500. A/1–1747
The Secretary of War (Patterson) and the
Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal) to the Secretary of State
secret
Washington, January 17,
1947.
My Dear Mr. Secretary: We have considered the
paper enclosed with your letter of 8 January 1947 on the position to be
taken by the United States Representative in the Security Council regarding
the Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 14 December 1946, on the
subject of “Principles governing the General Regulation and Reduction of
Armaments.”1
We have also obtained the views of the
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Joint Chiefs of Staff on the same paper, as requested
by you, and forward herewith the statement prepared by them. The War and
Navy Departments are in general agreement with the position indicated in the
paper prepared by the State Department, as well as with the views expressed
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon. It will be apparent that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff have taken into account the recent discussion in the
Security Council which may affect the present position of the United
States.
The War and Navy Departments are aware that it may not be possible to
postpone all general discussion of the regulation of armaments until after
broad agreement has been reached on the international control of atomic
energy. We believe, however, that it is greatly in the interest of United
States security that this be done.
We note that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have suggested that priority should be
given, in any discussion of the regulation of armaments which might be
forced upon the United States, to “discussion of practical and effective
safeguards against the hazards of violations and evasions, to the exclusion
of discussion of other elements of the general problem until this matter has
been settled to the satisfaction of the United States.” We agree that when
the substance of a regulation of armaments program is under discussion,
primary emphasis should be placed by the United States upon practical and
effective safeguards. We believe, however, that two other matters must be
dealt with prior to initiating any substantive discussion of the regulation
of armaments:
-
a.
- The terms of reference for any commission or committee which may
be set up by the Security Council to discuss the regulation of
armaments and armed forces must, presumably, exclude those functions
already allotted by the General Assembly to the Atomic Energy
Commission. One of these functions is to make specific proposals
“for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and
all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.” There has
thus far been no definition, except in the case of atomic weapons,
of weapons adaptable to mass destruction, nor has there been any
agreement as to which agency or agencies are responsible for
reaching such a definition. It would seem clear that the Atomic
Energy Commission itself should be asked for its views on what these
other major weapons are, not only because of its terms of reference
but also because its experience in dealing with atomic energy makes
it peculiarly aware of the great technical problems involved in
dealing with other such weapons. But the Atomic Energy Commission
still faces an enormous task before the international control of
atomic energy has been achieved, a task which takes priority over
the consideration of other major weapons.
-
b.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff have pointed out that a system for the
regulation of armaments can hardly be established prior to, or
independently of, the solution of other problems affecting the peace
and security of the United States. Such problems are the conclusion
of the
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peace treaties, the
termination of the occupation of ex-enemy countries, the
determination of measures which will be required to prevent German
or Japanese aggression in the future, and the allocation of forces
to the Security Council under the United Nations Charter. We note,
for example, the special responsibilities which the five principal
powers now have under Article 106 of the Charter to act for the
United Nations to maintain the peace, pending the establishment of
the security system envisaged in Articles 42 and 43 of the
Charter.
The War and Navy Departments believe that the proposed United States position
presents a logical and practical approach and one which is most likely to
bring about the most satisfactory establishment of a system for the
regulation of armaments and armed forces with due regard for the continuing
maintenance of international peace.
Sincerely yours,
Forrestal
Secretary of the Navy
Robert P. Patterson
Secretary of War
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to the Secretary of War (Patterson) and the Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal)2
Washington, 15 January
1947.
Subject: Basis for United States Policy on the
Principles Governing the General Regulation and Reduction of
Armaments
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered from the military security
point of view the paper prepared in the Department of State to form the
basis for the position to be taken by the U.S. Representative in the
Security Council of the United Nations during the consideration in that
body of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 14 December
1946 concerning the principles governing the general regulation and
reduction of armaments and are in general agreement with the contents
thereof.
If the United States is forced to accept early establishment of a special
commission to discuss general regulation and reduction of armaments
concurrently with discussion of the problems of international control of
atomic energy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned lest resultant
discussions, considerations and pressure for early commitments result in
premature agreements for disarmament to the detriment of United States
security and world position. They feel from the military security point
of view, that if the United States is forced to accept a resolution
calling for the discussion of other phases
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of the regulation and reduction of armaments
concurrently with discussion of the problems concerning the
international control of atomic energy, the United States, conforming to
its stated position that first things must be considered first, should
insist that priority be given to discussion of practical and effective
safeguards against the hazards of violations and evasions, to the
exclusion of discussion of other elements of the general problem until
this matter has been settled to the satisfaction of the United
States.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that if a special commission is set up to
discuss general regulation of armaments concurrently with continued
discussion of the problem of international control of atomic energy, its
terms of reference should ensure that it can not encroach on the field
previously allotted to the Atomic Energy Commission. (Paragraph 5(c) General Assembly Resolution of 24 January
1946). They further consider that the Military Staff Committee should
act as the military advisers to any special commission which may be set
up for this purpose.
If a proposal is made to establish a separate military body to furnish
military advice for a special disarmament commission, the proposal
should be resisted on the following grounds:
-
a.
- The Military Staff Committee, by terms of the Charter of the
United Nations, is given special responsibilities with reference
to the establishment of a system for the regulation of
armaments, and
-
b.
- The Military Staff Committee is empowered by Article 47(2) of
the Charter to invite military representatives of other member
nations to be associated with it when necessary.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff emphasize their view that decisions acceptable
to the United States regarding international control of atomic energy
must precede decisions regarding those other weapons adaptable now or in
the future to mass destruction, and that decisions acceptable to the
United States for control of such other weapons must precede decisions
regarding control of conventional weapons and the general reduction of
armaments and armed forces.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that armaments are a consequence and
not a cause. The need for them, today as throughout history, arises from
the existence of conflicting international aims and ideologies and will
pass only with the passing of such fundamental reasons for conflict
between nations. Consequently the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not consider
that commitments towards the regulation of armaments or disarmament
should be made prior to, or independently of, the solution of other
problems affecting world peace generally and, specifically, the security
of the United States.
They believe that present U.S. armaments are a vital factor contributing
to our own as well as to international peace and security
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and that reduction of these
armaments should not be considered independently of other problems
affecting that peace and security. Prior to the settling of such
problems the military requirements of the United States can not be
determined. Foremost among these problems, from the military point of
view, are the establishment of a system of effective international
control of atomic energy which is acceptable to the United States; the
conclusion of the peace treaties and enforcement of the terms therein
having predominate military implications; and the conclusion of
agreements for providing contingents of armed forces for the Security
Council of the United Nations.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel it is premature and dangerous to the
future security of the United States to go beyond the discussion stages
concerning the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed
forces—other than the problem of international control of atomic
energy—until these other problems have been settled to the satisfaction
of the United States.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
William D. Leahy
Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy, Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
