Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, General; The United Nations, Volume I

IO Files: SD/A/C.1/86

Department of State Position Paper

secret

[Washington,] August 26, 1947.

Draft Resolution on the Establishment of an Interim General Assembly Committee on Peace and Security

the problem

The problem is to determine what action should be taken to bring about the adoption of measures to enable the General Assembly more effectively to discharge its responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and security. The attached resolution² providing for the establishment of an Interim Committee of the General Assembly has been prepared to meet that problem.

recommendations

1. The United States Delegation should take the initiative and press by all proper means for the adoption of the proposed resolution.

2. In the event a majority of the Members favors the proposal in principle but desires modifications thereof in certain particulars which would not impair the essentials of the proposal, the United States Delegation should accept such modifications.

comment

1. This proposal is the product of the study undertaken at the instance of SPA looking to the development of an affirmative program in the General Assembly to meet the situation created by the stalemate in the Security Council and by indirect aggression in Eastern Europe. A suggestion for three possible proposals was made: (1) a commission on indirect aggression; (2) a mutual defense pact under Article 51; and (3) future policy on atomic energy. The Policy Planning Committee looked with favor on a standing committee on peace and security which might give some attention to indirect aggression. It opposed action on the mutual defense pact at this time and reserved for further study the question of future policy on atomic energy. The proposal, therefore, is a projection of the principal recommendation of the Policy Planning Committee.

2. The proposal is for the creation of a continuing committee of the General Assembly for a one-year period with authority to deal with situations impairing friendly relations (Article 14), to consider and report upon measures to make more effective the purposes and principles of the Charter with particular reference to acts of indirect aggression undermining the independence of states, to recommend, the calling of special sessions, and to report on the desirability of establishing the Committee on a permanent basis. This is aimed directly at broadening the efforts of the United Nations to deal with threats, or potential threats to the peace by developing the resources of the General Assembly. It would meet the urgent need created by the presently restricted basis of Security Council action, and at the same time allow time for further study of the need of further permanent machinery.

3. The proposal has the advantage of making the facilities of the General Assembly continuously available to all its members. The existence of such a Committee as is here proposed might, for example, have made unnecessary the Special Session of the General Assembly on the Palestine problem.³ A forum of this character would strengthen the machinery for peaceful settlement and give responsibility for such settlement to all Members of the United Nations.

4. The proposal might be attacked by certain Members as unconstitutional and by others as an oblique attack on the veto. Others might assert that this is an invasion of the Security Council’s jurisdiction. These arguments are without merit.

The General Assembly clearly has authority under Articles 11 and 14 to take action of the kind proposed. If the General Assembly can exercise jurisdiction over these matters at regular sessions, it can also deal with these matters through an organ of its own creation at other times. While the authors of the Charter did not contemplate that the General Assembly would be in constant session, they did not rule out the possibility that the General Assembly, or an organ of its own creation, could sit in constant session for the performance of the functions with which it is constitutionally charged. It has authority under Article 22 to establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions. Nor can the proposal be characterized as a circumvention of the veto. The creation of the Interim Committee with the duties and responsibilities set forth in the Draft Resolution is a proper exercise of the General Assembly jurisdiction. The proposal is a logical and legitimate development of the powers of the General Assembly under the Charter, and would not disturb the natural and proper functions of the Security Council.

2. Not printed. The draft printed in Doc. US/A/C.1/143, September 18, p. 174, is virtually identical with the one mentioned here.
3. For documentation on this subject, see vol. v, p. 999.