Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume IX

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Meeting of the Acting Committee of Three at Hsuan Hwa Tian, May 8, 1946, 3:15 p.m.

Hsuan Hwa Tian, May 8, 1946, 3:15 p.m.

• The following were present:
  • National Government:
    • Gen. Wong—Deputy Chief of Staff, Wu Han Headquarters of the Generalissimo, Representing General Hsu Yung-Chang.
    • Gen. Lu —Deputy Director of Operations, Wu Han Headquarters of the Generalissimo.
  • Communist Party:
    • Gen. Chou En-lai
    • Gen. Li Hsi[e]n-Nien—Commanding General, Communist Party Central Area Forces.
    • Gen. Wang —Chief of Staff, Communist Party Central Area Forces.
    • Mr. Chang
  • United States:
    • Gen. Henry A. Byroade
    • Lt. Col. W. D’ettore
    • Capt. Jack T. Young

Gen. Wang (CP): “Generals, I appreciate very much your coming in spite of all the difficulties.

“The meeting is called to order. General Li (CP) will give a report of the present situation here.”

Gen. Li (CP): “On behalf of the Central China Region of the Communist Forces, I express our welcome to General Byroade, General Wong, General Lu and General Chou. I will now submit a report on the present situation in this area.

“I personally feel that the situation in this area is rather serious. That means that hostilities are pending in this area. As a basis for my estimate of the situation here, I have information which shows that movement of the Nationalists’ troops around this area is very heavy. This movement is from both a strategic and tactical point of view and is of an offensive character. For example, the 34th Division of the 72nd Army which was stationed before the Cease-Fire agreement in Shih Hui Yao, below Hankow on the south bank of Yangtze River, according to our latest information arrived at Macheng, to the east of the Communist area on April 28.

“As another example, the two regiments of the New 13th Division of the 72nd Army—which are the 38th and the 39th regiments—originally stationed at Sung Pu to the south of Macheng, have arrived at Shiao Kai Ling on March 24 and launched attacks on the Communist forces. The 43rd Regiment of the New 15th Division of the 72nd Army entered the town of Chinfu on May 4. In the town of Shan Cheng in South Honan when the cease-fire agreement was signed there was only one regiment of the 48th Army. Now that place has been reinforced to four regiments, this movement taking place toward the end of March. The 47th Army, which originally had its Headquarters at Loshan on May 3, moved into Huang Oman, southeast of Honan. Furthermore, the 125th Division of the 47th Army, originally stationed at Loshan, has also moved to Huang Chuan. One division of the 41st Army has moved from Ch’ueh Shan toward Huang Chuan. Coming to the Peiping–Hankow railroad, we noticed that the 596th Regiment of the 199th Division of the 66th Army, which was originally stationed at Hwa Yuan, has now moved to Hsin Yang. When we move on a little further, we find that the New 10th Division, which was originally stationed at Hsuchow and Suo Hsing, has now moved around the middle toward Tai Ho and Fu Yang. According to other information, the 404th Regiment of the 135th Division, which was originally stationed at Li Shan in North Hopeh [Hupeh], on May 3 moved to Ma Ping and Hwa Yuan. At the same time, the 15th Army, stationed at Pi Yang in Honan, moved partly toward Hsin Yang. As to the 10th Army, which around January 10, was stationed in Han Chun, in March moved toward Lao Ho Kou, and then moved to this Communist area.

“Therefore, it can be concluded that the movement of Nationalist troops is both strategically and tactically of an offensive nature with the purpose of annihilating the Communist forces. Not only the movement alone emphasizes the seriousness of the situation. Many engagements launched by the Nationalist troop[s] have indicated its seriousness. What is most surprising to us is the attacks launched by the Nationalist troops at Shiao Chih Ling to the north of Macheng and to the south of Shang Cheng. During this attack, two regiments of the 72nd Army launched an offensive at 5 o’clock a.m. eg April 25. That started out in four routes; from Fu Tian Ho and Liang Lu Ko toward the Communist position in Shiao Chih Ling; the Shiao Chih Ling is already occupied by the Nationalist troops. Since this location is garrisoned by the main forces of the Communist troops, it shows that the Government aims to start a large scale battle at this place.

“On April 15, one company of the Nationalist troops 174th Division launched an attack from Shang Cheng and Yu Chia Chi and attacked one platoon of Communist patrols. These two engagements differ from the other engagements in the far-flung areas in this respect: that they were fought with the main forces.

