501.BC Atomic/6–1147: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in tJie United Kingdom
top secret
Washington, June 17,
1947—9 p.m.
2603. For Chargé d’Affaires eyes only from the Secretary. Reurtel 3183, June ll.1
- 1.
- Bevin’s reference to Hyde Park and Quebec agreements2 and to technical assistance available to him in London seemed to indicate intention to link question of British request for supply of information for use in developing atomic energy plants with question of independent British line in UNAEC as discussed in my 2486.3 However, British Embassy now volunteers information that Foreign Office officials discussed with Bevin his conversation with you and that, as a result, the British do not plan to try to tie the two questions together.
- 2.
- Dept strongly of opinion that they are separate and distinct problems and hopes that discussion of British request for information can be avoided. Your conversations should bear on international control proposals but we do not wish to conduct definitive negotiations in London on either the proposed new British UN plan or British request for information. Our thought is that your talks would be exploratory and chiefly directed, until further instructions are received, toward gathering information about British plan and explaining to British why they should not put it forward in light of considerations in my telegram in reference and New York background which Arneson can supply.
- 3.
- For your own strictly confidential information, and with reference British request for industrial atomic energy information, Dept is at present engaged with US Atomic Energy Commission in studying whether provisions of McMahon Act will allow us, in view of primary objective which is to assure common defense and security, to use information as a counter in dealings necessary to assure adequate supply raw materials for development atomic energy in this country. We are trying establish whether this proposition, which applies not only to our relations with UK, is correct and, if so, what our course should be. In any case we shall try to hasten decision.
- 4.
- Also for your own strictly confidential information, it is possible, [Page 518] but not likely, that we may come to some conclusion before UNAE Commission presents its report to Security Council in late summer or early autumn. We still hold strongly to view that original Dec 31 proposals present best scheme for international control and that abandonment of concept of full international control in favor of less complete control means endangering world security, rather than merely settling for something less than hypothetical “total” security of the earlier proposals.
- 5.
- If therefore Bevin in his further talks with you tries to condition UK support of our UN position upon our supplying information to them, or if he should press you for action on their request, you should tell him that we do not see how one relates to the other; that you are not in position to go into latter question extensively. We are trying as best we can to find solution to problem posed by McMahon Act and will investigate every possibility of extending basis of cooperation with Brit within provisions of law. Some time may yet elapse before we can come to conclusion since we are still in stage of basic studies within some of the Executive Departments. Some progress toward solution has been made by getting over one of the collateral obstacles in the way. Action on Brit request seemed to us necessarily to involve disclosure to the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy of wartime agreements, such as Quebec and Hyde Park arrangements. As Brit are aware, on May 12, 1947, I told Congressional Committee about these arrangements in strictest secrecy. There appear to have been no leaks and no complications. I believe our future handling of this problem has been facilitated by this session.
- 6.
- If Bevin renews his comment about a US proposal which might have effect of denying to his government use of atomic energy for industrial purposes, you may say that we do not understand this reference since we know of no such proposal. It is true that we believe that all important atomic facilities should be closely controlled by an international authority but this we conceived to be in interest of world security and not solely in US interest and most certainly not US policy aimed at Brit. When such an authority is set up, US and UK would be in same position in respect to whatever abatement of sovereignty an international authority would involve. We had thought UK in agreement with this position, when it supported Dec 31 report of UNAEC to Security Council.
- 7.
- Perhaps Bevin believes McMahon Act would prevent our turning over to an International Atomic Authority information it needs to develop plants in areas where they do not now exist. You may assure him that we do not see any obstacle there; in fact setting up of authority would presumably constitute kind of safeguard which the Act contemplates as existing before exchange of information on use of [Page 519] atomic energy for industrial purposes is permitted. In sum, we do not see how Brit position with respect development atomic energy for industrial purposes would be affected one way or another by proposed modification Dec 31 UNAEC proposals.
Re last paragraph your 3183, Dept presently sees no necessity Amb to forego planned short visit with General Clay but if at any time you and Arneson believe his immediate return necessary, Dept would concur in your decision.
Marshall