Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, General; The United Nations, Volume I

Editorial Note

At the meeting of the First Committee on the morning of November 18, Mr. Dulles submitted a draft United States resolution regarding voting in the Security Council as follows:

“The General Assembly, in the exercise of its power to make recommendations relating to the powers and functions of any organs of the United Nations (Article 10);

Requests the Interim Committee of the General Assembly, in accordance with paragraph 2(a) of resolution 111(II) of the General Assembly of 13 November 1947, establishing that Committee, to:

1. Consider the problem of voting in the Security Council, taking into account all proposals which have been or may be submitted by Members of the United Nations to the second session of the General Assembly or to the Interim Committee;

2. Consult with any committee which the Security Council may designate to co-operate with the Interim Committee in the study of the problem;

3. Report with its conclusions to the third session of the General Assembly, the report to be transmitted to the Secretary-General by 15 July 1948, and by the Secretary-General to the Members and to the General Assembly.

Requests the permanent members of the Security Council to consult with one another on the problem of voting in the Security Council in order to secure agreement among them on measures to ensure the prompt and effective exercise by the Security Council of its functions.” (GA (II), First Committee, pages 622 and 623, annex 18b)

In introducing the resolution, Mr. Dulles said that he thought it necessary to indicate the attitude of his Government on two special points:

• “(1) The United States did not consider the statement made by the four sponsoring Powers and France at San Francisco on 7 June 1945 as a treaty binding it for all time. It was at most a statement of the general attitude of those Powers. That statement had been based upon a series of assumptions which had proved false in the light of experience. In the circumstances, the United States did not feel debarred from seeking some means of improving the voting procedure in the Security Council. Nevertheless, it would not abandon its original attitude until some new and better solution had been found, and one which in its opinion would be satisfactory.
• “(2) As to the policy pursued by the United States as a member of the Security Council, the fact that its efforts to improve procedure in the Council were being deployed within a limited sphere should not be interpreted as meaning that the United States was opposed to the problem being studied on a wider basis in the General Assembly. Nevertheless, it realized that no amendment of the Charter could be effected without the agreement of the five permanent members, and that the Assembly would have to act very cautiously. The study the Assembly would undertake would doubtless enable it to understand the problem better, and would improve relations between the Council and the Assembly. The present voting procedure could undoubtedly be made more flexible in many respects without modifying the voting rules laid down in Article 27, and in any event many aspects of that procedure should be maintained.” (Ibid., pages 486 and 487)