“Coming to the Hsin Yang area. On April 14, the 554th Regiment of the 185th Division launched an attack setting out from Fung Chia Chuang, 40 li west of Hsin Yang toward Wang Kwang, and occupied that place. Now the National Government controls that position and has erected blockhouses.

“On April 14 at 9 o’clock a.m., two battalions of the 13th Division of the 66th Army started out from Ying Shan and occupied Er Shih Li-Pu, Ma Chia-ho and Hen Tien to the north of Ying Shan. Again, in the forenoon of April 24, the 596th Regiment of the 199th Division of the 66th Army set out from Hsin Yang and occupied the Communist position in Chin Shih Chiao.

“One battalion of the 595th Regiment of the 199th Division attacked on April 24 from Hsin Yang eastward toward Tu-cheng, 30 li to the east of Hsin Yang. During this engagement, 8 men of one of our platoons were captured by the Nationalist troops. We lost 6 rifles and one light machine gun.

“The 13th Division of the 66th Army sent the 38th Regiment and two battalions of the 39th Regiment with local troops to attack at 10 o’clock a.m. on April 23 the Communist positions in An-Lu and Ying Shan. They occupied Lau Chia Tien, Li Chia Tien and Ying Chia Tien. They also occupied the strategic point of Chi Yang Shan.

“Up until now, the two armies are staying in close contact with each other. Previously, there had been some dispute over this area. After the intervention of the Field Team, the line of separation between the two armies was determined. Due to the latest action on the part of the Nationalist troops, that agreement has been broken. The neutral zone has been occupied by the Nationalist troops. In addition to that, they occupied Chi Yang Shan, which is acknowledged to be the base of Communist forces.

“In coordination with these engagements, the National Government at An-Lu conducted many activities. I will prepare a memorandum on this subject to be submitted to Executive Headquarters as well as to the Committee of Three.

“In the vicinity of Huang An and Huang Pi, the Nationalist troops on March 17 occupied the following places in the neighborhood of Huang An: Chang Tien, Kao Chiao Ho, Miso Chi Wan and Ta Tsin Shan and Hsiao Tsin Shan. The Communist forces in the area between Huang An and Huang Pi have been restricted to a very small place with only two townlets, Shih Tse Shu Tian and Ta Er Kang. But even so, on April 2, the Nationalist troops launched a four route attack on this Communist area and, up until now, the two armies are still opposing each other.

“This gives a general outline of the situation here during the last fortnight. During this fortnight, the attacks made by the Nationalist troops have been rather frequent and so far as I can judge, the Nationalist troops seem to be motivated by two aims. The first one is to carry out the annihilation plan; particularly from the movements and the attacks by Nationalist troops, their annihilation plan has become obvious. Also, we have submitted a report to the Peiping Executive Headquarters as well as to Yenan regarding the situation here. We received information here from Yenan about the Nationalists around this area. They reported that a National Government general made a tour through Hsuchow and made preparations for an overall attack on the Communist area here.

“According to our information, the command system of the Nationalist troops has also undergone some change. The 47th Army and the 41st Army was under the Command of General Liu Chih and the 48th Army was originally under the command of General Hsia Wei, but they now all come under the unified command of General Chow Ai, under the Hankow Generalissimo’s Field Headquarters. Particularly, the command post of General Chow Ai, has moved to a place near Hua Yuan, and we cannot understand this, particularly since the cease-fire agreement is in effect.

“Furthermore, Directive 4²³ of Executive Headquarters provided for the removal of blockhouses. Also, when Field Team 9 arrived I raised this question. It was agreed by the field team and the agreement has been published here that all blockhouses should be removed, but in actual practice, this was never carried out. On the contrary, the number of blockhouses has been increased. According to a rough estimate, there are altogether over 6,000 blockhouses around the Communist area here.

“Our further information told of Nationalist troops being issued rations to be carried in battle, and they were all equipped so that they are ready for combat. In addition to that, recently we have found lots of bandits in the far flung areas as well as in the vicinity where our main forces are stationed. As I see the matter, these bandits are not bandits of the usual kind, but have a political background. Furthermore, the information we received said that the Nationalist troops are trying to carry out the annihilation plan in the form of banditry and staged people’s disturbances; not only military preparations were made.

