Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume IX

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Meeting of Acting Committee of Three and Three Commissioners With Members of Team 27 at Mukden, April 14, 1946, 3 p.m.

Mukden, April 14, 1946, 3 p.m.

• The following were present:
  • National Government:
    • Lt. Gen. Ch’in Teh-chun
    • Lt. Gen. Cheng Kai-min
    • Lt. Gen. YuTa-wei
    • Lt. Gen. Chao Chia-shan
    • Maj. Gen. Tang Yen
    • Col. Peter Pee
    • Col. Sammy Yuan
  • Communist Party:
    • Lt. Gen. Lo Jui-ching
    • Lt. Gen. Yao Shu-shih
    • Maj. Gen. Ch’en Shih-chu
    • Hwang Hwa
    • Chang Wen-chin
    • Ko Pai-nien
  • American:
    • Lt. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.
    • Walter S. Robertson
    • Col. Raymond R. Tourtillott
    • Col. K. K. Lau
    • Major L. W. Berger
    • Capt. S. Karrick
    • Capt. J. T. Young
    • Philip D. Sprouse

Col. Tourtillott, presiding, called the meeting to order and said that, as chairman of Team No. 27, he wished to welcome all present to Mukden. He would introduce first Mr. Robertson, the United States Commissioner from Peiping.

Mr. Robertson said that the Executive Headquarters regretted very much that it had been impossible to bring the Committee of Three to Mukden. Due to circumstances of which all were aware, none of the original Committee could be present here today. But he knew that the members of the Headquarters teams would be delighted to welcome General Gillem and the representatives of the National Government and Communist Party who were present to listen to the problems of the teams and gather information to be presented to the Committee of Three immediately upon the arrival of General Marshall within the next few days. He took pleasure in presenting Gen. Gillem, who, as all present knew, had been acting for Gen. Marshall during the latter’s absence in the States.

Gen. Gillem said that, on behalf of his colleagues, the acting Committee of Three, he would like to express appreciation for the reception tendered them on arrival. Speaking personally, it was a great pleasure for him to be able to extend his personal friendship with many of the officers in this area. As Mr. Robertson had said, at the time of leaving Chungking unfortunately none of the original members of the Committee of Three was available, for one reason or another. The delay in Peiping was due to the illness of Gen. Yeh and also because he (Gen. Gillem) expected definite information from Gen. Marshall with reference to his movements. When it was definitely determined that he was en route to China, then the group could move and attempt to bring to him first-hand information from the sources available to them in Mukden as to the situation in Manchuria. So, the plan was to get this briefing at the present meeting. Tomorrow teams would be brought in from the field, from the North and East, probably in the morning and afternoon. The group could extend their knowledge through briefing from those teams. In addition to the time spent in these general meetings, the respective members could consult with the echelons of their parties in this area, and in that way the three original members of the Committee of Three would be posted upon the return of this group to Chungking. Personally, speaking as an American, he (Gen. Gillem) hoped that it would be possible to arrive at a solution of this problem that would benefit China.

Col. Tourtillott said that, before proceeding with the briefing, he would like to introduce his fellow team members, “so that you will know whom to throw the rocks at”. He then introduced the National Government representative, Gen. Chao, and the Communist Party representative, Gen. Yao, and said that he and they had spent many hours wrestling over their problems and were in hopes that the visiting group would be able to carry back the story of their difficulties and give them a clear and definite directive.

Col. Tourtillott then introduced Gen. Chrn Teh-chun, Gen. Oven Shih-chu and Gen. Yu Ta-wei, and Mr. Robertson introduced Gen. Cheng Kai-min and Gen. Lo Jui-ching.

