Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume IX

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Meeting of Acting Committee of Three and Three Commissioners With Members of Teams Numbers 27, 28, and 29 at Mukden, April 15, 1946, 9 a.m.

Mukden, April 15, 1946, 9 a.m.

• The following were present:
  • National Government:
    • Lt. Gen. Ch’in Teh-chun
    • Lt. Gen. Cheng Kai-min
    • Lt. Gen. Yu Ta-wei
    • Lt. Gen. Chao Chia-shan
    • Lt. Gen. Chao I
    • Maj. Gen. Wang Chao-kun
    • Maj. Gen. Kuo Chi
    • Maj. Gen. Chang Ming-hsin
    • Maj. Gen. Tang Yen
    • Col. Peter Pee
    • Col. Sammy Yuan
    • Lt. Pei Yu-feng
  • Communist Party:
    • Lt. Gen. Lo Jui-ching
    • Lt. Gen. Yao Shu-shih
    • Maj. Gen. Ch’en Shih-chu
    • Maj. Gen. Keng Piao
    • Maj. Gen. Hsu Kuang-ta
    • Hwang Hwa
    • Chang Wen-chin
    • Ko Pai-nien
    • Chen Shu
  • American:
    • Lt. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.
    • Walter S. Robertson
    • Col. Raymond R. Tourtillott
    • Col. H. A. Davenport
    • Col. F. C. Culley
    • Col. K. K. Lau
    • Lt. Col. R. R. Drake
    • Major L. W. Berger
    • Captain S. Karrick
    • Captain J. T. Young
    • Philip D. Sprouse

Col. Tourtillott, presiding, called the meeting to order and stated that the senior members of Teams No. 28 and No. 29 had arrived in Mukden the previous afternoon and evening respectively and were now present. He would like first to introduce Col. Culley, chairman of Team No. 28 and ask him to introduce his team-mates.

Col. Culley introduced Lt. Gen. Wang Chao-kun, National Government representative on Team No. 28, and Maj. Gen. Keng Piao, Communist Party representative on that team.

Col. Tourtillott then introduced Col. Drake, chairman of Team No. 29, and asked him to introduce his team-mates.

Col. Drake introduced Maj. Gen. Kuo Chi, National Government representative on Team No. 29, and Maj. Gen. Hsu Kuang-ta, Communist Party representative on that team.

Col. Tourtillott said that now he would call on the team chairmen to make their reports, which would be in the form of a résumé of activities from the time they started out until they left their respective areas to come to Mukden. He wished to remind them that there were many things which these officers could not tell this group, because they were in the nature of confidential matters which had been given to the team chairman by both sides and which could not be disclosed at an open meeting. Both these teams had been doing splendid work in the field under most difficult circumstances. Team No. 27 had not been able to give them the directives it would like to have given them. These teams in the field were the ones who were going to determine the success of the Executive Headquarters in Manchuria. So it was most important that as soon as possible they be given definite interpretation of directives. Col. Tourtillott then called on Col. Culley to make his team report.

