Office of the Historian

501.BC Atomic/6–1047

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs (Johnson)

secret
[Washington,] June 10, 1947—2:45 p.m.

Having been informed by Mr. Volpe1 of the U.S.AEC this morning that Sir George Thomson of the United Kingdom Delegation to the U.N.A.E.C. had indicated to Dr. Bacher last week that the British did not approve of the positive operational and developmental functions for the Atomic Development Authority which the United States favored, and that a new plan was under consideration in London, I called Mr. Osborn to inquire whether the Department could help by sending a cable to the London Embassy on this subject. At the same time Mr. Osborn put in a call to me on the same subject.

Mr. Osborn informed me that Sir George Thomson, who recently arrived to replace Sir Charles Darwin as the United Kingdom Delegation scientist, had immediately, and without reading the four Committee 2 papers relating to functions, begun to attack the whole United States concept of ownership, operation and management by international agency. Thomson also in a Committee 2 meeting at Lake Success openly attacked the United States position.

On Monday, June 9, Senator Austin and Mr. Osborn, much concerned about this development, called on Sir Alexander Cadogan. Cadogan rather lukewarmly indicated his personal approval of an agency with ownership and operational functions but remarked, to Mr. Osborn’s great and understandable alarm, that it might be necessary in the long run to agree to a system involving solely inspection, in order to obtain Soviet concurrence. Mr. Osborn endeavored to explain in most vigorous terms to Cadogan, whom he described as not [Page 490] really understanding the issues involved, the absolute unacceptability and great dangers of any plan relying solely on inspection.

Cadogan informed Senator Austin and Mr. Osborn that Sir George Thomson had, before coming to this country, prepared a plan embodying his own views (elimination of operational and developmental functions and reliance upon inspection) which is now before Mr. Bevin for approval. Cadogan said the plan could not be made available to the United States until approved.

Senator Austin and Mr. Osborn were so alarmed at this development that they discussed with Cadogan whether it might not be desirable to send Mr. Arneson,2 USUN, to London to brief Ambassador Douglas3 in connection with a direct démarche by the latter at the foreign office.

I told Mr. Osborn I was calling him precisely to get his views on what the Department might do to help him to find out more about the Thomson plan and, if possible, forestall its approval. I said we had merely thought of a telegram to London but not of sending anyone there.

Mr. Osborn suggested that Mr. Acheson might as a first step call in the British Ambassador and through him request that approval of this plan by the Foreign Office be withheld pending a presentation of United States views. Mr. Osborn desired to telephone Mr. Acheson on this subject. I undertook to try to see Mr. Acheson beforehand to brief him regarding it with the understanding that Mr. Osborn would in any case call about 4:30 this afternoon.4

Joseph E. Johnson
  1. Joseph A. Volpe, Jr., Deputy General Counsel, United States Atomic Energy Commission.↩
  2. R. Gordon Arneson, Staff Member, United States Delegation to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.↩
  3. Lewis Douglas, appointed Ambassador in the United Kingdom March 6, 1947.↩

  4. A letter from Osborn to Senator Austin dated June 10 read as follows:

    “I talked to Mr. Acheson today about our interview with Sir Alexander yesterday. Acheson felt that this was a matter of the very highest importance and that if the British should disturb the work of the Commission at this point, it would have grave consequences in all our relations with the British. He said that he was going to call the British Ambassador at once and ask him to send a message to London, and if that was done, the State Department would keep Lewis Douglas fully informed and offer to send him Arneson.

    It was most helpful of you to come down for the meeting with Sir Alexander. It went all right, but I must admit that I was shocked by Sir Alexander’s saying that we might have to make very serious concessions in the plan ‘so as to bring the Russians in.’”(USUN Files)

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