893.00/1–2546: Telegram
Mr. Walter S. Robertson to the Secretary of State
[Received January 28—5:37 p.m.]
[3.] Repeated to the American Embassy at Chungking.
The greatest part of the cease-fire order violations which have been brought to date to the attention of the Executive Headquarters have come from the Central Government. On 21 January at a meeting the Commissioner of the Central Government, General Cheng Kai-min, charged that an all-out offensive was being launched by the Communists against railway lines of communication. The Communist Commissioner, General Yeh Chien-ying, stated he was of the opinion that the fighting was decreasing and he promised to give complete information based on Yenan reports at a later meeting. There is an inclination among American military observers to agree that there is less fighting and they point out that there is a tendency among the Chinese to exaggerate in military communiqués. The general belief is that each side exercises caution in maintaining a foundation for claiming its position is correct concerning the responsibility for conflicts in the event of any possible failure to consummate the ending of hostilities.
In some cases the Communists are still delaying action by their failure to furnish personnel to take part in teams, and at times action in meetings has been delayed by the tendency of the Communists to exercise extreme care on all points and to very often ask for an opportunity to study a matter further before giving their final answer. However, some part in this attitude may be played by the difficulties of translation. Usually the Central Government readily agrees with all American suggestions, the only opposition so far being their reluctance to agree on the Canton area team. In this connection General Cheng showed some resentment, the Government Chief of Staff, General Tsai, apparently not having advised Cheng of this agreement for a team to Canton which was arrived at an earlier meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
My No. 1 of 17 January. At the recent meetings the Communists have gone out of their way to express their confidence in the impartiality and fairness of the U. S. side, and in pointing to this confidence [Page 378] in the Americans, suggested that American observers be sent to investigate whether there was government personnel available for the Canton team. (Since the basic principle of our procedure necessitates a three way responsibility I did not approve of this.) When General Yeh approved the issuance of a safe conduct letter by Headquarters for the signal equipment shipped to the Jap forces in the Taiyuan areas by U. S. Marines, he stated he doubted the wisdom of such action but that he strongly believed the U. S. would be impartial and fair in repatriating and disarming the Japanese. In a meeting on 23 January, General Yeh in this connection said he desired to consider simultaneously the repatriation and disarming of the Japs and the restoration of communications. He was informed by General Byroade and myself that at Chungking a definite order had been set up for assuming Headquarters duties and that repatriation must be preceded by the restoration of communications since the matter was far too complicated to risk the delay involved in taking no action before trying to arrive at a decision on all its phases.