IO Files: US/A/971
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Robert M. McClintock, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Rusk)
| Participants: | The British Ambassador, Lord Inverchapel |
| Mr. Hector McNeil, Minister of State | |
| Mr. W. D. Allen, Counselor of the British Embassy | |
| A–A: Mr. Norman Armour | |
| EUR: Mr. Reber | |
| SPA: Mr. Robert McClintock |
Immediately prior to receiving the British Ambassador and the Minister of State, Mr. Armour1 had received an urgent telephone call from Mr. E. N. Thompson at Flushing, who said the British had just informed Mr. John Foster Dulles that they had received instructions from Foreign Secretary Bevin to ask the United States Delegation to withdraw its Resolution on the Veto which had already been adopted by Committee I by a vote of 36 to 6 with 11 abstentions. Mr. Thompson said that Mr. Dulles had protested to the British Delegation that it was impossible at this late stage for the United States Delegation to accede to this request. Mr. Thompson added that the [Page 234] British Ambassador had been instructed to call on Mr. Armour to repeat the request.
Lord Inverchapel did not participate in the discussion, which was led by Mr. McNeil. In expressing regret that the views of the British Foreign Secretary had been made known at such a late moment, Mr. McNeil said that Mr. Bevin strongly felt that it was unwise to charge the Interim Committee with a study of the veto question because the Soviet Union thought the Interim Committee was unconstitutional and for that reason had stated it would not participate therein. Mr. Bevin felt that if there were any slight hope of eventually lessening the rigor of the veto power held by the five Permanent Members of the Security Council this could be worked out more probably by study in the Security Council or some other organ than the Interim Committee which the Russians thought was ultra vires. Mr. Bevin, as did the Department of State, hoped that by some “code of conduct” agreed upon by the Big Five there might eventually be agreement on a more limited use of the veto. Mr. McNeil added the thought that although the Russians had admittedly been most obstructive in the Security Council they had at least during the past year agreed to one notable change: namely, the mutual agreement to permit abstentions by the Big Five as not implying vetoes under the Charter requirement that on questions of substance the Permanent Members of the Council must concur except in cases in which they are themselves involved in a dispute.
The American position was stated to Mr. McNeil in the following terms:
The United States had sought to introduce a compromise resolution calling for a study of the veto problem. In fact other delegations had wished to submit much more strongly worded resolutions but had been deterred in this desire because the American resolution seemed to meet the requirements of the situation. For us now to withdraw our resolution without any prior notice would seem in fact disloyal to those delegations whose views on the veto were very strongly held and to the two thirds majority of the United Nations which had supported our resolution. (It was noted that the United Kingdom’s Delegation had voted for the United States resolution in Committee I.)
It was pointed out that General Marshall in his speech of September 17th had clearly indicated the American position regarding both the study of the veto question and the constituting of the Interim Committee. Now to withdraw our resolution would indicate to many governments that the United States was backtracking on its own program and that it lacked confidence in the Interim Committee which was in a sense its own creation. Furthermore the Interim Committee was still open to adherence by the USSR. It was not the action of the United States or the General Assembly which had resulted in Russian refusal to participate in the Interim Committee.
At this point in the conversation Mr. Armour was called from the room and returned with a message telephoned by Mr. Thompson from the Assembly Hall in Flushing to the effect that Mr. Dulles had been called upon to speak and that he had reaffirmed the United States position on its veto resolution. Mr. McNeil said that this settled the matter and that it was now too late to have any hope of succeeding in carrying out Mr. Bevin’s instructions. Mr. McNeil added that he would take it on himself to go against his instructions, which were to abstain on the veto resolution if the American position remained unchanged, and that he would instruct the United Kingdom Delegation to vote for the United States veto resolution and to speak in its favor.
The conversation then turned very briefly to the question of the Bermuda base. Lord Invershapel expressed warm appreciation to Mr. Armour for the manner in which the State Department had initiated steps in that negotiation.
The substance of this conversation was immediately telephoned to, Mr. Thompson for Mr. Dulles in New York.2
- Mr. Armour was Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs.↩
- The General Assembly considered the First Committee report on Security Council voting at parts of morning and afternoon sessions on November 21 (GA (II), Plenary, vol. ii, pp. 1218–1272) and, in paragraph-by-paragraph voting, adopted the resolution contained in the report. The Soviet Representative (Vyshinsky) then requested that a vote be taken on the resolution as a whole. This was done, and the General Assembly adopted the resolution by a vote of 38 to 6, with 11 abstentions. For text of the resolution, Resolution 117(II), which is virtually identical with the draft submitted by the United States to the First Committee on November 18 (see editorial note, p. 18), see GA (II), Resolutions, p. 23.↩