“Furthermore, with regard to the political aspects of the situation public opinion has been mobilized by the National Government. They had reported that we attacked Ho Kou and at another time attacked southeast Honan. The most amazing thing was that I even received notification from Executive Headquarters, saying that 20,000 men under my command had moved toward Fu Yang and I was even blamed by the Communist Commissioner for moving the Communist troops without receiving an order. The Communist Commissioner said he received the message on April 2, from General Chang (NG Commissioner) to that effect. So I asked General Yeh how the Communist could move so large a force, and I asked for the destination of the alleged movement of Communist troops. I asked that Executive Headquarters investigate the matter. In case there are 20,000 Communist troops there, I would like to have them suppressed by the Nationalist troops. I deem this kind of allegation as being entirely without foundation.

“Coming to the deportation of wounded and sick soldiers, this question was first brought up by the Hankow Field Team to Executive Headquarters, suggesting that 1,000 sick and wounded be sent out. This was approved by Executive Headquarters. The field team agreed that this movement could be made by May 1. Under the pretext that there was not enough rolling stock, the movement of those Communist personnel has been delayed. This led us to suspect that the National Government was not willing to move these personnel. Since the ceasefire order, we cannot yet notice any kind of peaceful atmosphere in this vicinity.

“The Communist personnel sent out from this area for the purpose of purchasing food or for communications purposes have been arrested many times. The number arrested amounts to a total of over 360 men. When we have all this information pieced together it shows that the Nationalist troops intend to annihilate our forces, and this annihilation plan is to be carried out in various forms. In case we should make counter-attacks, the Nationalist troops would [have] alleged that we were trying to force our way out. Under such circumstances, our losses would be very heavy and we would never try to make any kind of counter-attack.

“Of course, I, myself, would like to give assurance that, so long as the Nationalist troops do [not] carry out the annihilation plan, we will not undertake any large scale action against them. Therefore, I wish to make this request to the Committee of Three and Executive Headquarters—that they try to adjust the situation on the basis of the conditions here. In case they find my report not true, then I would like them to undertake a survey. My present report is confined to activities during the last fortnight. As to attacks made between January 13 and a fortnight ago by the Nationalist troops, I will not mention them here, but I will mention them in a separate memorandum to be submitted to Executive Headquarters and to the Committee of Three.

“In view of the above, it seems to me that our military region is subjected to very difficult circumstances. I think that both the Committee of Three as well as General Byroade of Executive Headquarters are aware that, militarily, we are placed in an inferior position in this area. So, obviously, the allegations made by the National Government that we are trying to break the cease-fire agreement and that we are trying to launch attacks are not true. These allegations serve no other purpose than to slander the Communist forces here. In order to avoid conflict, as early as the time when General Marshall was in Hankow, I proposed to the Committee of Three that the Communist forces here be moved. In view of the serious circumstances now prevailing, it seems to me indispensable that I raise this question again.

“We have the following reasons for requesting the movement of our forces. According to the Army Reorganization plan, there should be a reorganization of all units. As the Communist force[s] here are half under the command of the New 4th Army and half under the 8th Route Army, we deem it necessary that the Army be permitted to move. In addition to that, we have financial, as well as food difficulties in this area. It is alleged that we are conscripting food from the populace here, but actually we have stopped conscripting food from this area. We now depend on money supplied by the Communists in North China to purchase food in this area. As to what should be the destination of our move, I will not go into this question here, though previously we have proposed that we would like to have our forces moved to North Kiangsu. However, I would leave it to the Executive Headquarters and the Committee of Three as to where our forces should be moved. The junior officers as well as the enlisted men of our forces are rather inclined to stay in this area since this area was established and developed and cultivated by them in the days of the war against the Japanese. They feel very much attached to this area, but now, to obey the reorganization plan, we would like to move our troops to some other area. Though this question has been brought up over two months ago, it has not yet been resolved. Now this question can be easily settled, and, if the Government is not willing to have our forces move away, then it seems to us that their purpose is to starve our army and then carry out their annihilation plan. There can be no other interpretation.

