Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume IX

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Meeting of the Acting Committee of Three at Hsuan Hwa Tien, May 8, 1946, 7 p.m.

Hsuan Hwa Tien, May 8, 1946, 7 p.m.

• The following were present:
  • National Government:
    • Gen. Wong—Deputy Chief of Staff, Wu Han Headquarters of the Generalissimo, Representing General Hsu Yung-Chang.
    • Gen. Lu —Deputy Director of Operations, Wu Han Headquarters of the Generalissimo.
  • Communist Party:
    • Gen. Chou En-lai
    • Mr. Chang
  • United States:
    • Gen. Henry A. Byroade
    • Capt. Jack T. Young

Gen. Byroade: “It appears to me that the largest issue brought up today was the evacuation of the Communist forces. I remember General Wong’s (NG) remark that he did not have authority to deal with this issue and also our agreement in Hankow that we would only take up emergency matters here, but I would like to bring it up at this time so that we can formally decide the disposition of that question.”

Gen. Chou (CP): “Of course, I feel that the question of the evacuation cannot be solved here, but, before coming to this point, I would like to ask a few questions. On the Communist side, they think they have certain foundation for their belief that some attack has been contemplated against them, while on the Government side, General Lu (NG) has just pointed out they are worried that the Communist forces may want to fight their way out of this area. General Lu (NG) has just referred to three kinds of possibilities. Regarding the second one, which suggests that the movement may be effected through negotiation, of course, that is not a point which the Government will be worried about, since in that case, it will be done legally and peacefully. Regarding the first and third ones—whether we want to fight out or whether we want to move out in a secret manner—the Government still entertains suspicions. I feel that such suspicions might be removed by the fact that the Communists have asked the National Government representative as well as the United States representative to come down here. This shows sincerity on the part of the Communists. We don’t want to solve the question by force. If we had had those intentions we would not have asked you to come down here. I want to get clarification about certain points which have been under suspicion.

“The Government representative just now assured us that there is no intention on the Government’s part to launch an offensive against the Communist force. I believe it, but still I would like to get more data so that I shall be able to convince my own people. In the previous meeting, General Li (CP) brought out certain information that indicated that there had been certain intentions on the Government side. I would like to get enough data from the National Government so that I may be able to convince my people. Also, when I go back to Nanking, I can tell Marshall about it, and my trip will have brought positive results.

“In the previous meeting, General Li (CP) brought up the point that, as first evidence, there had been some movement of Nationalist troops. General Lu (NG) admitted that, saying it was for the purpose of changing positions among National Government troops. The National Government representative on the field team 9 also admitted that these moves were made without notification to the field team, so it can be concluded that it is a fact that there are some changes in garrison duties. I would like to know whether the facts coincide with the Government’s information that the Nationalists have made movements. For example, it was stated that the 34th Division of the 72nd Army has moved from Shih Hwei Yao in the south of the Yangtze River to Macheng. I would like to know whether that is true or not.

“Secondly, the 41st Army has moved one division from the Peiping–Hankow railway to Hwang Chuan and put it under the command of the 47th Army.

“Thirdly, the 66th Army has moved one division from the Peiping–Hankow railway to Loshan.

“Fourthly, the 66th Army originally stationed at Kwang Shui and Ying Shan, to the west of the Peiping–Hankow railway, has now been assembled at Chin Yang and Loshan. For example, General Lu (NG) referred to the fact that the Government has set up two command posts under the pacification command in Shang Cheng and Hwa Yuan, all under the jurisdiction of the Hankow Generalissimo’s field headquarters. These points are of importance and when coordinated with the other information regarding combat actions, they have to be considered as military operations.”

Gen. Lu (NG): “In reply to the first question, the 34th Division of the 72nd Army was originally garrison-stationed in a stretch from Shih Hwei Yao to Macheng and Chihui and that is where they are now. This is the position that they occupied as of January 13 and they are still there now.

“In regard to the second one, the 1st Division of the 41st Army moved from the Peiping–Hankow railway to Hwan Chuan. We have no report of this movement as yet, but I see no necessity for such a move. However, a movement of one division of troops cannot be disguised and could be witnessed, and we can investigate it to establish its truth.

