500.A/1–847

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of War ( Patterson )

secret

My Dear Mr. Secretary: I enclose herewith copies of a paper prepared in the Department of State designed to form the basis for the position to be taken by the United States Representative in the Security Council of the United Nations during the forthcoming consideration in that body of the Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on December 14, 1946, concerning the “Principles governing the General Regulation and Reduction of Armaments.”

Officers of this Department have consulted informally with officials of the War and Navy Departments in the course of preparing this paper.

As consideration of this subject is expected to take place in the Security Council in the immediate future, this is a matter of great urgency. I should, therefore, appreciate it deeply if you and the Secretary of the Navy, to whom I am today sending a similar letter,1 could, after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, let me have your views on the enclosed paper as soon as possible.

It will not be necessary to have comments at the same time on the parenthetical paragraphs under points (3) and (5) of the enclosure, relating to the need for agreement upon necessary intra-governmental organizations and procedures. As these are, nevertheless, matters which [Page 342] require early action, I have asked the State Department member of the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee to consult with his colleagues from the War and Navy Departments with a view to making appropriate recommendations as a matter of urgency.

Sincerely yours,

James F. Byrnes
[Enclosure]

The Basis for United States Policy in the Security Council During the Forthcoming Consideration of the General Assembly Resolution of December 14 on the “Principles Governing the General Regulation and Reduction of Armaments

It is recommended that the following points form the basis for the position to be taken by the United States Representative on the Security Council in connection with the forthcoming consideration of the General Assembly Resolution of December 142 on this subject.

1.
In the implementation of the General Assembly Resolution of December 14 on general regulation and reduction of armaments, the Security Council should give consideration first, and as soon as practicable, to the problem of the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to insure its use for peaceful purposes only. The Council should make the Atomic Energy Commission’s report the basis of its consideration.
2.
When the Security Council has completed to the satisfaction of the United States its forthcoming consideration of atomic energy control, the Atomic Energy Commission should be instructed to proceed with the drafting of a convention to implement the plans.
In the event that the Security Council is unable to complete satisfactorily its forthcoming consideration of the report of the Atomic Energy Commission, the United States will have to reconsider its general position on the regulation of armaments.
3.
Not until after its completion of the consideration referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above should the Security Council take up the second priority problem, that of the international control of other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction. In the consideration of this problem primary emphasis should be placed on the provision of adequate safeguards to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions. This should also be dealt with by the Atomic Energy Commission in accordance with its terms of reference (Paragraph 5(c), General Assembly Resolution of January 24, 19463).
Decision by the Security Council as to the exact time when the Atomic Energy Commission should take up this subject should be made after the forthcoming consideration of the control of atomic energy has been completed in the Security Council.
(Intragovernmental organization and procedures should be immediately agreed upon for formulation of the United States position on international control of these other weapons of mass destruction.)
4.
No additional United Nations machinery is necessary at the present time to deal with the regulation of armaments.
5.
As regards armaments other than those adaptable to mass destruction—the “minor weapons” of paragraph 4 of the General Assembly Resolution—the formulation of plans for the regulation of such armaments and of armed forces should not be taken up by the Security Council until a later date. The United States position is that the prospects for success by the United Nations in their great undertaking of a general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces will be enhanced if success is first attained in working out controls for the major weapons. Indeed no general international regulation of armaments and armed forces as a whole could be effective without such controls. Were the Security Council to itself discuss, or establish any agencies for the discussion of the details and complexities involved in attempting to regulate conventional weapons and armed forces, progress with respect to the major weapons might well be retarded. Consequently the United States will not itself advance proposals relating to the regulation of conventional weapons and armed forces at this time or in the immediate future, except possibly as its proposals relating to major weapons may as a necessary incident include other weapons. The United States should discourage other members of the Security Council from advancing proposals regarding conventional weapons and armed forces. In the event that other Security Council members should nonetheless advance proposals which are not confined to major weapons the United States will determine its position with respect to the advisability of Security Council consideration of any such proposals on the basis of its decision as to whether such consideration is likely to promote international security and particularly United States security and whether it will in fact facilitate or obstruct the working out of a satisfactory system for the overall regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. No commitment should be undertaken by representatives of the United States to agree to discussion by the Security Council of any proposal relating to the regulation of conventional weapons and armed forces unless a specific decision is made by the Government of the United States with respect thereto.
Intragovernmental organization and procedures should be immediately agreed upon for a detailed formulation of the United States [Page 344] position on the regulation and reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces. This information should include the preparation on a tentative basis of specific proposals which may be introduced in the Security Council when it is decided that presentation of them will be timely. These proposals should emphasize the provision of adequate safeguards. Among the factors to be considered in determining the timing of their introduction are: (1) the progress made in the international control of atomic energy and of other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, in accordance with paragraphs 1–3 above; (2) progress achieved in the settlement of issues arising out of the Second World War; and (3) progress in the negotiation of the special agreements for the provision of armed forces in accordance with Article 43 of the Charter.)
6.
As regards the negotiation of special agreements pursuant to Article 43 of the Charter (referred to in paragraph 7 of the General Assembly Resolution), the Military Staff Committee is already working on Article 43 from the military point of view. The early conclusion of those agreements is desirable to carry out Charter commitments and is called for by the General Assembly Resolution. Early consideration should therefore be given to methods whereby the conclusion of these agreements may be accelerated.
7.
Another recommendation made by the General Assembly in paragraph 7 of its Resolution concerns withdrawal of armed forces of members of the United Nations from ex-enemy territories. This is directed, not to the Security Council, but to individual Members of the United Nations. The United States has already proposed that this matter be dealt with by the Council of Foreign Ministers and it should be followed up there, not in the Security Council.
8.
If the question of the withdrawal of troops from territories of other Members is raised, the United States will determine its position in the light of the particular proposals made. So far as United States troops are concerned, we have made it plain that, as the Secretary pointed out on December 13 to the General Assembly, our troops, except in ex-enemy countries, are stationed abroad with the consent of the states concerned and in no sense constitute a threat to the internal or external peace of any country.
9.
Information on the armed forces of Members of the United Nations is not necessary to give effect to the General Assembly’s Resolution on general regulation and reduction of armaments. Accordingly, if this question is again raised in the Security Council, the United States should take the position that any request for such information should not be based on the General Assembly’s Resolution on this subject. If the question should be raised independently, however, and, not in connection with implementation of the Resolution on general [Page 345] regulation and reduction of armaments, the United States should not oppose the Council’s making such a request. The United States is prepared to support a request by the Council asking for troops at home as well as troops abroad. It will not oppose the adoption of such a request even if it excludes home forces.
10.
Information on arms and armaments, as distinct from that on armed forces, should be neither requested nor supplied at the present time, but only in response to the requirements of the overall program for the regulation and reduction of armaments as developed in international arrangements according to the sequence set out in paragraphs 1–5 above.
  1. Identical, mutatis mutandis (500.A/1–847).
  2. Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. i, p. 1099.
  3. GA (I/1), Resolutions, p. 9.