Col. Tourtillott said: “Now that we all know each other we are ready to go to work.” He then gave a summary of the situation, as follows:

When Gen. Byroade, Director of Operations, left Mukden on April 6 (Col. Tourtillott said), he left certain instructions with the teams in Mukden. At the time he left, the Communist Party delegates for all the teams were in Mukden ready to go, and the last contingent of National Government representatives were expected to arrive that afternoon. Gen. Byroade desired that teams go into the field on the morning of Sunday, April 7, if it was possible to get them into the field. It was his desire that Team No. 27 exercise operational jurisdiction over the other Manchurian teams and that Team No. 27 have a joint meeting on the evening of April 6 to establish that jurisdiction and to issue instructions to the teams to go into the field. He felt that one team should be dispatched to the North of Mukden and one to the South, but further details he was willing to leave to the discretion of Team No. 27.

The National Government representatives (Col. Tourtillott continued) did arrive on the afternoon of the 6th of April, and a meeting was held that evening. In this meeting it was established that Team No. 27 had operational jurisdiction over the other teams. They then proceeded to establish the interpretation by the team of the directives which were at hand. First it was discussed whether the team agreed on the interpretation that the Manchurian directive of March 26 [27] should be accepted and should govern the activities of all the field teams in Manchuria. All agreed that it should be applied and that the teams should be governed by its provisions. Next the meeting proceeded to establish the interpretation of the Cease-Fire Order. After long hours of discussion—to make a long story short—the proposal that the Cease-Fire Order apply and govern all activities of the Manchurian teams was voted on. The National Government representative and the United States representative voted for the proposal that the Cease-Fire Order, with its “Remarks” in paragraph 5, should apply to the activities of the Manchurian teams. The Communist Party representative voted that it did not apply unless the paragraph 5 remarks be deleted therefrom. The team then agreed unanimously on a radio to be sent to the three Commissioners in Peiping, asking for clarification on this matter. It was then determined that Team No. 28 would go to the area between Changtu and Ssupingkai, and that Team No. 29 should go to the area between Fushun and Penhsi. It was next discussed when the teams should go. The National Government side contended that the teams should not go unless they were instructed to be governed by both the Cease-Fire Order and the Manchurian directive. The Communist Party representative expressed the desire that they not go into the field unless they operated only under the Manchurian directive. These reasons, Col. Tourtillott said, were, he believed, obvious to everyone and need not be discussed further. However, after many more hours of discussion, it was unanimously agreed that the teams be given a temporary mission to get them into the field. Pending further instructions from Peiping, the teams were given all that could be unanimously agreed upon to work with. So, it was finally agreed that the teams should go into the field as early as possible on the morning of the 8th of April, instructed only to investigate troop dispositions, pending receipt of detailed instructions. As chairman, Col. Tourtillott said he regretted very much that the interpretation of the directives which he felt were at hand could not be unanimously agreed upon. He felt that the Cease-Fire Order and the Manchurian directive went hand in hand and should not be separated. But this was not the unanimous interpretation.

Team No. 29, Col. Tourtillott went on, got away the next morning at 8:45, by truck. Team No. 28 got away at 9:30 that morning, also by truck. Team No. 28 encountered some little difficulty as it reached the field; there was some discussion as to whether the Communist Party side should be permitted to use their radio; there was some restriction placed on the personnel of the team, as well as on the team activity in the Kaiyuan area. These matters, Col. Tourtillott said, had been presented informally and formally to the National Government representative, who gave assurances that steps would be taken to correct the situation. No serious problems were encountered by the team (No. 29) sent to the Fushun area, although both teams had encountered some difficulty in accomplishing their mission of getting the order of battle of both sides.

Col. Tourtillott said that he thought further details at this time were unnecessary. He had notified all members of the teams in the field and expected Team 28 personnel to arrive in Mukden on the evening of the 14th and Team 29 personnel perhaps on the morning of the 15th. He believed this was as much detail as we desired from him, inasmuch as the field teams were coming in and could personally present their stories. He would now like to ask the National Government representative on Team No. 27 to give his idea of the situation and a brief summary from his point of view.

Gen. Chao said that he fully agreed with Col. Tourtillott’s account of the action taken by Team No. 27. Col. Tourtillott’s story was impartial and went into detail of how that team had carried out its work. Teams going into the field would of course meet with difficulties, but every effort would be made to straighten them out. So far as was now known, they were working very smoothly. He hoped that from time to time the team would be given guidance in its work.

