IO Files: US/A/C.1/284
Minutes of a Meeting With Members of the United Kingdom Delegation, New York, October 7, 1947, 10 p.m.
| Present: | Mr. Hector McNeil of the United Kingdom Delegation |
| Sir Hartley Shawcross of the United Kingdom Delegation | |
| Mr. H. M. G. Jebb of the United Kingdom Delegation | |
| Mr. W. E. Beckett of the United Kingdom Delegation | |
| Mr. P. S. Falla of the United Kingdom Delegation | |
| Mr. John Foster Dulles of the United States Delegation | |
| Mr. Elwood N. Thompson of the United States Delegation | |
| Mr. David W. Wainhouse of the United States Delegation | |
| Mr. Charles Noyes of the United States Delegation | |
| Mr. Hayden Raynor of the United States Delegation | |
| Mr. Eric Stein of the United States Delegation |
General Assembly Interim Committee and the Veto
a. interim committee
United Kingdom Discussions with the Chinese and Canadians
Mr. Beckett reported that in the course of discussions with the Chinese the latter pointed out that the Committee would have discretion in determining whether a matter should be placed on its agenda. Even after the Committee has placed a matter on its agenda this would not affect the right of the General Assembly to refuse to place the same matter on its own agenda. The Chinese also think in terms of the preparatory and “follow-up” functions of the Committee and agree that the Committee in the exercise of the preparatory functions would have the power to ask Members to accord to its facilities for investigation. The carrying out of the investigation would depend upon the consent of the Members concerned. It was agreed that this was also the understanding of the United Kingdom and United States Delegations. The United Kingdom Delegation suggested to the Chinese that the Interim Committee should not even discuss a matter appearing on the agenda of the Security Council even though the General Assembly itself might have the power to do so. The Chinese agreed to this view, according to the British.
In their discussions with the United Kingdom Delegation the Canadians expressed preference for a broader jurisdiction of the Interim Committee which would not be restricted to peace and security matters. Mr. Dulles pointed out that under the U.S. draft resolution there is no restriction on the power of the General Assembly to refer to the Committee any matter it deems suitable for consideration by the Committee. However, as a matter of policy it might be better if the Committee would deal with matters arising under the Articles set forth in the U.S. resolution.
Should the Committee Jurisdiction Be Restricted to Matters Relating to Peace and Security? French Objections
Sir Hartley expressed the view that it would be desirable to restrict the jurisdiction of the Committee to matters relating to peace and security and to questions specifically referred to the Committee by the Assembly. Otherwise, there will be a danger that trivial matters will be brought before the Committee for the sole reason that the Committee would be available as a forum. In the absence of the Committee such matters would never come before the General Assembly and would be left for settlement by the parties. Mr. Jebb thought that this solution might allay the French fears that the question of Viet Nam could be brought before the Committee. Mr. Raynor raised the question whether under this narrowed definition of jurisdiction the Committee [Page 205] could deal, for instance, with the problem of Austria, should the treaty negotiations definitely collapse. Sir Hartley and Mr. Jebb thought that the Austrian situation could be considered as affecting peace and security because of the failure of the U.S.S.R. to evacuate its troops from Austria. Mr. Thompson stated that if the Committee should be restricted to matters relating to peace and security other delegations might raise some questions as to the invasion of the Security Council jurisdiction. It was for this reason that the terms “peace and security” were omitted from the Committee title. Mr. Dulles asked whether the French could not be satisfied by the adoption of a rule in the Committee requiring a two-thirds vote for placing an item on the agenda. He thought, however, that this would be too restrictive. Mr. Wainhouse emphasized the importance of retaining the Committee jurisdiction under Article 14 which goes beyond the peace and security matters. It was agreed that a restriction of the Committee jurisdiction to matters relating to peace and security would not guarantee that problems such as Viet Nam could be kept out of the Committee since it might always be argued that such problems do in fact relate to peace and security, and this argument might well obtain the backing of the required majority. It was further agreed that a rule requiring a two-thirds majority for placing a matter on the Committee agenda would be too restrictive. Mr. Dulles stated that, as he himself has pointed out to Mr. de Murville, an effort to frame the Committee jurisdiction so as to bar the Viet Nam problem from the Committee would in the end be not effective as such problem would “overflow” in some other organ; such effort is in its end result comparable to the Soviet use of veto.
Sir Hartley suggested that the discretion of the Committee in selecting items for its agenda should be emphasized by inserting in the resolution a clause providing that the Committee will “consider in its discretion such matters which it deems sufficiently important or urgent to require preparatory study”. The Interim Committee would from time to time select matters suitable for preparatory consideration from the matters submitted to the General Assembly.
Sir Hartley agreed that the Committee jurisdiction should not be restricted to matters relating to peace and security and that the Committee should be able to deal with any question under Articles 11(2), 14 and 35. Sir Hartley then suggested that the talks with the French be carried on with a view to convince them to accept this definition of Committee jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction of the Committee under Article 11(1) and 13(1a)
The British believe that the Committee should not possess general jurisdiction under these Articles for two main reasons: (a) because the studies under these Articles are not of an urgent character and do [Page 206] not require focusing of public opinion such as the specific situations which would be dealt with in the Interim Committee under Articles 11(2), 14 and 35; (b) such studies would be of an academic nature requiring an entirely different type of expert personnel. Moreover, the work of the committee on specific cases could easily be bogged down by such broad studies which would impair the effective discharge of its main function as a forum designed to focus world opinion to specific situations.