Col. Culley said that Team No. 28 departed Mukden on 9 April, last Tuesday, and arrived at Kaiyuan that evening at 6:30. The team was complete in all of its components, 12 National Government members, 10 Communist members, 5 U. S. members. Three radios were carried, one for each of the component elements. The mission of the team was to proceed to investigate the troop dispositions in the Changtu-Ssupingkai area. The trip was uneventful, and the team arrived at approximately 6:30 on the evening of the 9th. The team was met at the station by the Deputy Commander of the NECC,¹⁰ Kaiyuan, Maj. Gen. Wang. The first night was spent in the headquarters of the NECC at Kaiyuan. The next morning, Col. Culley said, he, as team chairman, called to pay his official respects to General Liang. He explained the mission of the team to Gen. Liang, and asked for a formal conference with the team as soon as it was convenient to the General. He explained the plan of operation of the team, which had been agreed on by the team members. The team would interview the senior commander in the Kaiyuan area, and would call upon him to give an account of the tactical situation, with a troop disposition map or overlay. With that information available, the team would then decide which division and lower echelon commanders should be interviewed in the Changtu–Ssupingkai area. Next the team members would decide which other specific tactical areas should be visited to complete the first phase of their mission. The second phase would be identical on the Communist side. The appointment with Gen. Liang (Gen. Tu Li-min’s deputy at NECC) was arranged through the National Government team representative, Gen. Wang. Gen. Liang was informed in advance what the team would ask that evening, namely his troop dispositions and a résumé of the military situation. At the formal conference that evening, very little information of a tactical nature was given the team, and no troop dispositions were given. Gen. Liang stated that the situation was very tense and fluid. Realizing that situation, the team pressed for permission to move forward into the Changtu area. Gen. Liang promised to take that under consideration and advise them on the next day. He also promised to furnish a disposition map the next day. Neither one of these promises had been fulfilled up until the departure of the commanding officers of the various components last night at 5:15. Definite restrictions were placed upon the operation of the team immediately after the first night in Kaiyuan. The radio of the Communist Party representatives was officially closed down on the night of April 10 by order of Gen. Liang. The Communist members in their quarters were placed under armed guard. They were not allowed access even to the local telephone in Kaiyuan. Col. Culley said he immediately called upon Gen. Wang, the National Government representative on Team No. 28, and asked him to talk to Gen. Liang to have him rescind his order. Gen. Wang exerted great effort to that end, but was unsuccessful. Col. Culley next called on Gen. Liang and made the same plea, and was finally successful in having the Communist delegation moved to a separate set of quarters for their own use. However, up until the time of departure from Kaiyuan last night, they were still under armed guard and radio restriction. The latter was only lifted as the team boarded the train. Col. Culley said he asked Gen. Liang for an explanation of his actions with regard to movement of the Communists and the closing down of their radio. He stated that the military situation was very tense in the Kaiyuan area and that since the arrival of the team in the area Communist activity had been renewed. He closed the radio station to prevent the possibility of the Communist Party representatives on Team No. 28 communicating with Communist forces outside of Kaiyuan. He further claimed that he had received no instructions as to the mission of the team. This, Col. Culley said, completed his résumé of the situation.

Col. Tourtillott then called on the National Government representative on Team No. 28 to give his reaction.

Gen. Wang said that the team was dispatched, arrived and started work as Col. Culley had reported. To supplement Col. Culley’s report, he wanted to mention that the team went about 20 kilometers north of Kaiyuan to investigate the destruction of a bridge on the railway line. The results of the investigation had already been given in the team’s written report. The reason the teams had not been able to go forward to carry out their mission was that they had not obtained the chart of troop dispositions. Gen. Liang told him (Gen. Wang) that the delay in furnishing this information was due to need for security. That was one reason he did not want to give the troop dispositions right now while conflicts were still going on. Another reason the team could not go further was that the bridges on the railway line north of Kaiyuan had been destroyed between the 25th and 29th of March. The very night the team arrived in Kaiyuan, there were sounds of explosions which destroyed a small bridge. Gen. Liang had agreed in principle to giving the troop dispositions. He just wanted to wait a few days until the situation was not so critical.

Col. Tourtillott then asked the Communist Party representative on Team No. 28 to speak.

Gen. Keng Piao said that he fully agreed with Col. Culley’s report. He only wanted to add that the reasons given by Gen. Wang as explanation for Gen. Liang’s unwillingness to produce the troop dispositions did not cover the whole ground. There were two reasons why the purpose of the team was not accomplished: (1) Gen. Liang was asked to give troop dispositions, and he did not; (2) Gen. Liang was asked to furnish a map, and he did not. Also, the order issued by the Three-man Committee regarding use of radios by the team and freedom of movement for team personnel was violated.

Col. Tourtillott said that some of those present might wish to ask questions regarding the Team No. 28 report. It would simplify the procedure if, in asking a question, the person asking it would state to whom he addressed the question. Were there any questions?

Gen. Gillem said he would like to ask Col. Culley whether he ever contacted the Communist general in that area and if so with what result.

Col. Culley said that he did not contact the Communist commander, because the Communist radio was shut down and that was the only means of contacting the Communist forces. He had planned, immediately upon completion of inspection on the Nationalist side, to establish liaison with the Communist commander through the Communist radio so that the team could move into the Communist area.