“On the third charge regarding the movement of one division of the 66th Army from the Ping Han railway line to Loshan, my answer is that there has been no such move. Part of the 66th Army moved from their position, which is Kwan Shui and Ying Shan, to Loshan and Chin Yang areas.

“The last one concerns the establishment of two command posts. One is the Huan Yuan command post of one pacification area. Another is the Shang Cheng, also a pacification area command post and put under the command of the Wu Han Generalissimo’s field headquarters. At Huan Yuan, we had one post originally located. There is no such command post established at Shang Cheng.

“In another charge, involving a location some distance from here, General Chou said that the New 10th Division moved from Hsuchow to Fu Yang. I do not know anything about this.”

Gen. Chou (CP): “Secondly, two days ago the Communist representative of the Field Team reported that they had noticed at the Hankow railroad station that several train loads of troops had been sent up to the north. I would like to know whether that is true or not.”

Gen. Lu (NG): “A Mr. Mar, Secretary to the Hankow Field Team, brought this fact to my attention on one occasion. At the time he brought it up, he expressed the hope that I would accompany him to the station to investigate this immediately. According to my opinion, this Mr. Mar must have been mistaken, because there are 2,000 Japanese repatriated troops moved out of Hankow every day. He might have mistaken these for National Government troops. On each of the trains that moves northward the Central Government has one platoon of soldiers as guard. Based upon this, I believe that Mr. Mar is definitely mistaken. Furthermore, I told him on the spot that he was definitely mistaken. At that time, Mr. Mar insisted that the 18th National Government Army was moving northward. The 18th Army is the garrison army of the Wu-Han area and cannot be moved to other places.

“I further wish to express the opinion that the Government has no plan for any encirclement and general attack on this area. The present strength of the National Government troops stationed in this area is not sufficient to launch a vicious program like this. At the present time we are facing overall problems in China. Suppose we should settle the question of the Communists in this area by annihilation. It would not help to solve the entire problem. Further, I express the hope that the Communist forces in this area will settle down here, stay here peacefully and not be afraid of any contemplated move on the National Government part to wipe them out. We figure that the intelligence reports that the Communist forces here gather are not reliable.

“At the same time, I want to take this opportunity to express my full acceptance of the proposal that both sides should establish liaison and mutual confidence.”

Gen. Chou (CP): “Shall we go on to the details?”

Gen. Byroade: “First I would like to ask whether General Lu (NG) has any suggested program as to how to establish better liaison.”

Gen. Lu (NG): “At the present time, there are 28 members of the Communist delegation at Hankow. There is not a single National Government representative in Hsuan Hwa Tien. I hope that the National Government will be able to dispatch a few liaison officers to Hsuan Hwa Tien.”

Gen. Byroade: “How would you suggest?”

Gen. Lu (NG): “If you send liaison people here, 8 will be more than sufficient, but I am thinking of this new field team that comes here. If it stays here more or less permanently, that will take the place of the liaison people.”

Gen. Byroade: “It isn’t General Chou’s idea that the field team will stay in the city permanently, is it?”

Gen. Chou (CP): “I wish and hope that this team will stay in Hsuan Hwa Tien and its immediate vicinity.”

Gen. Byroade: “Isn’t it a matter of liaison also among the units that face each other? Isn’t that really the point where the establishment of liaison counts?”

Gen. Chou (CP): “I know that other places have adopted this method very successfully. Particularly in this place, it may be very effective. I am very agreeable to establishing liaison between the commanders.”

Gen. Byroade: “I see no point in this Committee is [sic] making up the details. If both General Chou and General Wong (NG) will speak to their commanders we will have the field team which comes here work out the details.”

Gen. Chou (CP): “General Wong (NG) has to wait until he gets back to Hankow, but I can do it right here, particularly because the National Government has more units surrounding the Communists here.”

Gen. Byroade: “Does General Wong (NG) agree on the principle and that we will let the field team carry it out?”

Gen. Wong (NG): “That is correct.”

Gen. Byroade: “As another subject, the movement of 1,000 sick has been discussed for the past two months and, as I look back on it, I am inclined to believe that two or three parties may be equally guilty in delaying it. I think our team in Hankow discussed the matter too long without referring it up to higher authorities for decision. I have no way of investigating the delays in trains, etc., and do not know what the true status of that is. I do know, however, that after it had been agreed, there was almost three weeks delay in gathering the necessary statistics and data from the Communist forces here. It was finally agreed to move before May 10. Just as we arrived at Hankow, the field team was informed that the trains could not be ready until the first of June. So, with all of this past delay, I will ask General Wong (NG) if he can take any steps to allow that move to go through right away.”

