501.BC Atomic/6–1347
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs (Johnson)
Mr. Osborn called to pose two questions which are now in the minds of himself and his colleagues regarding the report which the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission is to submit in the Fall, and which he would like to have interested persons in Washington thinking about.
1. What form should the second report of the AEC take?
This question arises as a result of the present efforts of the Soviet Union to have the proposals recently put forward by Mr. Gromyko in the Commission1 referred to Committee 2. Mr. Osborn says that the Soviet Union is endeavoring to have this referral made for the purpose of mixing these proposals with the papers now being developed by Committee 2. (This appears to be consistent with Gromyko’s statement reported in today’s New York Times to the effect that there is a possibility of agreement on the basis of the divergent Soviet and United States proposals.) The United States view, shared by a number of others including particularly the French and Canadians, is that if the Soviet proposals are submitted to Committee 2, there will be real danger of confusion and of possible compromising attitudes on the part of certain delegations.
Mr. Osborn indicated that he personally sees certain advantage in the Atomic Energy Commission submitting two proposals in its next report,—that being developed in Committee 2 along the lines of the First Report of the Commission, and one based upon the Soviet proposals. While he did not say so specifically, I gathered that his expectation was that the submission of two plans might result from keeping consideration of the recent Soviet proposal and of the development of the First Report separate. Specifically, therefore, Mr. Osborn’s question is whether it would be wise to consider making a report which would include the submission of two plans.
2. Would it be advisable for the United States to consider permitting a report to go forward containing some proposals on which we have reservations?
Mr. Osborn explained that it might be possible by “politicking,” negotiation and heavy pressure to get the same kind of agreement on a plan acceptable to us as was obtained last December. On the other hand, it is conceivable that we might accede to the watering down of the plan on certain points, with the United States entering a reservation on all points that we considered important.
[Page 508]Mr. Osborn pointed out that certain countries will definitely make reservations on specific points. Brazil, for example, will undoubtedly continue to make a reservation with respect to international control of her monozite sand deposits. Australia also will probably insist that ownership and management of refineries and concentration plants by the international control agency should be permissive rather than mandatory. (On this last point Mr. Osborn commented that he finds it difficult to fight too hard on this point, provided it is definitely clear that the agency may in its discretion own such plants.)
Mr. Osborn commented that Mr. Baruch would undoubtedly disapprove any open willingness on the part of the United States to permit a plan to go forward on which we have reservations. Mr. Osborn’s own preliminary thought, however, is that since all our reservations would be in favor of stronger security provisions than the actual draft, it might not be too dangerous to consider this tactic.
When Mr. Osborn indicated that he was merely telephoning in advance of a letter, I suggested that, rather than send a letter to me, he prepare a formal dispatch to the Secretary of State (either telegraphic or by courier) raising the questions. He gave me the impression that he would do so, but made it clear that his formal message would only raise the questions and would not indicate his preliminary attitude on them as outlined above.
In further discussion Mr. Osborn indicated that he thinks it will be possible to defeat the Soviet effort to have their recent proposals referred to Committee 2.
- For the text of the proposals, see Gromyko’s speech at the 12th Meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission, June 11, AEC, 2nd yr., Plenary, pp. 20–24.↩