IO Files: US/A/831
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Thomas F. Power, Jr., Secretary-General of the United States Mission at the United Nations
Mr. Cordier1 expressed to me this evening grave concern and considerable pessimism for the future of the United Nations because of today’s announcement by the U.S.S.R. and her satellites of the boycott of the Interim Committee. He thought it raised a serious possibility that the Russians were intent on wrecking the United Nations by striking a grievous blow at the General Assembly. He thought that serious consideration should be given to finding a way out of the impasse at once before the situation is frozen.
He suggested that some thought be given to the possibility of holding two special General Assembly sessions on approximately January 15 and May 15. These could be either a substitute for or in addition to the Interim Committee. Thus the Assembly could be in special session for approximately the first six months of 1948.
As an alternative, the Assembly might utilize its Rule 6 which provides that it may decide at any session to adjourn temporarily and resume its meeting at a later date. Under this, the Assembly could reconvene on about the same dates mentioned above on a skeleton basis, thereby remaining in virtually a continuous session.
The legality of the special sessions or the continuous session would be unquestionable. The Soviets would have to attend the meetings unless they were determined to flagrantly and bluntly break the United Nations. Although he recognized there was a risk of forcing the issue, Cordier thought the situation should be faced. Moreover, he thought the suggestions would have the further value of saving face, both for the Russians and ourselves. The United States and the majority of the Assembly would not have to abandon their position on the constitutionality of the Interim Committee which could be continued, and the major purposes of the Interim Committee could still be achieved under the special or continuous session techniques.
At the outset of our conversation, Cordier thought that such a proposal could probably not be put forward by the United States but might be supported by one of our friends. However, after further discussion, he suggested that it might actually be preferable for the United States to propose such a course, taking a bold step to demonstrate clearly that the United States meant to make full use of the United Nations and make it unmistakably clear that the United States was committed to United Nation’s success.
- Andrew Cordier, Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.↩