Gen. Wong (NG): “On that part, I will rush preparations to evacuate the sick and wounded. As to the changing of the date, we have our reason for that. It is a time limit set up for the repatriation of Japanese in order to meet the American schedule for their shipping.”

Gen. Byroade: “How much interference with the repatriation program will this move cause?”

Gen. Lu (NG): “It takes 8 trips for one trainload a day in order to evacuate 2,000. In order to evacuate those 1,000, plus their families, it will take 10 days from the point of embarkation to the point of debarkation. It will delay the movement of 4,000.”

Gen. Byroade: “Repatriation is the responsibility of the National Government. I know that there is every reason in the world to push it as fast as we can. However, if it is agreeable with General Wong (NG) I will take the responsibility for the delay in U. S. shipping.”

Gen. Wong (NG): “If you will be responsible for the delay in shipping, I can start to move the wounded first.”

Gen. Byroade: “I will be. I will notify General Marshall when I get back to Nanking. Then it is agreed that we will move the 1,000 sick and 100 extra people as quickly as possible. I will inform the field team in Hankow to that effect, and I would like to request that General Chou speak to his people to make sure there will be no delay in meeting those trains. I wonder whether we can make a tentative date here?”

Gen. Chou (CP): “I suggest May 15.”

Gen. Wong (MG): “The tentative date is set at May 15.”

Gen. Byroade: “It is so agreed.

“I find here in the points presented by General Li (CP) that the Communists had started demobilizing and their ex-soldiers were not given security, and he requested provisions for their security. Also the point that fits in with that is the release of those people arrested by the National Government. Can we discuss that next? I am not sure that I have expressed that properly. Is that satisfactory to General Chou?”

Gen. Chou (CP): “Regarding the arrest of personnel, the Communists have a list ready showing all the names. Those people are divided into two classes. The first are those arrested before January 10, and the second covers those arrested after January 10. Those coming under Class 2 amount to about 70 people. All together, there are about 360. Regarding those arrested after January 10, I think it might be easy to arrange for their release, because, on the basis of our list, the Government can easily ascertain whether they are kept in custody. There seems to be no other cause for the Government to arrest them than the fear that they may conduct activities against the Government. As to those arrested before January 10, they may have been arrested for various reasons. For example, they may have been arrested as political prisoners. If they come under that class, the Government has also asked the Communist Party to give them a list of political prisoners.

“Coming to the demobilized personnel, the Communists have issued an identification card to those people and they bring with them nothing else. Since they are sent out for no other purpose than to go home, I think that the Government can also release them right away.”

Gen. Byroade: “Does General Wong (NG) have anything to say on this problem?”

Gen. Wong (NG): “With reference to this point, first if the Communists will present us with a name list, I will make a thorough investigation and study as to the reason why the people were detained, and those that are found to be detained without reason will be and should be released immediately. So far as the safe conduct and security of demobilized personnel is concerned, if they are given a proper form of demobilization certificate, the National Government will not hinder their movement. However, I want to make a comment on these two points. So far as I know, there is no case reported of detention of demobilized personnel.”

Gen. Byroade: “Do I understand that the list of these people has not previous[ly] been given to the National Government representative?”

Gen. Chou (CP): “I do not know, but I will ask. I presume such a list has not been presented.”

Gen. Byroade: “I would like to ask if General Wong’s (NG) remark satisfied General Chou about this problem.”

Gen. Lu (NG): “On this case of arrested personnel, there were 18 detained who came out to purchase food. They came out armed with rifles, but, as soon as we found out what their mission was, we notified the Hankow field team. Up to the present time, however, Communists have not gone there to take their personnel back. Also the National Government has four people from the village Government and 9 Japanese puppets that were detained by the Communists forces here and have not been released.”

Gen. Chou (CP): “How did the Japanese captives come over there? They were sent up the hill to get fire wood and were captured. I suggested that the memorandum should be submitted by each side to the opposite party regarding the arrested personnel. If the personnel were arrested for the simple reason that they belonged to the opposite party, they should be released. Only if they have committed criminal acts should they be detained.