“Therefore, I wish seriously to bring up the question of the movement of our troops to you. Of course, the movement of the forces will take some time even if provisions for it have been made by the Committee of Three or Executive Headquarters; it cannot be expected to be carried out in a day or two. There are 60,000 men in this area, so I wish to submit the following to the Committee of Three and Executive Headquarters: This first thing is that assurance should be made that there will be no further hostilities. On my part, I will personally take responsibility that no attacks will be made by the Communist forces. Secondly, seeing that the Communist forces are confined to such a small area, in order to carry out Directive 2, it is proposed that both armies should withdraw to their positions as of midnight January 13 and that the Nationalist troops will do likewise so that they will evacuate the town of Kwang Shan which was occupied by them at 8 o’clock a.m. on January 14. Of course, not only the town of Kwang Shan itself is involved. Subsequent to January 13, many places have been occupied by the Nationalist troops. It is requested that the Nationalist Government evacuate all places mentioned in a memorandum prepared by me. When this has been carried out, the Communist area will become larger and it would be easier for us to procure food. The third request is that Directive 4 be thoroughly executed and that all blockhouses be removed and all lines of communication be reopened. The fourth request is that the decision of Executive Headquarters to move 1,000 sick and wounded and 100 dependents to An-Yang will be put into effect. The fifth thing is that demobilization has already been under way in this area. So far, 15,000 men have been demobilized, but on account of the fact that many of them have been arrested by the Nationalist Government, they feel that there is no security and many of them have come back. I request that their security be protected. The sixth request is, seeing that summer is here and it is now more likely that there will be an increase of sick soldiers, and since we are so greatly [in] lack [of] medicines and medical supplies, we hope that this problem can be settled. Lastly, there is a very great difficulty with regard to finance and food. Some of our troops have only two meals of porridge a day and in one of our units it happened that the man in charge of the kitchens and mess felt very helpless. We wish that arrangements be made to alleviate financial and food conditions. This is the report I wish to make to you gentlemen. Regarding the requests, I think the best way is for our troops to be permitted to move at an early date. Right now, the National Government is suspicious that we have some kind of plan. If our troops can move to some other place, they will have no cause to suspect us.

“One more request I wish to mention is that the people arrested by the National Government troops be released. I would like to know if General Wang Chien (CP) has any supplementary report to make.”

Gen. Wang (CP): “Shall we have a five-minute rest?”

(The meeting recessed for five minutes and reconvened to report the following):

Gen. Wang (CP): “We earnestly hope, with confidence, that General Byroade, General Wong (NG) and General Chou will agree on effective measures to resolve the problem here so that the situation can be stabilised through peaceful means.

“To supplement the report of General Li (CP), I wish to state that, since January 13, hostilities have not ceased in this area. The Nationalist troops have undertaken measures to annihilate several tens of thousands of Communist personnel in this area. I will stand by the statement of General Li (CP). According to a Directive of Executive Headquarters to Kuang Shan and the agreement reached at Loshan and due to the responsible attitude of Colonel Ford, we have, in general, brought hostilities in this area to a stop. Despite all that, the Nationalist troops have, by besieging and blockading the Communist areas, repeatedly gained positions and reinforced their troops.

“The second chairman of the 9th Field Team, Colonel Graves, for the purpose of carrying out Directive 4, has made a long tour through this area and the Peiping–Hankow railroad to make a survey. He then specified that many blockhouses in this area should be removed and no new ones should be permitted to be erected. In actual practice however, the Nationalist troops have been stalling in carrying out Directive 4. On the contrary, they have erected several thousands of new blockhouses in this area. All these facts I am sure Colonel Graves has seen himself, as they were also seen by the American council [consul] who came along with him.

“Previously, the Communist area here was still connected with the Communist area in Honan and in East Hopeh [Hupeh], but, during the last two or three months, they have been isolated by the Nationalist troops by virtue of those blockhouses, and the Nationalists have moved into positions between those Communist areas. Now the Nationalist troops are adopting tactics of besieging and blockading the Communist area. For example, a junior officer of the Nationalist troops in the neighborhood of Huang An and Huang Pi has told us confidentially that they have received orders to suppress Communist troops, and the same thing happened to the west of the Peiping–Hankow railroad. Once the erection of the blockhouses for the purposes of besieging and blockading the Communist area has been completed, then a plan worked out by General Pai Chung Hsi and General Ho Ying-Chin will be put into effect, which they have been carrying out since May 5.

“We have prepared an overlay to show the details of that scheme and it will be submitted. Several army units have been brought from the Third War Area and sent to the front lines around the Communist areas; these are: the 48th Army, the 47th Army, the 41st Army, the 72nd Army and the 66th Army. The massing movements of those forces are not for the purpose of strengthening the blockade but rather they are disposed for launching major attacks along several lines. They have been assembled in certain concentrated places. The 66th Army, the 75th Army and a part of the 18th Army are under the Command of General Chou Ai and are disposed along the Peiping–Hankow railway toward Hsuan Hwa Tien. The 72nd Army, under the command of General Fu Yi, is moving from Macheng and Chin Fu toward the north. The 47th Army, under the command of General Cheng Ting Shun, is attacking from Kwang Shan and Hwang Chuan toward the south. The 48th Army is assembled at Shang Cheng. In the neighboring Nationalist troop areas labor and bridge material are being conscripted, and transportation activity is heavy.