Col. Tourtillott then asked Gen. Yao (Communist Party member of Team No. 27) to make a few remarks on the activities of the team from his viewpoint.

Gen. Yao said that he agreed with Col. Tourtillott’s account of the situation, but wished to add a few remarks. When Communist personnel for the teams reached Mukden airfield, 42 of them were detained by National Government authorities for three and a half hours. He (Gen. Yao) appreciated very much the help given by the American representatives in this situation, especially Gen. Byroade, but up to now no reply had been received from the National Government authorities in Mukden about this incident. About Directive No. 1 (the Cease-Fire Order) he considered that directives by the Committee of Three should be the basis for the field teams’ activities in the Northeastern Provinces. The teams were sent here under the special Manchurian directive. The Communist members of Team No. 28, sent to the Kaiyuan area, Gen. Yao continued, still, up to the present time, had no freedom of radio communication. Their freedom of movement was also hampered. A platoon of armed soldiers and two plainclothes men were posted in the house where they lived. When Field Team No. 29 reached Fushun, both the American and National Government representatives were well treated by Communist authorities there. Gen. Yao went on to say that he appreciated very much the cooperative spirit and the friendliness of the American and National Government representatives while they were all working together. He hoped that more help and more instructions would be given by the Committee of Three in Chungking and the three Commissioners in Peiping.

Mr. Robertson said that, on behalf of the three Commissioners of Executive Headquarters, he would like to say how sorry they were that the representatives in Manchuria found themselves in the predicament of trying to decide among themselves instead of having instructions as to what directives did or did not apply to their operations. Under the plan of operation the Committee of Three in Chungking made Chinese agreements. Those agreements were then sent to Executive Headquarters, so that the Headquarters could then issue directives to the teams as to how these decisions should be implemented. He thought all would agree that under no circumstances should it be possible for team members to decide which directives should be obeyed and which disobeyed. However, in this case, he would be the first to admit that the confusion was not the fault of the teams, but the fault of their superiors, the Executive Headquarters. The reason that the Executive Headquarters had not been able to issue clarifying instructions to the teams was that it had not been able to obtain clarifying instructions from the Committee of Three in Chungking. Just as Chinese sometimes reached agreements, so they also sometimes reached disagreements. The directives issued to Executive Headquarters by the Committee of Three were certainly (speaking for himself, at least) the directives on which the Headquarters operated until contrary directives were issued by the Committee of Three. The representatives of Executive Headquarters were very glad to hear of the fine spirit existing in personal relationships between the team members while they were discussing these controversial subjects, and hoped that very soon this whole issue could be clarified to the satisfaction of all concerned.

Col. Tourtillott said that he would now like to ask the National Government representative, Gen. Ch’in, to express his thoughts in this meeting.

Gen. Ch’in said that he was very glad to hear Col. Tourtillott’s report. After hearing it he was very much gratified by the earnestness and the effort made by the team representatives, especially the American representative. Such difficulties as had arisen were technical difficulties, and he was sure that, with such earnestness and effort as were being shown by Col. Tourtillott and the other representatives, they could all be overcome. It was particularly fortunate that Gen. Marshall was now on his way back to China. It was a pleasure to him (Gen. Ch’in) to accompany Gen. Gillem and Mr. Robertson to Mukden to determine the facts in the field in order that information might be given to Gen. Marshall. With his able guidance some sort of satisfactory solution would be reached. He (Gen. Ch’in) would like to take this opportunity to express to all members concerned, and especially the American member, his appreciation for their earnestness and effort and his hope that the problem would be solved.

Col. Tourtillott said he would now like to call on Gen. Lo to say a few words as Communist Party representative for the Committee of Three. (Gen. Lo’s interpreter had explained to Col. Tourtillott that Gen. Lo, rather than Gen. Ch’en, would speak for the Communist representative on the Committee.)

