Office of the Historian

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Memorandum by Colonel Ivan D. Yeaton, United States Army11

April 15, 1946
[Extract]

Final Report of Yenan Observer Group, 15 April 1946

the chinese communist party

I. General.

1. Communism is international!

[Here follows report on general aspects, on the Communist border region government, on Communist party military districts, on the 18th group army headquarters, and on aims of the party in China.]

V. Apparent Physical Aspects and Future Aims of the Chinese Communist Party.

. . . . . . .

4. Chinese Communist Party members have indicated beyond any question of doubt that their daily thinking and planning for the predictable future is towards the accomplishment of a divided China. One half of which, they will completely dominate. This, instead of the free, independent, democratic China which they ostensibly acclaim as their goal of lofty achievement. This apparent attitude may be due to the fact that in their opinion, no amalgamation with the Kmt is possible. However, it is considered to be equally certain that should a new China government ensue as a result of such amalgamation, the Communists would immediately endeavor to secure one party domination of all China while engaging in free, and open political competition with the Kmt who are not in position to meet it.

5. This conclusion is engendered as a result of frequent conferences during the past ten months with members of the Politburo, with lesser lights in the Central Committee and through daily contact with the members of the 18th Group Army Headquarters and the Liaison Group living in the Yenan Observer Group compound.

VI. Liaison Between Chinese Communist Party and Moscow.

1.
All aid, both advisory and material, rendered by the Soviet Union to the Chinese Communist Party is clandestine in nature. This status is of necessity occasioned by the ostensible relationship of Moscow to both the United States and China as indicated by secret and open agreements with these countries.
2.
Prior to three months ago, the Soviet Union maintained a three man mission in Yenan which was known as the “Tass Agency”.12 Objective of the mission was obviously the rendition of both political and military advice.
3.
Communication between the mission and the Soviet Union was through coded messages. These messages were transmitted through the Yenan radio station and then relayed into the Soviet net at some point probably in Manchuria. Proof of the fact that communication with the Soviets was maintained was noted in the fact that invariably the arrival of a Soviet plane at the Yenan airport would be anticipated twenty-four hours ahead of time. The Soviet mission conveyed such information to the Chinese Communist Party members through Poku,13 their liaison contact.
4.
Members of this Soviet mission attended political meetings of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party at times when even members of the Central Committee were not admitted. They were present at all official banquets and it was significant that the chief of the mission always sat next to Chairman Mao.14 They consistently abstained from contact with other nationals.
5.
Within the past nine months, three Soviet missions have been flown into Yenan for the purpose of discussing the future plans of the Red Army in Manchuria and undoubtedly to coordinate the movements of the Red Army with those of the Chinese Communist Army and the Manchuria underground.
6.
At the present time one member of the former mission with a new helper is constantly attendant on Chairman Mao. The chief of the present two-man mission is, ostensibly, Chairman Mao’s personal physician although Mao, contrary to general belief, appears to be entirely rested and in perfect health.
7.
Proof relative to the rendition of military aid and coordination of military effort is obvious. In substantiation of this premise, it is to be noted that the defense of Szupingkai and its attendant effective halting of the northern advance of the Central Government Armies into Manchuria was apparently the result of the following:
(a)
Large stores of captured Japanese war material, including ammunition and weapons were furnished by the Soviets to the Chinese Communist Armies.
(b)
Coordination of the withdrawal of the Soviet occupational forces on a schedule favorable to the Chinese Communist forces thus enabling the latter to make timely and accurate tactical consolidations.
8.
Direct positive proof based upon personal observation together with much circumstantial evidence definitely establishes the fact that the Soviet Union is guiding the destinies of one of its strongest satellites, the Chinese Communist Party, as it has in the past and will in the future.
Ivan D. Yeaton

Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G–2
  1. Commanding Officer, U. S. Army Observer Group at Yenan, Shensi, from July 31, 1945, until April 11, when the group was withdrawn except for one officer and two enlisted men. Lt. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, China, forwarded this report to General Marshall in his letter dated May 9, not printed.↩
  2. Official Soviet news organ.↩
  3. Chin Pang-hsien (known as Boku), member of the Chinese Communist Party’s Politburo.↩
  4. Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Party’s Central Committee.↩