Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, General; The United Nations, Volume I

SWNCC Files

Report by the “Ad Hoc” Committee To Effect Collaboration on Security Functions of the United Nations to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee¹

confidential
SWNCC 219/17

Washington, June 10, 1947.

Draft Final Report of the Military Staff Committee on the General Principles Governing the Organization of the Armed Forces Made Available to the Security Council of the United Nations by Member Nations²

1. The Ad Hoc Committee to Effect Collaboration Between the State, War and Navy Departments, on Security Functions of the United Nations has completed its examination of the final report made by the Military Staff Committee to the Security Council on the above subject. Special attention was given by the committee to those matters in the report on which unanimity was not reached in the Military Staff Committee and to the reasoning submitted by the United States Delegation in support of its position with respect to these matters.

2. As a result of its study, the Committee is of the opinion that the position taken by the United States Representatives in the Military Staff Committee in each instance was correct and was consistent with the attainment of the objective stated in Appendix “A” to this report. The Committee is further of the opinion that the positions taken by the United States Representatives in the Military Staff Committee with respect to the major matters on which agreement was not reached were consistent with the principles stated in Appendix “A” to this report.

3. Approval of Appendix “A” is recommended.

Appendix “A”

United States Position With Reference to Those Major Matters Pertaining to Implementation of Article 43 of the United Nations Charter on Which Unanimity Was Not Reached in the Military Staff Committee

Attainment of the objective stated below and adherence to the principles stated below are reaffirmed as United States policy:

Objective:

The early conclusion of special agreements conforming to the provisions of Articles 43 and 45 of the United Nations Charter which will make available to the Security Council on its call armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including bases, rights of passage, and the immediately available air force contingents referred to in Article 45, adequate with regard to strength, amount, composition, training, equipment, readiness, location, and in all other respects, to fulfill any need which might arise by reason of the Council’s functions under the Charter with reference to the maintenance of international peace and security.

Principles:

a. That the Representatives of the United States shall refrain from agreeing to the principle of equality (identical contributions) which has been advocated by the Soviet Representatives with respect to the armed forces to be made available to the Security Council by the five permanent members but shall insist that the contributions of the permanent members, as well as those of the other members of the United Nations, shall be made in accordance with each Nation’s capabilities and the needs of the Security Council. (Article 11 of the Military Staff Committee Report.)

b. That the Representatives of the United States shall maintain the principle that no Member be asked to increase its armed forces or to create components for the specific purpose of making its contributions (Article 13 of the Military Staff Committee Report).

c. That the Representatives of the United States shall insist that the degree of readiness of national air force contingents should be maintained at a level which will enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures in accordance with the provisions of Article 45 of the Charter (Article 25 of the Military Staff Committee Report).

d. That the Representatives of the United States shall refrain from assenting to the use of the term “national emergencies” as a case in which member nations will have the right to make use of armed forces which they have made available to the Security Council (Article 17 of the Military Staff Committee Report).

e. That the Representatives of the United States shall refrain from agreeing to the establishment of any predetermined time limit for the withdrawal of United Nations armed forces which have completed their tasks or to limitations to territorial waters or areas within which these forces must be located when not employed by the Security Council or to which they must be withdrawn after employment which would bar them from any area to which they have legal right of access (Articles 20, 21 and 32 of the Military Staff Committee Report).

f. That the Representatives of the United States shall insist that bases be included in the definition of assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, which member nations may obligate themselves to make available to the Security Council on its call and in accordance with specific agreements (Article 26 of the Military Staff Committee Report).

g. That the Representatives of the United States shall refrain from assenting to any provision which states or implies that “commanders-in-chief” of land, sea or air forces acting under the supreme commander or commanders of armed forces made available to the Security Council may be appointed only by the Council (Article 41 of the Military Staff Committee Report).

Appendix “B”

1. The Military Staff Committe report was submitted in response to a request by the Security Council for submission not later than April 30, 1947, of recommendations as to the basic principles which should govern the organization of the United Nations Armed Force. This was to be done as a first step in complying with the request contained in the resolution adopted on February 13, 1947, to the effect that the Military Staff Committee submit to the Council, “as soon as possible and as a matter of urgency,” its recommendations based on an examination from the military point of view of the provisions in Article 43 of the Charter, which the Council had previously requested the Committee to undertake. The purpose of the requests was to provide the Council with advice and assistance which it would need in the discharge of its obligation under Article 43 of the Charter to take the initiative in negotiating “as soon as possible” the special agreements mentioned in that Article by which Members of the United Nations would undertake to make available to the Council on its call armed forces, assistance, and facilities necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