“Were it not for the coming of the Committee of Three and the General from Executive Headquarters, I believe the offensive would have long ago broken out. In particular, we have received reliable information from Nationalist troops in adjacent areas saying that the suppression campaign will be launched on May 5. Recently, among the soldiers and junior officers of the Nationalist forces, as well as among the civil administration, the Communists were called ‘bandits’ or ‘traitor bandits’ and when I asked by [why?] they say this, they reply that they have received orders that the Communists will be suppressed. The allegations made by the Central News saying that we are attacking different places or that we are moving to other places like Fu Yang are all measures designed to prepare mentally the large scale annihilation campaign so that they will have a pretext to launch attacks. I wish to state frankly that at the time General Marshall, General Chang Chih Chung and General Chou En-lai came to Hankow, General Li (CP) and myself made a trip to Hankow to ask for movement of our forces. At that time, in my confidential talk with Colonel Graves, he told me that the best way to resolve the situation were [there?] was to evacuate the Communist troops. Colonel Graves also expressed the opinion that the wisest and most reliable assurance of peace would be to evacuate the Communist forces. At that time, no decision was made on the point of evacuation. We made serious preparations to overcome all the difficulties ahead of us, and when I was coming back by instruction of General Li (CP), I made an inspection tour in this area. I saw that all our forces are deeply engaged in rural productive work. They went into the hills to collect wood. They have also cultivated vegetables so that they may sustain themselves for a long time. This can also be seen by the Nationalist troops in the surrounding areas.

“We firmly upheld the peace principle and the cease-fire agreement, as well as the Army Reorganization Plan. Seeing that our requests have not been agreed upon by the Committee of Three, the only way out for us is to try to sustain ourselves by planting vegetables and to raise hogs so as to maintain the health of our soldiers. This is why we cannot understand their alleging that we are trying to find a way out. Evidently, these statements are not made because they are ill-informed, but rather because they are deliberately trying to libel the Communist forces so that they can have a pretext to annihilate our forces.

“To firmly uphold peaceful policy and adjustment by peaceful means, we again request the Committee of Three and the Peiping Executive Headquarters as well as the Government representative here that, in view of present conditions, they will speedily solve the question of evacuation of the Communist troops. I personally wish to state, in a frank manner, that if the Government thinks that they can annihilate the several tens of thousands of Communist forces, I think they have enough experience and lessons in the past so that they can understand that, despite so many lines of blockhouses, they will not prevent the Communist forces from going wherever they want to. We can even go to those places where we are least desired by the Nationalist troops, because those blockhouses cannot prevent the Communist forces from going through.

“The only reason we can truly explain why the Government does not want the Communists to evacuate is that they are engineering a large scale civil war and they wish to have that civil war started from this point. I personally feel confident that on the Communist side unless they give up the peaceful policy, they will not be annihilated. (This last sentence was repeated at the request of General Byroade.) Even if we are branded as bandits, blockaded and our demobilized soldiers arrested, all our soldiers realize this: that in order to sustain themselves, in order to maintain their honor that they have established during the anti-Japanese War, in order to preserve themselves, the nation and the Chinese people, and in this anti-Fascist War, they must not let themselves be annihilated as bandits or traitors.

“In view of the present situation, in order that the peace aspired to by the Chinese people can be realized, it is imperative that Directives 4 and 6²⁴ of Executive Headquarters be immediately carried out.

“Lastly and most fundamentally, I hope that the problem of evacuation of the Communist troops can be speedily settled; otherwise, I personally feel that there is no way to stop the Communist forces. Therefore, I hope that the Nationalist generals will consider my personal views on this matter and the solemn statement I have just made.

“An overlay has been prepared regarding the disposition of troops in this area and a report submitted to Executive Headquarters and the Committee of Three. I wish to request that the representative of Executive Headquarters and the Committee of Three, as well as the Generalissimo’s headquarters in Hankow, send representative officers to survey the situation in the neighboring area and determine the disposition of the troops, the strategical key points captured by the Nationalist troops, as well as the large scale military fortifications in this area, [which] are all factual evidence.”

Gen. Byroade: “Thank you. I would like to know if General Wong (NG) has any comment to make on this presentation.”

Gen. Wong (NG): “I will ask my assistant to give a brief resume of the situation from the National Government point of view touching the points that the Communist generals have just raised.”

