atomic energy & disarmament policies”, April 7, 19472) which Mr. Joseph Johnson discussed with you in Washington, and of which you have a copy. Although we have not lost hope of achieving an international control regime and intend to continue the effort in the AEC as long as we can, I, personally, and most other observers are much discouraged about [Page 538] present prospects and fear that the Russians’ present line is to filibuster in the United Nations, while at the same time they try:
- a)
- To attract support from anxious minority opinion in other United Nations atomic energy commission countries;
- b)
- To break down existing US–UK arrangements for procurement of raw materials by tactics such as they are pursuing in Belgium;3
- c)
- To infiltrate research and control programs in any or all other countries;
- d)
- To hasten their own development of atomic weapons; and
- e)
- To extend their area of effective political domination, as in Hungary.
The longer the filibuster can be prolonged, the more they can hope to play upon the fears and idealism of that part of the population of interested countries which is desperately anxious to preserve peace and which is receptive to Soviet professions and propaganda.
In the early fall the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission is to make its second report to the Security Council; we had planned and hoped that by that time the essential points of difference between the Soviet Union and the countries supporting the original December 31 proposals would have been isolated, and that it would be clear just what, if any, possibility existed of agreement on these points, so that if negotiations were to fail or to drift into nothingness, it would be clear to the world where the responsibility lay.
Since we have been pursuing that policy it has been difficult to bring the Russians down to brass tacks or to prevent them from taking refuge in discussions of comparatively minor phases of an international convention. It is my own strong feeling that they are not really ready to adopt any international control scheme, either the Baruch proposals, the new British plan, or any other. They have recently given some details as to how they would expect inspection systems to function, but it is clear that they do not intend to abandon their insistence on the destruction of atomic bomb stocks before adoption of an international control convention. I am confident that the United States would never agree to this. Furthermore, the Soviet Union is just as adamant as ever about not accepting international ownership or genuine control of important facilities. Compared to these two major points of disagreement, the questions of the veto and of the mechanics of inspection seem less important.
In view of all the above, I think it would be a grave error for the British to introduce new proposals at this time. It would merely give the Soviet Union a new set of points to discuss, new papers to prepare, and new ammunition for the filibuster.
[Page 539]I should like you, if possible, to convey to Bevin some sense of this climate of opinion here, without giving him the impression that you are presenting a crystallized hard-and-fast policy on Russia. Also, both we and the British must avoid giving the Russians the opportunity of accusing us of bad faith or of selling the UN negotiations short.
It would be very useful to have from the British at the close of your talks a clear indication as to whether they intend to put forward their proposal or to support one on similar lines. They might not be willing to tie their hands now but I think you should ask them anyway for any forecast they are prepared to give of their future course, at least through September.
The conversations have been most helpful and we are very grateful to you and Arneson.
Sincerely yours,