Gen. Gillem asked whether he was to understand that the team had so far been unsuccessful in making any contact with the Communist army or leader in that area.

Col. Culley replied that the team had had no success at all in this regard.

Gen. Gillem asked whether he had said that the radio was opened last night when the team left.

Col. Culley said that about four o’clock on the afternoon of 14 April he received a telephone call from one of Gen. Liang’s staff officers, who stated that the radio would be permitted to operate from then on. He (Col. Culley) asked him to send that order over Gen. Liang’s signature. The staff officer said that was not possible, because Gen. Liang was not present, but he was passing on a verbal order. Before the team departed, Gen. Liang’s Chief of Staff went to the Communist quarters and officially declared the radio open. (Gen. Wang here corrected Col. Culley’s statement, saying that it was not the Chief of Staff but one of the senior staff officers.)

Gen. Gillem asked whether the original contact with the Nationalists was established through radio, or was the team informed of the location of their headquarters.

Col. Culley replied that that contact was established by the senior team in Mukden and immediately upon arrival the team went to the Headquarters of Gen. Liang, who was the senior NECC commander in that area.

Gen. Gillem asked: “Now that the radio is open, what is your plan with reference to the Communists?[”]

Col. Culley said they intended to follow the original plan—that is, immediately on return to Kaiyuan, to establish liaison with the Communists and move into their area as soon as reconnaissance in the Nationalist area was completed. The Communist representative had assured him that there would be no difficulty.

Col. Tourtillott asked whether there were any other questions; as there were none, he asked Col. Drake to report on the activities of Team No. 29.

Col. Drake said that Team No. 29, composed of 12 National Government members, 8 Communist Party members, and 6 American members, left Mukden last Monday morning, April 8, at approximately 9 o’clock. It arrived in Fushun shortly after 12 o’clock, where it was met by Gen. Lu, the National Government’s Second Division commander. The mission of the team, as he understood it, was to investigate troop dispositions south of Mukden, particularly in the Fushun and Penhsi areas. The team was escorted to the Second Division headquarters, where its mission was explained to Gen. Lu. It was explained to Gen. Lu that the team desired to go to the headquarters of the 52nd Army. Gen. Lu stated that he did not know the whereabouts of the headquarters of the 52nd Army, although he did have radio communication with them. Gen. Lu did, however, furnish information as to the whereabouts of the Second Division. He also gave information as to Communist activities in that area. He stated that he would contact 52nd Army headquarters by radio and attempt to determine their whereabouts. It was then decided that the senior members of the team would proceed on into Communist territory over the road leading from Fushun to Penhsi. The team was warned that it would be difficult and dangerous for it to attempt to get through the lines. However, that afternoon the team did proceed into Communist territory for a distance of about 16 miles. It arrived at the brigade headquarters of the Peace Preservation Corps, where the mission of the team was explained to the Chief of Staff of the brigade. The brigade headquarters furnished the team with their troop dispositions. It was explained to the Chief of Staff at brigade headquarters that the team would attempt to go to Penhsi to the headquarters of the Communist army on the following Tuesday. The team returned to Fushun Sunday night. It was decided that the team would attempt to reach 52nd Army headquarters the following day. Gen. Lu, the Second Division commander, promised to furnish a guide. The following morning the National Government representative was unable to accompany the team because of illness. It was decided, however, that the team would proceed, with a junior member of the National Government branch. There was some delay in finding a junior member from the National Government side. The team was further delayed by being unable to locate the drivers of the vehicles. The team finally left late Monday morning for 52nd Army headquarters. The guide was very unfamiliar with the route. It was necessary to make numerous stops at villages along the way to pick up new guides. The team was stopped several times by members of the Communist army. The vehicles were mired in the mud numerous times. Late in the afternoon it was decided that it would be impossible to reach 52nd Army headquarters that day, and the team returned to Fushun. The following day, Tuesday, was the day that had been set to go to Penhsi. However, the National Government representative informed him (Col. Drake) that his orders were that he was not to leave the Fushun area. After much discussion and sending of radiograms back and forth to Mukden, it was decided that the team would proceed early the following day to Penhsi. Early Wednesday morning the team left for Penhsi. About 10 miles out of Penhsi the team was stopped by guerrilla forces and held for about three-quarters of an hour. After the team’s identity was established, it was allowed to proceed and was assisted to move on. Local villagers along the entire route assisted in filling trenches which had been dug across the highway. The team arrived in Penhsi about 4 o’clock Wednesday afternoon. It was met by a delegation of about 30,000 people. The team was conducted to quarters, where it was later met by Lt. Gen. Shao, the political commissar for the area. The mission of the team was explained. Gen. Shao promised to give all possible aid. The following day the promised data was collected. It was given to him (Col. Drake) early Saturday morning. It consisted of complete troop dispositions of all Communist forces in the area. Saturday the team returned to Fushun. Yesterday afternoon (14 April), just before the team left for Mukden, the National Government member turned over to him (Col. Drake) the troop dispositions of the 52nd Army. This, Col. Drake said, concluded his report.