“Gen. Lu (NG): “After listening to the report by both the Communist generals here, I feel that my coming here has great significance because I feel that when you come face to face with people concerned, you can always solve problems. I, myself, am responsible for the operations in the Generalissimo’s Wu-Han Field Headquarters. The thing that concerns me most is the contemplated move of the New 5th Division of the Communist Army. There are several possibilities in connection with this contemplated move of the Communist Army: One is that they say that the National Government plans to launch attacks on this region. Another is the alternative of reaching an agreement that will move them out peacefully. Another is that they may move out without detection and they will move in small units one at a time. In accordance with the Loshan Agreement, troops of both sides should remain where they are and maintain the status quo. Unless we have new directives from Executive Headquarters, the National Government will not agree to any movement of Communist troops in this area. The most difficult issue that we are facing is that we have no way to comply with the Communist request for evacuation. The report we have heard from these two generals here coincides with our estimation of the situation and our predictions. Their report touches all three possibilities in connection with moving. The fortunate part of it is that the Committee of Three arrived here at a good time to see that peaceful conditions here still prevail. We read the May 1 issue of the Liberated News and we gathered the impression that the Communist troops would move out of here without previous warning. Now the Communist troops are still in here waiting for further disposition. I feel that this question can easily be resolved.

“With respect to the question of evacuation that they brought up, I have one statement to make. I feel that we are facing great difficulties after hearing the remarks of General Wong, the Chief of Staff (CP) has made. The remark he made was that all the Chinese in China are looking for peace. The only reason is the Government wants to fail to gratify this wish of the people is that they want to stop us from going out of this area. The General also made the remark that if he wants to go to any place, he can get there without any difficulties in spite of this blockade that the National Government has established here. I hope, however, we will sit down here and discuss this situation in a more quiet tone. I can assure you, being a representative of the National Government, that the Government will not launch any attack on the Communist forces in this region.

“First, we can see what the Government troops’ dispositions were as of January 13. The National Government troops of the 66th Army were stationed near Hsin Yang along the railway line. A part of the 66th Army was stationed at Ting Yuan-tien and Chow Tang-fan. A small group of this 66th Army was stationed in the neighborhood of the Hsuan Hwa Tien area. This small force was attacked by the Communist forces in this region and as a result they were dispersed into the mountain region. Because of this, the regimental commander was dismissed.

“The National Government 72nd Army was stationed at Huang Pei Tsan and Chin Fu and Fu Tien Ho and Liang Lu Kou. A part of them were stationed at Sha Wo. Between January 14 and 17th, the Communist forces attacked and occupied Huang Pei Tsan and Fu Ho. The 48th Army is not under our chain of command.

“The 48th Army was stationed in Shang Cheng and Ku Chih. The general just mentioned two places and both of these places were occupied by the Communist since January 17—Yu Chia Chi and Kwan Miao Pu. The 47th Army is also not under my chain of command. Therefore, I do not know the exact disposition of the 47th Army. But their front lines are to the south of Loshan and Kwang Shan. The positions of few armies I have just mentioned coincide with what General Li (CP) has just reported. It is true that they are surrounding the Communist forces in this area on all sides. Since the ceasefire order of January 13, there were some changes in the disposition of troops, but there is no large-scale troop movement to change stations or positions. In this cease-fire order, no limit is placed on change of garrison duties. However, the Communist forces changed the garrison troops from one station to another very frequently. For instance, the 15th Brigade of the Communist Army has two regiments that moved from the east side of the railroad track to the west side of the railway track. The 13th Brigade withdrew from the front lines to the interior regions of this area. Also, there is some troops that moved from this area to Shang Cheng. I will now disclose the National Government troop dispositions in this area, regardless of disclosing a secret, but for the sake of China, I will do it.

“We now have two field headquarters in two different areas for each a division. We also have two command posts for each Army in each regiment. We have three area headquarters in each pacification area. In one War Area, we have it flexible in accordance with the need of the situation. Therefore, this accounts for this report that General Li (CP) just said that one pacification area Headquarters’ command post in Hwa Yen.

“Now about the conflict. The three memoranda that our field team 9 has received from General Li (CP) containing his report are as follows: One memorandum conveys the same thing that appeared in the Liberated News. This memorandum concerns an alleged attack by 26 National Government divisions composed of about 300,000 troops. They think that this attack is the starting point of a civil war in China. Another memorandum concerns the attack from all sides in the area called Tai Er Kang. The next one at Su Chih Tien. I am not very sure whether General Li’s (CP) remark referred to this situation or not. This involves attacks from all four sides, the first from Chien Yen; the second from Yao Chia Chi, by a force consisting of one company; the third from Chang Tien; the fourth attack from Shan Tien involving one platoon. The total forces engaged in this four-front attack numbered one battalion and two companies. They were engaged in combat for two hours. The conflict took place on April 28. We have received a report that on April 18, 1,000 Communists attacked Ta Chen Tun. However, we had only four soldiers stationed at Ta Chen Tun. As a result of this report we recalled these four men from that place. We have received no report of our own on this alleged conflict that took place on April 28.

