890.0146/3–1947

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison)

secret
Participants: Mr. Alfred Stirling, Minister, Australian Embassy
Mr. John M. Allison, Acting Chief of NA
Mr. Arthur Richards, Assistant Chief, British Commonwealth Division

As a result of discussion among DA, EUR and FE, it was decided to request Mr. Stirling of the Australian Embassy to come in and discuss the whole question of the Australian attitude toward the U.S. Draft Trusteeship Agreement for the Japanese Mandated Islands.1 Mr. Stirling came in at 4:30 this afternoon. He stated that he was not entirely familiar with the problem but did have a general knowledge of the question.

It was explained to Mr. Stirling that Australia’s insistence on her proposed amendment to the effect that the agreement would not enter into force until the date on which the interim or final peace treaty became binding on Japan was a real source of concern to the Department. Reference was made to the statement of the Australian representative on the Security Council that the sole purpose of this amendment was the support of the principle that belligerents against [Page 271] Japan were entitled to participate in the peace settlement and that the disposition of these islands was part of such a settlement. It was emphasized that in view of the fact that representatives of all members of the Far Eastern Commission had been invited to the Council table it would seem that at least all the active belligerents against Japan were taking part in the proceedings.

Mr. Stirling was told it did not therefore seem to the Department that any legitimately interested parties were being ignored and that it was felt an outsider listening to the Australian statement might very well come to the conclusion that Australia had some ulterior reason for wishing to delay consideration of the agreement. In view of official Australian statements that it did not have any objection to the U.S. occupying the Mandated Islands as administering power, the Department naturally had no doubts itself of the Australian position but wanted to point out how the present Australian action might be misconstrued by unfriendly persons. It was further emphasized that the Department had no desire or intention of bypassing any of the powers properly concerned in the final settlement with Japan. Reference was made to previous confidential assurances that the U.S. Government would support the full and equal participation of Australia in any consideration of a peace treaty with Japan and this assurance was reiterated.

Mr. Stirling was told that it was evident from expressions of opinion at the Security Council Meeting on March 17 that if a vote were to be taken the Australian proposal would be defeated but that the Department hoped it would not be necessary to press the matter that far. The hope was expressed that the Australian Government might see fit to reconsider its action and might desire to instruct its representative on the Security Council not to press for adoption of the proposed amendment or even to withdraw it.

Mr. Stirling was informed that the Department was distressed that in this matter it was necessary to oppose Australia and the United Kingdom, two of its best friends, but that the Department was firmly convinced of the rightness of its position and that it would continue to press for approval by the Security Council of the Trusteeship Agreement without the Australian Amendment.

  1. The text of a draft telegram to New York dated March 19, which was never sent, throws light on Department thinking prior to the conversation recorded here.

    • “1. While Australia proposed new Article 17 to US draft trusteeship agreement as revised at SC meeting Monday is totally unacceptable as you so effectively made clear we are concerned over embarrassing necessity of publicly defeating Australia and UK. We would like, if possible, to persuade Hasluck [Australian Representative at the United Nations] to withdraw amendment or give him opportunity to save his face in final showdown.
    • “2. Please remind Hasluck that US has consistently informed Australian Government on several occasions that it recognizes Australian position and interests in Pacific and will assist Australia to become a principal participant in the peace settlement with Japan. While we cannot publicly confirm this policy at this time we are happy to do so privately.
    • “3. You may tell Hasluck that if he is unwilling to withdraw his amendment you will state before final vote that US, of course, recognizes Australia’s natural interest in all problems relating to Pacific and the valiant part played by Australia in Pacific War and that US equally recognizes the great contribution made by Australia to the trusteeship principles of the Charter and in implementation of these principles in New Guinea trusteeship agreement. Furthermore, you may inform him that US will gladly agree at peace conference to proposals or support a treaty article to following effect: (a) that treaty extinguishes any rights and interests which Japan may have in mandates system as one of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in First World War and in former Japanese Mandated Islands as a former mandatory power, and (b) that treaty takes note that by instrument of surrender that Japan has lost all rights, titles and control in former Japanese Mandated Islands and in any Japanese islands which may be detached.” (890.0146/3–1947)