2. The tabulation which follows shows the nations whose representatives dissented from the majority version of each “article” of the Military Staff Committee report on which unanimity was not achieved (the article numbers in the tabulation refer to articles in the Military Staff Committee report, not to articles of the United Nations Charter). As shown by the tabulation, the Committee was unable to achieve unanimity in the wording of 16 of the 41 articles of the report. A majority of the nations represented was, however, able to reach agreement on the wording of every article. The United States was in every instance included in that majority. The U.S.S.R. was on the minority side in 14 of the 16 instances in which unanimity was not achieved. In 13 of those 14 instances the U.S.S.R. did not reach agreement with any other nation, and in 11 of them it was the sole dissenter. France was on the minority side in five instances, and in two of them did not reach agreement with any other nation, but was not in any instance the sole dissenter. China and the United Kingdom were each on the minority side once but not as the sole dissenter.

Dissenters From Majority Version of Each Article of Military Staff Committee Report on General Principles Not Unanimously Agreed To

Article 7 and 8	ussr accepts conditionally provided Soviet version of Article 11 is accepted by other Delegates—condition unacceptable to others. These articles are not discussed further in this report.
Article 11.	ussr would not accept version agreed to by others.
Article 16.	ussr ” ” ” ” ” ” ”
Article 17.	china and France agreed; others insisted upon omission of article.
Article 20.	ussr would not accept version agreed to by others.
Article 21.	ussr ” ” ” any version acceptable to others.
Article 25.	ussr would not accept version agreed to by others.
Article 26.	ussr and France disagreed with each other and would not accept version agreed to by others.
Article 27 and 28	ussr would not accept the version agreed to by others. No further discussion of these articles appears in this report.
Article 31.	ussr would not accept the version agreed to by others. No further discussion of this article appears in this report.
Article 32.	ussr and France disagreed with each other and would not accept version agreed to by others.
Article 33 and 34.	ussr would not accept the version agreed to by others. No further discussion of these articles appears in this report.
Article 41.	uk and. France agreed but would not accept version agreed to by others.

3. In view of the principles advocated by the Soviet Representative for inclusion in this report of the Military Staff Committee, the position which they took in the extended discussions which occurred during the preparation of that report, and other circumstances, the U.S. Representatives in the Military Staff Committee have reached the conclusion, in which the Ad Hoc Committee concurs, that the Soviet objectives in relation to the implementation of Article 43 of the Charter are:

a. To delay to the greatest possible extent the date at which it would be possible for the Security Council actually to organize a United Nations Armed Force.

b. To word as many articles as possible of the principles governing the organization of armed forces made available to the Security Council in such a way as to limit the effectiveness of such a United Nations Armed Force. The “principle of equality” advocated by the Soviet Representatives (see paragraphs 5 and 6 below), the restrictions which they advocate with reference to the immediately available air force contingents referred to in Article 45 of the Charter (see paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 below) and with reference to the location of the forces made available to the Council (see paragraphs 12 and 16 below), and their attitude concerning the availability of bases and rights of passage (see paragraphs 17, 18 and 19 below), appear to be of particular significance in this connection. Acceptance of the Soviet proposals concerning those matters could be expected to have the effects of reducing drastically the range and striking power of the armed forces which the United States could make available to the Council and of increasing greatly the shortest period within which they could be brought to bear at a point distant from the Continental United States. It is probable that the Soviet attitude concerning bases and rights of passage is in addition connected directly with the Soviet unwillingness to permit the penetration into the USSR or the Soviet sphere of domination of the nationals of nations outside that sphere.

c. To gain armament advantages and to reduce present disadvantages of that nature. One way in which the USSR might hope to accomplish this would be first to get the Security Council to agree on a basis for implementing Article 43 of the Charter which would eliminate from the forces which Members might make available to it the kinds of forces in which the United States has an advantage over the USSR, or which might prove particularly useful to the United States in a war with the USSR; then to try to engineer the adoption of a reduction of armaments plan based on the forces made available by each nation to the Security Council.

[The remainder of this document consists of discussion, by groups of related articles, of the instances tabulated above in which the Military Staff Committee failed to reach unanimity.]

1. This document, a report by the Ad Hoc Committee dated June 6, 1947, was circulated in the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee on June 10 as SWNCC 219/17 and approved by SWNCC on June 27. For information regarding the organization and functions of SWNCC, see Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. i, footnote 3, p. 1112. Regarding the Ad Hoc Committee, the principal SWNCC subcommittee charged with consideration of matters relating to the regulation of armaments and collective security at the United Nations, see Ibid., footnote 73, p. 754.
2. SC, 2nd yr., Special Suppl No. 1.