“The third memorandum concerned a conflict in Hsiao Chih Ling. According to the report we received on April 19, there was a small scale conflict did take place in that area. Our sentry posted in Hsiao Chih Ling was attacked by the Communists. This fighting went on for a very brief period of time. As soon as the attack was stopped, we took no further action. On our side we received only these two reports. This one and the other one of the conflict on the 18th of April. With the exception of these two, we have received no reports of large-scale fighting from our side. Therefore, we were very much surprised at hearing about the report in the Liberated News and from Yenan. Executive Headquarters Field Team 9 was also surprised.

“Lastly, whether the Communist force in this region can be evacuated, to other regions is not within my power to discuss. I want to make one more supplementary remark. That has to do with the disposition of the 75th Army. I can definitely assure you that it is not stationed along the railway line. General Wang (CP) brought up the question of having the field team investigate the situation here; it is for this reason that we are here, so we will welcome investigations by the field team.

“This concludes my report. I will ask General Wong (NG) to make any additions or corrections he may desire to the remarks I have just made.”

Gen. Wong (NG): “I asked General Lu (NG) to make this report because it concerned military operations. You can see, there is some difference in the reports rendered by the two sides. General Li (CP) also reported conflicts that occurred in some regions, but all of these conflicts are of a minor nature. However minor these conflicts may have been, they are still conflicts and I express my regrets that these conflicts should have happened.

“Being a National Government representative, I want to assure you that these conflicts are not originated or contemplated by the Central Government. I hope that there will be no further conflicts, so that we can proceed with negotiations.

“Gen Li (CP) also touched the question of evacuation which is at issue. Not only General Lu (NG) is not in a position to discuss this—I am not myself. I will take this question to Hankow and discuss it further. However, I want to make one more remark on this question of evacuation. That the Communist forces are confined to this area is not due to the wish of the Wu Han garrison area. They are being confined here by an agreement reached by both sides. Any evacuation will violate the truce agreement signed in Chungking and also the agreement reached in Loshan. This will have to be discussed thoroughly in Hankow.

“With reference to the other minor problems that the Communist generals brought up, we will not spend much time discussing them here. For instance, the various terms they used like calling the Communist personnel ‘traitor bandits’. No general with common sense would issue an order calling his opponents ‘bandits’.

“I want to conclude my remarks by saying that the National Government’s wishes are the same as those of the people—we all want peace. The reason is simple. If the Government did not advocate peace but wanted to fight, it would not have the support of the people. Therefore, we should continue our efforts toward peace and settle all outstanding disputes, not only in Executive Headquarters, but in our field teams. We can avoid many of these disputes if we discuss everything in a free spirit as though we were in college.”

Gen. Wang (CP): “I wish to make some supplementary comments touching on points which General Lu (NG) has referred to. I want to state frankly that after January 13, certain conflicts took place at Chow Tang Fan. At that time, the 61st, 41st and 47th and 42nd Armies contemplated to [sic] annihilating General Li’s (CP) forces at Kwang Shan and Hsuan Hwa Tien, beyond that line of January 13. That report was furnished by a captured National Government battalion commander.

“We have several conferences with General Lu (NG) together as well as many personal interviews. According to the Loshan Agreement, all hostilities should cease regardless of whether they are being carried on by regular or irregular troops. At that time, the Generalissimo’s field headquarters would not recognize the Communist troops to the west of the railroad in Shuang Shu Tien, because they meant to attempt to annihilate the Communist forces in that area. In order to avoid any more conflict, I have requested that field teams go to the points of conflict in order to ascertain whether they are regular or irregular Communist troops.

“General Lu (NG) has just referred to the fact that the Generalissimo’s field headquarters at Hankow is particularly concerned that the Communist forces may try to secretly move away from this area. Now I ask General Lu (NG) what other design does the Government have than to lay an iron belt around the Communist forces? The reason why we have brought up the question of the move is that despite all the agreements and the negotiations, all conflicts have not been settled since January 13, and the work has not succeeded in stopping them. In order to put a stop to all conflicts, we have brought up the question of moving our troops. I wish to recall that, in the initial talks we have had in Hankow, the Generalissimo’s headquarters tried to establish that there were no Communist troops in this or that area. But lately, it was determined that there were still Communist forces in that area. Now it can certainly be stated that those forces were not parachuted down. It puzzles me why the Headquarters would not recognize the existence of those troops. So it appears to me that the contemplated annihilation plan was prepared a long time ago.”