Gen. Lo said that he regretted that Gen. Chou En-lai and Gen. Yeh Chien-ying had both been unable to come to Mukden. Gen. Chou had at first intended to come himself, but because of the unfortunate incident of the missing plane, in which many Communist leaders were killed, he was unable to leave Chungking. He then authorized Gen. Yeh to represent him, but Gen. Yeh was ill and so asked Gen. Lo and Gen. Ch’en to accompany Gen. Gillem. On behalf of Gen. Chou and Gen. Yeh, he wished to express their appreciation for the efforts made by the members of the teams in Mukden. Of course there were many difficulties, but in the short period they had been here the teams had accomplished so much that their work should be greatly appreciated. The purpose of this trip, as Gen. Gillem, Mr. Robertson and Gen. Ch’in had said, was to collect first-hand information. Although there were difficulties, the teams should carry on their work and do their best. Particularly since Gen. Marshall was coming back within a few days, he (Gen. Lo) felt confident that, once the first-hand information for the Committee of Three had been collected, they would be able to overcome the difficulties. In the whole world, in China and in Manchuria, everyone needed peace, and for that purpose further efforts would have to be made. He felt sure that the difficulties could be overcome and hoped that the work in Manchuria would have greater success.

Col. Tourtillott then called on Gen. Cheng Kai-min, National Government Commissioner from Peiping, to present his comments.

Gen. Cheng said that Mr. Robertson had said all that he wanted to say.

Col. Tourtillott then called on Gen. Ch’en. Gen. Ch’en said that Gen. Lo had spoken for him.

Col. Tourtillott asked Gen. Yu if he had any comments, and Gen. Yu said that he had nothing to add to what Gen. Gillem had said.

Gen. Gillem commented that the present meeting did not indicate that “long-winded discussions” were held in Mukden.

Gen. Gillem then continued that it seemed the group had traveled a long way only to find that everybody was very friendly and all problems were apparently solved. We [Was?] he to believe that? He would like to express his appreciation to all these officers for their very earnest effort to help in meeting this problem. The Committee also appreciated the fact that the representatives had in their minds very definite understandings—or misunderstandings—and that they were men enough to present those points of view. He thought it was a very good principle to express differences of opinion, because by so doing, those opinions were brought forward and the differences could be adjusted. In the brief time he had been in China it had become quite evident to him that frequently discussions were held and reports exaggerated on the basis of inaccurate information, because information was bound to be difficult to obtain in a country as big as China. In Gen. Marshall’s press conference in the States⁹ he expressed the same opinion—that it was quite possible that a thorough understanding did not obtain in Manchuria insofar as the opinion at hand was concerned. He (Gen. Gillem) trusted that, by getting first-hand information, it would be possible to at least minimize some of the reports that had largely been exaggerated. He had frequently heard that one of the outstanding characteristics of the Chinese was patience. Ink was also cheap and was used very freely over here. It was his earnest wish that lots of ink would be used, also plenty of words—and the powder be conserved. He hoped that in the two days the group was here they would become well-informed and, through the channels available to each of them, could pass back available data which the Committee of Three could use effectively.

Col. Tourtillott then said that Gen. Gillem had suggested that the meeting now adjourn, each side going to its own conference room to talk to its own representatives and get all the first-hand information it was possible to get.

The General had also suggested, Col. Tourtillott went on, that all press release[s] gotten out here be agreed to by all three branches before being released, in order that a unified, agreed document might be presented to the public. All such documents should be coordinated by him (Col. Tourtillott) and he would then release them to the press.

Mr. Robertson said that, for the information of the Committee of Three, he would like to mention that this had been a long-standing rule of Executive Headquarters. In the early days of operation the rule had been adopted that no press release should be issued except by unanimous agreement.

Gen. Gillem said that the same rule was followed by the Committee of Three. Col. Tourtillott said it was also followed by Team No. 27.

Col. Tourtillott then said that, as the time of arrival of the field teams was rather indefinite, Gen. Gillem had asked him to say that the next meeting would be announced as soon as the time of arrival was known. He suggested that everyone hold himself in readiness from about 9 a.m. tomorrow on and he would notify them individually of the meeting time.

As there was no further business the meeting adjourned.

9. March 16, regarding American assistance to China; see Department of State Bulletin, March 24, 1946, p. 484.