“Regarding demobilized personnel, the situations in various localities are not the same. In some places, they left quietly. In other places there might have been trouble with them. First, they will carry no arms and second they should have demobilization identification cards, and then they will go back to their homes. In that case, they should be left alone. I cannot make any promise about their dress. They may still be dressed in their uniforms.”

Gen. Byroade: “It seems to be a problem that proper liaison could work out. Can we set our May 15 date here as a date by which time lists of prisoners will be exchanged?”

Gen. Lu (NG): “I have something I have not said yet. I would like to bring up the question of demobilized personnel. If the Communist Party will notify the National Government the number of the demobilized personnel, where they are going and the route they will take, not only will they not be molested but we will accord them all types of facilities in our power.”

(Both parties feel that May 15 is not enough time because they may have to investigate. May 30 is considered a reasonable date and it is so agreed between them. This matter will be put in the hands of two units—both the field team and the team in Hankow.)

Gen. Byroade: “Then it is agreed.

“Another point that was brought up was the execution of Directive 4 regarding blockhouses. That question has been discussed many times in Executive Headquarters and has been referred to the Committee of Three for decision. I propose, therefore, that we not try to solve that here tonight, if it is agreeable to you.”

Gen. Chou (CP): “I am rather helpless. These people here are very anxious to have it settled.”

Gen. Byroade: “We in Executive Headquarters are equally anxious to have it settled.”

Gen. Wong (NG): “I want to make a few comments on the destruction of blockhouses. If they will interfere with the lines of communications, I am all for doing away with them. At the same time, we must take into consideration how the population around here look upon blockhouses as a matter of security and self-protection. It will more or less give them confidence to leave them alone. A blockhouse is not like a tank. It is only a defensive weapon. They were built before the cease-fire agreement.”

Gen. Byroade: “Is it agreeable to defer that question here tonight?”

Gen. Chou (CP): “The blockhouse problem has to be viewed in connection with the evacuation problem. Because, once it has been decided, the Communists will look on blockhouses as a blockade. Of course, I am aware that on the National Government side they built up those blockhouses because they are afraid that they might be attacked by the Communist Party. For defensive purposes, they felt the necessity to erect them. I feel that it is necessary to have the three problems solved simultaneously. One is that hostilities should be stopped, and another order should be issued to this effect to emphasize the importance of cessation of conflicts, and we should also assign the field teams to go to points of conflict whenever conflict has been reported either by the National Government or the Communist side. That would cause a lot of trouble to the field team, but I feel confident that it would like to take up those troubles. I suggest that the field team to be stationed here may take care of the area to the east of the railroad tracks and the team at Hankow will take the western part. As a second step, we may leave the other Committee of Three to decide regarding the removal of blockhouses and evacuation. On the Hankow Executive Headquarters side, they will decide whether the Communist forces should go away, for that would eliminate trouble for them. As the Generalissimo has no other purpose, they will certainly be glad to have those forces moved away.

“It would be most desirable to have three field teams in this area, but that seems not to be possible at the present moment. We would like to have two field teams to take care of the eastern part and the western part respectively. The order should be issued from both sides that there must be no further movement of troops. Under such circumstances, I would accept General Byroade’s proposal that we leave the question of removal of fortifications to be discussed by the Committee of Three. I think if the conflict could be stopped, it would be easy to settle the other questions. We could have solved the problem of the fortifications separately, but since now they are so tied in together, for this moment I would suggest that we can do four things:

“The first thing is that hostilities should be stopped, and orders to reinforce the previous agreements should be issued.

“Secondly, there will be no future movement of troops on either side—movement for the change of garrison troops should be reported to the field teams beforehand.

“Third, no further blockhouses will be constructed henceforth. This is to get rid of any suspicion or fear.

“Fourth, we should instruct the field teams and the liaison officers of both sides that the present separation lines should be determined, because there should be no more change of separation lines henceforth. It may be rather complicated to determine the positions as of January 13. It has been argued for a long time regarding these lines. General Li (CP) has just mentioned that the Communists would claim the legal positions as of January 13. The National Government also has certain claims to make. We can make the Field Teams responsible that no further conflict will occur henceforth, that no blockhouses will be established, and that they will go to the point of any reported conflicts.

