Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, General; The United Nations, Volume I

890.0146/1–2147

The British Ambassador (Inverchapel) to the Secretary of State

No. 45

Washington, January 21, 1947.

Sir, I have the honour to refer to Mr. Acheson’s note of the 6th November 1946 enclosing the draft of a strategic area trusteeship agreement setting forth the terms on which the United States Government is prepared to place the Japanese Mandated Islands under Trusteeship.²

His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom appreciate the action of the United States Government in submitting the draft to them for information, and welcome the announced intention of the United States Government to seek the approval of the Security Council for the draft agreement as an earnest of United States support for the implementation of the Trusteeship principle. His Majesty’s Government feel impelled, however, to state that they regard the action of the United States Government as a declaration of intention which cannot take effect in advance of the Peace Treaty with Japan³ and consider that it would be premature at this stage to place proposals formally before the Security Council. In particular, from the point of view of His Majesty’s Government, such action by the United States would be open to the serious practical objection that it would confuse the issue about trusteeship for the former Italian Colonies.⁴

In the meantime His Majesty’s Government wish to discuss with the United States Government certain textual points in the draft under reference. A memorandum setting forth the comments of His Majesty’s Government on the points in question is enclosed herein.

I have [etc.]

Inverchapel

[Enclosure]

1. Preamble

In the second recital the reference should presumably be to Article 77(B), since the United States are in possession of the islands by virtue of the war and are not a Mandatory Power.

2. Article 8(1)

The purpose of this clause is apparently to control the immigration of potential enemy agents. It conflicts, however, with Article 83(2) and 76(D) of the Charter, and appears to be inconsistent with the “open-door” policy which the United States has insisted upon in regard to the United Kingdom mandates and in Western Samoa.

3. Article 8(111)

In the view of His Majesty’s Government this clause strains Article 76(D) of the Charter.

4. Article 13

His Majesty’s Government wish to suggest the following re-wording:

“The provisions of Article 87 and 88 of the Charter shall be applicable to the trust territory, provided that the administering authority may at any time inform the Security Council, in accordance with Article 83(111) of the Charter, that Security considerations do not permit the exercise of the functions of the trusteeship council in regard to specific areas.”

His Majesty’s Government attach particular importance to the point that if any areas are closed for security reasons they shall be closed so far as civil aviation is concerned on a nondiscriminatory basis to civil airlines of the United States as well as to those of other nations.

5. Article I, which describes the area as a strategic area, when read in conjunction with Article XIII, might be interpreted as meaning that, as distinct from individual islands and the territorial waters round them, the United States would close the complete area and so disrupt sea communications. His Majesty’s Government feel there would be no basis in international law for such action, and doubt whether that is the interpretation which the United States Government would in practice apply. They would, however, welcome clarification on this point.

2. For text of the draft trusteeship agreement, see Department of State Bulletin, November 17, 1946, pp. 889 ff. On November 6, 1946, President Truman announced that the United States was to submit this draft agreement formally to the Security Council for its approval “at an early date”; for text of the President’s statement, see Ibid., p. 889, or Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. i, p. 674. At the same time, the Department sent to the diplomatic missions of the other members of the Security Council (in Washington) and of the Philippines Republic and New Zealand, for the information of these Governments, copies of the draft trusteeship agreement; these notes are not printed. On January 15, 1947, similar communications were transmitted to the Governments of Belgium, Colombia, and Syria, these states having been members of the Security Council since November 6 when they were elected.

   On December 11, 1946, the Soviet Embassy submitted a note dated December 7 in reply; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. i, p. 710. The view was expressed that Security Council consideration of the United States draft trusteeship agreement should be delayed until the peace settlement with Japan.

   On December 27, 1946, the British Embassy informed the Department that the Foreign Office was “urgently engaged” in obtaining the informal views of the Australian and New Zealand Governments. The Embassy expressed the hope that this Government could defer presenting the draft agreement to the Security Council until a further communication had been received from the Embassy. (See memorandum of telephone conversation, by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss), December 24, 1946, Ibid., p. 711.)

3. For documentation regarding United States policy with respect to a peace settlement with Japan, see vol. vi, pp. 446 ff.
4. For documentation on this subject, see vol. iii, pp. 569 ff.