Gen. Byroade: “I would like to say that I am deeply concerned about the presentation made by General Li (CP) and his deputy, General Wang (CP) this afternoon. I am concerned for two reasons: The first is the gravity of the situation as presented. I would like to say that there is little that Executive Headquarters or the Committee of Three can do about an anticipated future plot, because there is little to investigate. In this connection, I would like to thank General Wong (NG) and his deputy, General Lu (NG) for their assurance that this plot was not a reality. I would like to say that I was personally assured by Gen. Hsu (NG), Director of Operations of the Chinese Armies, that on his word of honor there was no such plot of annihilation. Likewise, General Marshall has been so assured by National Government representatives in Nanking.

“In regard to this future plot, we can only rely on integrity of the persons of high level of the National Government who have put on the record these denials.

“The reports of conflict within the last two or three weeks is another matter, because it is a factual matter than [that] can be investigated on the ground. In this respect, I come to my second concern, which is the lesser of the two, I found, upon getting to Hankow, that our field team had been doing little for the past two weeks, except working on details of the evacuation of the sick and other matters of minor nature. This leads me to believe that there is not enough confidence placed in the field teams and they are not being properly used in this area. For instance, I have determined, and I believe my dates are correct, that this information of serious disturbances here in the last two or three weeks reached the field team a day after it was presented to the Executive Headquarters in Peiping. We want our field teams to receive information promptly and act quickly so that they can investigate and correct such situations as have been reported today.

“We now have two field teams in this area. They are here at the disposal of the two commanders. We want them to move promptly and investigate quickly the situations reported to them. It is only in that way that we in Executive Headquarters can help you. We in Executive Headquarters and General Marshall, have been long concerned about the problems that face you in this area. We have all felt a really serious concern over the food situation. General Marshall personally has diverted U. S. landing craft to Hankow to bring food. I hope, as I know he hopes, that that has been of some aid in your food problems in this area. All that could be done from outside sources was small, we know, and I hope the food crop that I see about ready to be harvested here will aid materially. I do not believe from the evidence I have seen back in Peiping that there has been a sincere enough effort between commanders to establish liaison in order to gain mutual confidence and prevent some of these minor occurrences that are happening. I feel certain that the sincerity of the commanders involved and their spirit which produced the Loshan Agreement can produce other good effects if we can bring their people close together in this area. I hope I can initiate steps while on this trip to improve this liaison.

“You have raised many serious problems today. These will be discussed here now among the Committee and later in Hankow and, if necessary, in Nanking. I am sure that all concerned are sincere in trying to arrive at solutions to better this situation.

“In a desire to get to work on these problems I suggest that we adjourn this meeting and have a Committee meeting to insure that we can finish our work tonight.”

Gen. Chou (CP): “I agree with the suggestion made by General Byroade. Some of my comments I would rather reserve for the Committee of Three meeting.

“A short while ago, the Communist general made a presentation and expressed his views. My points can be discussed later on by the Committee of Three. Some of the views expressed showed diversity between the Communist and Nationalist commanders. The coming of General Wong (NG) and General Lu (NG) indicates that there is no intention to launch an attack on the Communist force. For myself as well as for the Communist Party, we hope eagerly that this is true. I have in mind all the outstanding issues which need to be settled if we want to reach a stable situation in this area. Otherwise the circumstances will become more and more complicated and the problems will be more difficult to solve.

“The Government has entertained a suspicion that the Communists want to fight their way out of this area. If we are motivated by this point of view, it may lead us to some large conflicts in the future. Therefore, with that in mind, it seems indispensable that we solve all the outstanding issues, and I hope that in working together, with the spirit which has been showed at the conference today, we can solve all the problems. On our side, we have asked the National Government representative as well as the United States members to come down here. That shows that we want to settle it peacefully, and the presence of the Nationalist generals shows that the Government likewise wishes to act in a similar way. In following this spirit, we can solve all the outstanding issues. I wish also to take opportunity to express my thanks for the coming of General Byroade and his assistants.[”]

The meeting adjourned at 1850 hours 8 May 1946.

23. This was General Directive No. 4–A, February 12, not printed; see agreement for the restoration of communications on February 9, p. 422.
24. General Directive No. 6, March 22, not printed.