Col. Tourtillott asked the National Government member of Team No. 29 for his comments.

Gen. Kuo said that Col. Drake had reported the results of the mission of the team, and he fully agreed with the report. He would like to add a few remarks. The first day, when the team arrived in Fushun, Gen. Lu behaved very frankly and discussed with the team the equipment of the Nationalist armies and their troop dispositions. Also he told the team very frankly the activities of the Second Division. But when the team arrived in Penhsi, the Communist headquarters, it did not find the same kind of frank discussion. When asked about their equipment and troop dispositions, the Communists would not tell. When Col. Drake received this information, he received it privately; the National Government representative did not know about it. But the National Government commander discussed these things openly. Furthermore, when the team left Fushun, about 10 kilometers out, they were met by Communist troops and were fired upon. That was an insult and also a hindrance of the team’s work. Also the manner of the Communist troops was rude and their language abusive. There were two vehicles; the second was also fired upon. This incident showed a threatening attitude toward Executive Headquarters teams. If the Communists were to go on that way, it would be very difficult for the teams to get into Communist territory and do their work. On the team’s first trip towards Penhsi the highway was in good order; on the second trip they found trenches dug across the road about 10 meters apart.

Col. Tourtillott then asked the Communist Party member of Team No. 29 for his comments.

Gen. Hsu said that he completely agreed with Col. Drake’s report, but had a few words to add. The team arrived at the headquarters of the Second Division of the Nationalist Army on the 8th. When the team asked Gen. Lu to give the locations where fighting was taking place and locations of the 52nd Army, he said he did not know. He said the Second Division was in Fushun and there was no conflict around Fushun. He talked about activities of the Communist Army. It was not true that he told the team about the equipment and troop dispositions of the Nationalist Army. When the team asked to go to the headquarters of the 52nd Army he did not agree. He said in the first place that he did not know where the headquarters was and that in the second place the road was bad. Third, he said he could not guarantee the safety of the team. But Col. Drake was very anxious to press forward the same day. It was quite an accident that the team found the Communist troops. The Nationalist representatives said there was no point in going to Penhsi. It was only after receiving instructions from the central team in Mukden that the team finally went to Penhsi on the 11th. When the party reached the Communist outposts they were questioned. The reason why they were questioned was that they had first intended to go on the 10th instead of the 11th, and in several places fighting was going on. But, having passed the outposts, they reached Penhsi smoothly. In Penhsi the Communist commander gave the team all detailed information. Col. Drake had told him (Gen. Hsu) that the Nationalists had supplied information, but whether they had or not, he himself did not know. In his opinion the mission of the team was to stop the fighting; since it was not doing that, it had very little to do. The work it was doing had of course little significance. Since the team was not stopping the fighting, its moving about between the two fronts placed the security of the team in question. The area of conflict was far from Fushun, and so he thought the team should be stationed in Fushun.

Col. Tourtillott asked whether Col. Drake had anything to add before he asked for questions.

Col. Drake said he would like to add that, while the Second Division commander did tell the team that his Division was stationed in Fushun, the brigade commander of the Peace Preservation Corps also gave his troop dispositions on the same day. It was later agreed in a meeting among the team members that the information given to the team chairman by each side would be kept secret and would not be disclosed to the other party. It was for that reason that Gen. Kuo had not been able to see the Communist troop dispositions given at Penhsi, as he mentioned a few minutes ago.