In the British view the General Assembly might direct the Secretariat to conduct such studies, or the General Assembly could perhaps remit to the Interim Committee certain aspects of the study, but the Interim Committee should not be given jurisdiction to undertake such studies of their own initiative. Mr. Dulles emphasized that the General Assembly has an affirmative duty under Article 13(1a) to undertake studies for the promotion of international cooperation in the political field and that it has thus far failed to take any steps towards the implementation of this task. Mr. Wainhouse and Mr. Raynor stressed that one of the main reasons for inserting the reference to Article 13(1a) and 11(1) in the U.S. draft resolution was to provide for a possibility to raise the question of indirect aggression before the Interim Committee; the Committee could use the services of the Secretariat experts and could perform its functions in this field through sub-committees so that this work would not interfere with its main purpose of dealing with specific situations. Mr. McNeil thought that a blanket jurisdiction under the above two Articles was risky and that some other State might bring before the Committee under this heading such items as war mongering, the Marshall Plan, etc. Mr. Dulles said that one of the reasons for this approach to the problem of indirect aggression was the desire on the part of the United States to limit the number of proposals advanced by the United States Delegation in this General Assembly which could be considered as being directed against the U.S.S.R. For this reason the United States Delegation prefers the broad clause of Article 11(1) and 13(1a) to a specific provision for indirect aggression or to a specific reference of this problem by the General Assembly to the Committee. Mr. NcNeil felt that the general principles on indirect aggression are sufficiently clear and that no public attention could be attracted to abstract issues before the Committee; this would defeat the main purpose of bringing the matter before the Committee. Mr. Wainhouse thought that it would definitely be advantageous for the Committee first to spell out in detail the principles relating to indirect aggression without focusing the study on specific situations and that after such principles are developed it might be easier to deal with such situations as the problem of Hungary. Mr. McNeil would not favor even a specific [Page 207] reference of this type of problem by the General Assembly to the Committee. An inconclusive discussion ensued as to whether the Committee would select less important items submitted for the consideration of the General Assembly thus “clearing the deck” for Assembly consideration of the more important matters; or whether the Committee should select the more important items for a thorough study which would assist the General Assembly in dealing with such items when it convenes.
Mr. Dulles suggested that more thought be given to this aspect of Committee jurisdiction and that the United States Delegation will carefully consider whether it would accept an amendment to its proposed resolution which would exclude the jurisdiction of the Committee under Article 11(1) and 13(1a).
b. veto
General Position in the Current Session of the General Assembly
Mr. Dulles and Mr. Thompson referred to the speech of Secretary Marshall and stated that owing to the complexity of the voting problem in the Security Council all proposals for a liberalization of the Security Council voting procedure should be referred to a committee for study and report to the third session of the General Assembly in 1948. The General Assembly study might stimulate the efforts of the Security Council to improve its own procedures. Mr. Dulles believed that the establishment and operation of the Interim Committee might also have an effect on the Security Council’s work in this field. The British agreed that this might be the best position to take, but they had some doubts as to whether the smaller nations which are hostile to the veto would be amenable to such solution. Mr. Beckett said that a liberalized “gentleman’s agreement” among the great powers would be probably the only way to obtain success; the efforts in the Security Council are the most realistic method from the viewpoint of final success. Mr. McNeil emphasized that Mr. Bevin would be most reluctant to agree to any step on the subject of veto which might be seized upon by the Soviets as a reason for their withdrawal from the United Nations. He said that the British have repeatedly stated that they would oppose any amendment of the Charter at this time and that he believed that the United States had made similar statements. It was agreed that discussions will be carried on particularly with the Australians and with the Chinese with a view … that all proposals for a liberalized voting procedure should be referred to a committee for further study and report in 1948. Mr. McNeil expressed a strong belief that a special committee should be established for such study and that the study should not be referred to the Interim Committee; the special committee should be composed of jurists or “semijurists”. Mr. Dulles [Page 208] stated that a decision on this matter would depend on the final character of the Interim Committee.
[Here follows discussion of a draft resolution on the veto introduced by the Chinese in the First Committee, during which it was decided “that an effort will be made to convince the Chinese that their and other proposals should be referred to a committee for study and that no action should be taken thereon in the current session of the Assembly.”]
Possibilities of U.S.S.R. Withdrawal from the United Nations
Mr. Dulles asked Mr. McNeil whether he knows of any indication of the Soviet intention on this subject. Mr. McNeil stated that while he does not possess any information it has been his “personal guess” that the Soviets do not intend to withdraw. He was somewhat shaken in this view by Mr. Bebler’s outburst in today’s meeting of Committee 1 on the Greek question. He noted that Mr. Gromyko very ostentatiously congratulated Mr. Bebler on his speech and that Mr. Vishinsky was present in the Committee meeting. Nevertheless, he felt that the Soviets do intend to stay in the United Nations, but he expressed the belief that we should not press for far reaching action on the veto. “If we get the Interim Committee we will do well”, and we should not take risks on the veto question. Mr. Dulles agreed that it is most important not to give the Soviets any decent excuse to withdraw from the United Nations. Sir Hartley thought that we should not precipitate a crisis on the veto. In his view an argument could be made that a proposal such as that contained in Section C of the Chinese resolution, while not amounting to a modification of the Charter, is designed to “terrorize” a permanent member so that it would not use the veto. Mr. Dulles pointed out that a similar argument could be used against the Interim Committee to the effect that the veto was intended to protect the minority and that therefore a veto in the Council procedings should finish the consideration of a matter. He agreed that with Korea and the Interim Committee on the agenda, we should proceed with caution. In this connection Mr. McNeil suggested that in the general debate on the Interim Committee we should state that in our view the veto problem should be passed to a committee for study and report in 1948.
Meeting adjourned at 1:00 a.m.
(The discussion on membership is contained in a separate memorandum—US/A/C.1/285).