Department of State Atomic Energy Files
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. R. Gordon Arneson
At 11 a.m. I saw Mr. Gallman,1 who is acting in the Ambassador’s absence. Mr. Landreth Harrison, Embassy First Secretary, joined us about 11:30.
Mr. Gallman reported briefly on the talk that the Ambassador and he had had with Mr. Bevin last week. Mr. Bevin complained that the British were not being given the assistance due them under existing executive agreements. It was pointed out that domestic U.S. legislation precluded the continuation of war-time arrangements.
I suggested to Mr. Gallman that I would endeavor in talking with the British to point out at the earliest opportunity that my mission is concerned only with a special sector of the entire problem, namely, current negotiations in the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission. He agreed that it should be made perfectly clear to the British that we are not concerned at this time with any other arrangements that might have to be made in the event of a breakdown in the negotiations. I went on to say that should it prove necessary some time after September to make less-than-universal arrangements, negotiations would have to be taken up by a quite different group, not drawn from the present U.S. delegation to the U.N.A.E.C. Mr. Gallman agreed.
When Mr. Harrison joined us, he gave me a general briefing on the current situation here. He stated that two general theories have had currency in official circles. The first is that the U.K. should attempt to put in an alternate plan which would serve to mediate between the Soviet and American positions. The second contemplates the establishment of an international system of control ex-U.S.S.R. This latter plan would presumably have the U.S., the U.K., France, the Dominions, and probably Belgium as a nucleus. The way would be left open for the U.S.S.R. to join later, if she were so persuaded.
Of these two proposals, the second seems to be gaining ground. My own personal opinion is that British thinking on specific proposals [Page 510] such as those indicated in the summary we have of their current effort, is conditioned by this less-than-universal concept. It is difficult to see how they could seriously propose the kind of plan they are thinking about if it is intended to include the Soviet Union.
Mr. Harrison pointed out that there is a considerable difference of opinion among various groups of scientists, government officials, and industrialists on the question of what sort of international control should be arrived at. Decisions on policy are evidently made at the highest levels, with pressure being brought to bear from all quarters: Parliament, business, scientific groups, and the various Ministries.
As to the prospects of atomic power, it was Mr. Harrison’s opinion that the scentists, in general, are not very optimistic as to the immediate prospects. Many persons in the government, however, and particularly those concerned with the economic affairs of the country seem to be persuaded on the basis of wishful thinking that atomic power is just around the corner and may be looked to as a means of economic salvation.
The general public does not appear to be very well informed on the issues involved, but there is much discussion in official quarters.
While I was with him, Mr. Gallman called Roger Makins2 of the Foreign Office, to arrange an appointment. I am to see him at 5 p.m., accompanied by either Mr. Gallman or Mr. Harrison. I know Roger Makins quite well, having had some dealings with him when I was in Secretary Stimson’s office. He should be quite reasonable to deal with.