“Regarding whether we should adopt the Loshan Agreement for this area or whether we will stick to Directive 6, that can be solved later on. We have the remaining problems of evacuation, the removal of blockhouses and the question as to which agreement should be adhered to in this area. They can be left for the Committee of Three or Executive Headquarters. Once the evacuation has been decided upon, the legal position as well as the fortifications will lose their significance.”

Gen. Byroade: “Could you give me a very brief summary of the Number 2 point again?”

Gen. Chou (CP): “There will be no further movement of troops—even garrison commands.”

Gen. Byroade: “What are General Wong’s comments on those four immediate points?”

Gen. Wong (NG): “I agree that these are the logical steps to be taken.”

Gen. Byroade: “Is it believed the best procedure that we write that into an agreement and sign it here?”

(Both the National Government and Communist Party indicated their approval.)

Gen. Byroade: “Does General Chou think that it should be signed here or in Hankow?”

Gen. Chou (CP): “It is immaterial.”

(After a short discussion in Chinese, they agreed that the agreement should be signed in Hankow as it was late, and this would give General Byroade more time to prepare it.)

Gen. Chou (CP): “We have the problem of getting money in to our people in this area. There are two ways to get money in here—either by air transport or by trucks from Hankow.”

Gen. Byroade: “Is there any special action that General Chou would like the Committee or myself to take on that matter of money?”

Gen. Chou (CP): “I just pointed out the two immediate things. This falls into another category.”

Gen. Byroade: “The money and the food should come under UNRRA’s supervision, but I see no reason why it cannot be brought in by the transportation serving the team. However, the air-drop of money present[s] a little different problem. We are so limited in aircraft that we have tried to avoid using our aircraft to take care of administrative matters of either side. If this drop is approved, I would not want it to establish a precedent, because we cannot do that. I do not believe that is a proper function of Executive Headquarters, and we do not have the aircraft to continue carrying on that practice.”

Gen. Chou (CP): “I do not mean by air-drop actually. I mean by using our courier plane when there is available space.”

Gen. Byroade: “I think we can do that all right.”

Gen. Lu (NG): “To avoid any new developments of conflict here, I hope the Communists in this area will issue orders not to levy any taxes in the form of money or grain in this area. We would like to put this into the list of problems, among the four immediate things to be taken up.”

Gen. Chou (CP): “I have not inquired about this point from General Lee, but he was informed today by the Highway Section at Ho Kow that the levy of taxes concerns both parties. In the neutral zone between the Armies, the National Government troops also came to levy taxes. The Generalissimo’s field headquarters has issued orders to this effect. That was the cause of the continued conflict between the two armies. I think that both parties should restrict themselves. However, there is one basic point beneath this issue. If the Communist troops are permitted to evacuate, of course, that operation will depend on money sent in from outside. If that is not permitted, we have to try to pin ourselves on the soil. Our present scheme is aimed at eventual evacuation, and we have arranged everything accordingly. Of course, we will not try to support ourselves from the local people, but in case evacuation is not permitted, we will have to somehow try to support ourselves. The Communist forces will try to create productive works in order that they can sustain themselves.”

Gen. Byroade: “I would suggest that the matter of taxation had better not become a matter for Executive Headquarters or the Committee of Three, but should be dealt with by the commanders themselves.”

Gen. Wong (NG): “The system of taxation enforced by the Government is handled through the administrative function. We have the provincial government. The troops themselves have no right to tax directly.”

Gen. Chou (CP): “This problem can further be taken up within the basic issues which will be resolved later.”

Gen. Byroade: “Are there any other problems to be brought up here tonight?”

Gen. Chou (CP): “That seems to be all that can be dealt with today.”

Gen. Byroade: “I have one thought. We have a lot of press people up here. What is to be our policy toward the press?”

Mr. Chang (CP): “I think we should say we have reached an agreement, but the details will be disclosed when we reach Hankow.”

(Both sides indicated their approval of this plan.)

Gen. Byroade: “Is it agreeable to adjourn the meeting?”

Gen. Chou (CP): “I wish to express my thanks and appreciation to the National Government and American members for coming here. I asked you to make this very special and hard trip here.”

The meeting adjourned at 2050 hours, 8 May 1946.