Gen. Gillem said he would like to ask a little more detail about the shooting and conduct of the Communists toward the team.

Col. Drake said that the shots were fired by what he would call militia forces, not uniformed soldiers. About five shots were fired into the air. He did not think that the shots were directed at the team’s vehicle. He stopped the vehicle; all the occupants got out and were approached by the Communist troops and forced to hold their hands in the air for about five minutes. The regular Communist forces were scattered on the hills nearby and saw what had happened and came on the scene immediately. They requested the team to remain in the area until the battalion commander was contacted. The battalion commander did not come himself, but sent word it was all right for the team to proceed, and it was then allowed to go on.

Gen. Gillem asked whether the vehicles were marked by American flags. Col. Drake said they were, but the guerrilla forces said they did not recognize the American flag.

Gen. Gillem asked whether the knowledge that the teams were operating in these areas seem[ed] to be general. Col. Drake said it did.

Col. Tourtillott asked whether there were other questions, and as there were none, continued that he would like to thank all the team members for their spendid reports, and for the spendid work they were doing in the field. He asked whether they [there] were any other matters to be brought before the meeting.

Gen. Gillem said that he wanted to express his very great appreciation to the members of these teams. He was sure that all here realized the delicate nature of the mission of these teams. Pie was certain that all could fully understand the caution that both sides felt must [be] observed in regard to exact details of troop dispositions. He himself could understand perfectly the feeling of the respective party members about security. The security of the detailed reports made by the commanders to the team chairmen must be scrupulously preserved. So long as this unfortunate situation of at least threatened hostilities existed, the team chairmen must be doubly cautious to see that the data they received should not in any way get into the possession of those who should not have it. They must take every measure to preserve the confidence of the respective leaders with whom they had contact.

Gen. Gillem continued that the members of the acting Committee of Three and the Commissioners must now be fully aware—though he assumed they were aware before—of the difficulties being met by the teams. It was quite obvious that there was an over-all necessity for an understanding at the heads of both parties. The “ends of the fingers”, which were the heads of these respective teams, could not be expected to settle policies which they were obviously not empowered to settle. The maximum judgement must continue to be exercised in these areas of immediate contact or hostilities. So, again he wanted to express his appreciation to the American officers and the officers of the two Chinese parties and to ask them to continue on their mission to the best of their ability pending the receipt of more detailed and definite directives. He further wished to request the leaders now present to urge those with whom they were associated that all exercise the maximum tolerance at this time. It was true that China was now facing a trying period, but he was not convinced that she could not meet this as she had met periods of difficulty in the past.

Gen. Gillem went on to say that the visiting group planned to return to Peiping sometime on the morning of the 16th. The exact hour was not yet known, but, if all members of the group would keep in contact with Col. Tourtillott’s headquarters, the hour of departure would be announced. It had been found necessary to change planes, so another plane was awaited at the moment. Were there any other matters to be brought up before adjournment?

Mr. Robertson said that he wished to say, on behalf of Executive Headquarters, a word of appreciation to the teams for the manner in which they were trying to carry on under very difficult circumstances. They were entitled to have not general directives, but clear, detailed instructions. As Gen. Gillem had said, this group had come on a fact-finding mission, with the purpose of making a report to the original Committee of Three immediately upon Gen. Marshall’s arrival in Chungking, in the middle of the coming week. Executive Headquarters hoped very much that the leaders in Chungking would soon reach agreement on the questions which now made it impossible for Executive Headquarters to give the teams the detailed instructions they should have. If the teams would carry on as they had been doing, for a few days more, Executive Headquarters felt confident that in a short time they could help resolve the many difficulties now facing the teams.

Col. Tourtillott said that, if anyone desired to contact the Committee of Three, they could be reached through him at his house at 6 o’clock that evening. The purpose of the visit of Teams Nos. 28 and 29 to Mukden having been accomplished, he would now direct them to return with their personnel and carry on the splendid work they had begun and were doing.

As there was no further business, the meeting adjourned.

10. Northeast Chinese Command.