501.BC Atomic/6–2247: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State
3414. 1. Ambassador, Gallman and I1 met Friday2 with Makins, Rickett, Miles and representatives from Prime Minister’s office, Ministries of Supply and of Defense. At outset Ambassador stressed broader implications of relations among Big Five. Failure of US, UK along with majority of other countries represented in UNAEC to present a united front against Soviet intransigence would have most far-reaching repercussions. US was anxious to secure agreement but not at price of jeopardized effective control.
2. Makins agreed on need for united front and said this was objective of present conversations. They, too, wanted an intrinsically good plan. There were three main aspects of problem before us: (1) Broad political factors; (2) tactics and timing in UNAEC; (3) functions and powers of agency. Suggested discussion be confined for moment to (3). Previous talks had shown wide measure of agreement in general but following points of disagreement:
- (a)
- Status of UN working papers. UK considered no commitment involved. US considered papers expression of firm US views.
- (b)
- Security objective. UK wanted security but stressed minimum to increase possibility of agreement. Admittedly wide latitude in year-end report3 to strengthen controls or relax them. US moving in direction of stronger controls. UK wanted about the same as provided in year-end report.
- (c)
- Powers of control. US required ownership or at least all powers normally subsumed under that term. UK not yet convinced of necessity for ownership which raised serious problems of workability because (1) heavy burdens of decision on agency concerning allocation of materials, location of plants, distribution of nuclear fuel; (2) harder for countries to accept; (3) no solution to problem of undeclared plants. Makins stressed that UK views were being crystallized but not yet formalized.
3. Discussion covered much the same ground of previous meetings. Some new points raised:
- a.
- Question of proportionate depletion of mines. British thought this quite complicated especially in view of by-product mining. Seemed impressed with point we made on need to give agency power to require production to prevent a country securing advantage over long term by depletion of other sources.
- b.
- Additional advantage to security under ownership. British hold system should (1) make it possible to know all that was going on (2) provide unmistakable evidence when rules are broken and (3) give no nation a predominating position in event of breakdown of the treaty. A thorough-going system of inspection plus management would, in their view, make it possible to achieve objectives (1) and (2) above. Ownership would give no additional guarantees. We stressed that powers stemming from ownership would reduce dangers of diversion and clandestine operations. Under inspection violations might easily occur without clear assurance that agency could prove them as for example various seemingly innocent interferences with agency functions. Under ownership scheme nation would be forced to seize agency materials or facilities, in order to gain advantage. Such action would be clear and unambiguous danger signal, which would surely arouse other nations to action. British, especially representative of Prime Minister’s office, seemed impressed with this point. Ambassador stressed that ownership would greatly reduce frictions and make more certain and continuous the application of strict control. Makins thought that the actual difference between a system of ownership and a system of inspection and management would not in practice be very great.
- c.
- Managerial control. British thought that managerial control by agency of dangerous plants would give adequate powers of decision on security grounds. Pressed to define what they meant by managerial control, their answer was ambiguous.
- d.
- Power plants. We stated that it was in no way our intention that any highly industrialized country with bona fide needs for atomic power should be denied reactors provided (1) security requirements were met, [(2)] clear economic justification existed and (3) nation concerned bore equitable share of cost.
- e.
- Time scale. UK feels that basic principles on stockpiling and distribution of nuclear fuel contained in working papers based on assumption of long period before atomic power feasible. We stated that criteria (indicated above) on which nation’s request for power reactors would he judged should be applied whatever the time scale might prove to be. They finally seemed to agree on this point.
4. Further discussion concerned with nature of controls required at each stage from mine to final product. General result was clarification in British minds as to provisions of working papers.
5. British expressed fear that agents under ownership would be empowered to dictate precise location of plants within a country. We stated that while no final position had been reached on whole subject of strategic balance it was not our intention that the agency should be concerned with specific location of plants within a given country except in cases of obvious misplacement in relation to proper use. In any event, it seemed to us that solution lay not in reducing powers of agency on question of strategic balance but in spelling out general principles on this matter in the treaty itself.
6. At close of discussion Makins stated that he thought they were now quite clear as to the US position and they wanted time for consultation [Page 531] among themselves and reference of matter to their respective Ministers. Next phase of discussions might move on to broader policy questions and question of tactics in UNAEC.
Dept please repeat to New York for Osborn from Arneson.