501.BC/3–1747

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation 1

Participants: Mr. Dean Rusk, SPA
Mr. Charles P. Noyes, U.S. Delegation, New York, Adviser to U.S. Representative on the Security Council and General Matters

Mr. Rusk said that he had been able to obtain a high-level decision from both the State Department and the Navy Department on the question raised in Mr. Noyes’ memorandum (attached).2 Both Departments were agreed that Mr. Austin abstain from voting if any of the amendments proposed to the United States draft agreement should be put to a vote, provided that Mr. Austin stated clearly in advance of the vote that the United States would not be able to accept these proposed amendments. Mr. Noyes remarked that in this sense the United States, as the other party to the agreement, would maintain the right to reject the agreement, if certain amendments were insisted upon by the Security Council. Mr. Rusk agreed that that was the correct interpretation. He added that the United States would not use the veto to deny to the Security Council the right to express its view with regard to proposed amendments.

Mr. Rusk stated that this policy of abstaining did not apply to the point of order which might be raised in connection with the Australian proposal. Mr. Noyes said that this was understood and that the United States would be able to vote on the subsidiary legal question raised by the point of order. Mr. Noyes said that he was informed that the President of the Security Council (Aranha) would himself raise the point of order. Since the United States did not rest its whole case on the Australian proposal on the point of order, he felt that Mr. Austin might wish to deal with both the procedure and the substance of the question at the same time. If the legal point came up as a separate matter, however, the United States could vote on it, Mr. Noyes said.3

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Mr. Rusk again stated with regard to substantive amendments that Mr. Austin could abstain from voting and make a flat statement of the United States position as previously indicated and that this would be satisfactory to both the Navy and State Departments. In concluding he remarked that Mr. Fahy, Mr. Acheson, and Mr. Forrestal4 had all been consulted on this question.

  1. Apparently (on the basis of drafting information), the record of this conversation was made by William I. Cargo of the Division of Dependent Area Affairs.
  2. Supra.
  3. It was felt by some members of the Security Council, including the President of the Council, that the Australian amendment raised an important constitutional point regarding the competence of the Security Council in strategic trusteeship matters.

    It was the United States view further that the amendment called into question the effectiveness of the instrument of surrender of September 2, 1945, as a means of extinguishing Japanese authority over the mandated islands legally and permanently. Actually this issue was first raised in the Security Council on March 7 when the Council began its debate on the draft trusteeship agreement and before the Australian Delegate submitted his amendment. The United States view that the Japanese mandate was terminated by the surrender was stated by Ambassador Austin at that time. (SC, 2nd yr., pp. 464–472)

  4. Charles Fahy was Legal Adviser of the Department of States; James Forrestal was Secretary of the Navy.