IO Files: US/A/C.1/481
Memorandum by Mr. Elwood N. Thompson of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers to All Political Officers
It is suggested that conversations with other delegations concerning the United States position on the “veto” should begin at once. In these conversations you may find useful the general guide lines set forth below.
The United States believes that liberalization of the voting procedure would make the Security Council more effective. As stated by the Secretary in his opening speech to the General Assembly, the abuse of the veto in the Security Council has made such liberalization essential. Therefore, the United States would be willing to agree to the elimination by whatever means may be appropriate of the veto under Chapter VI of the Charter (pacific settlement), and in voting on applications for membership. The United States however is opposed to any alteration of the veto under Chapter VII, or in the process of amending the Charter. Concerning other decisions to which the veto may now be [Page 215] applicable, the United States will indicate its position as occasion may require in the course of the study proposed below.
As to the means of securing liberalization of the voting procedure, the United States wishes to go as far as possible through the development of practices and procedures in the Security Council agreed to by all its members.
However we recognize that such changes will probably not go far enough to solve the problem. It will be necessary for the General Assembly to study what can be accomplished through Charter interpretation and by changes that may require Charter amendment. The issues arising out of substantial changes in the voting procedure of the Security Council are so complex and so important to the future of the United Nations, and there is such a divergence among the members, that a year’s study is essential prior to decisions on the issues involved. Moreover the United States hopes that the General Assembly study will stimulate the efforts of the Security Council itself to improve its voting practices.
Our position on the veto in this Assembly constitutes an important step forward in the direction of liberalizing the veto from the basic position which we took last year. Last year we were unwilling to support steps looking toward the amendment of the Charter although we expressed hope that in the future the permanent members might agree among themselves and with other members to modify the veto under Chapter VI. This year, the United States continues to stand by its conviction concerning the necessity of agreement among the major powers in taking decisions under Chapter VII and with respect to amendement of the Charter; however the United States is prepared to support, after careful study,1 the liberalization of the veto under Chapter VI and on membership questions by any appropriate means including modification in the attitude expressed in the Four-Power Statement and amendment of the Charter.
The United States will make every effort to find a common ground among the permanent members of the Security Council so that any [Page 216] recommendations resulting from the General Assembly’s study will have their approval as well as the overwhelming support of the members of the United Nations. The acceptance and support by the United States of such recommendations, however, will not necessarily depend upon their approval by all the permanent members.
The United States believes that the General Assembly should include in its study both a survey of the changes that should be made and the methods of their accomplishment. Accordingly we shall suggest that proposals submitted by members concerning the “veto” be referred to a special committee (presumably the Interim Committee would be appropriate), which would make the necessary study and report to the next session of the General Assembly.
The United States is not at this time abandoning the Four-Power Statement of June 7, 1945. However, the United States believes the General Assembly’s study should not be limited by the Statement; in the event of a conflict between the recommendations resulting from the study and interpretations of Article 27 contained in the Four-Power Statement, the United States would be willing to consider changes from the attitude expressed on that Statement.
The United States would agree to a resolution limiting the terms of reference of the Committee, so as to exclude recommendations eliminating or limiting the requirement of unanimity under Chapter VII and in amending the Charter.
The United States considers a study by a committee preferable to a general conference under Article 109 as requested by Argentina. The study by a committee offers a possibility of attaining the desired result without the disturbance to the basic fabric of the Charter inherent in the calling of a general conference at this time, where the range of proposals for change in the Charter would be virtually unlimited.
Pending study by a committee, the United States does not plan to urge the adoption by the current session of the General Assembly of specific proposals either for interpreting or amending the Charter. The United States delegation hopes other delegations will share its belief that the debate in Committee I will be most useful if directed to establishing the proposed committee study rather than to determining, in advance of the study, the merits of the specific proposals. The United States also hopes that other delegations, aware that Committee I will begin its discussion of the veto near the end of its long and difficult agenda, will likewise prefer to refer for study substantive proposals on voting in the Security Council.
- A “Comment Paper” of some length with four annexes setting forth the United States position on General Assembly items dealing with voting in the Security Council had been prepared for the information and guidance of the Delegation (IO Files, Doc. US/A/C.1/228/Rev. 1, October 21, 1947). The main paper describes the need for a basically new U.S. position for liberalization of the voting procedure in the Security Council in terms of “… experience to date, that the abuse of the rule requiring unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council in non-procedural decisions is preventing the Council from meeting its responsibilities under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.” Specific remedies enumerated in the document to which this footnote is appended are described in detail in the comment paper, along with careful consideration of how to implement the new U.S. position both in the Security Council and in the current session of the General Assembly. The annexes contain inter alia an historical account of the former U.S. position on the voting problem and new draft rules recently proposed by the United States in the Security Council’s Committee of Experts.↩