892.014/10–1746
The Minister in Siam (Stanton) to the Secretary of State
No. 135
[Received October 30.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Department’s telegrams Nos. 800, 801 and 802 of October 5, 194697 transmitting the French proposals for the settlement of the dispute with Siam, the Department’s memorandum of October 4 to the Siamese delegation and oral comments made by the French Ambassador at Washington which were communicated to the Siamese delegation at the same time the French [Page 1089] proposals and the Department’s memorandum were handed to the Siamese delegation. As indicated in my telegram No. 1141 of October 12,98 I was not able to hand these documents to the Minister of Foreign Affairs until the afternoon of October 11 due to the fact that all three of these messages were very badly garbled and required several days to decipher and make them intelligible.
The Foreign Minister made little comment when he first read over the French proposals except to reiterate how difficult it would be for the Government voluntarily to declare the 1941 agreement null and void and to retrocede the territories. He referred to the fact that the Pridi Government and the present Government99 had both hoped it would be possible to evolve a procedure by which the Security Council or some organ of the United Nations would decide on the validity of the agreement and declare that the territories must be returned. I pointed out to Nai Direck that the Department had made every effort to evolve a procedure which would be acceptable to the Siamese, being cognizant of the difficult position of the Government with respect to retrocession of these territories. I reviewed the difficulties which the Department anticipated in connection with the presentation of Siam’s case to the Security Council and the certainty that the French would veto consideration of the case by the Security Council. I also referred to the fact that the Siem Reap incident had caused the French to withdraw the proposal that this dispute should be referred to the International Court for adjudication. I stressed that several months had elapsed in efforts to work out a satisfactory procedure; that conditions along the border had not improved; and that our information indicated the French military in Indochina were becoming very restive and would probably occupy the territories by force as soon as weather conditions permitted. I said the urgency of this problem was such that any further delay might precipitate armed clashes with French troops which in turn might conceivably lead to a state of open hostility. Nai Direck replied he was fully aware of the urgency of the problem and that this whole matter would be immediately considered by the Cabinet upon the arrival of Nai Sutchit Hiranpruek.
Nai Sutchit arrived on Saturday morning, October 12, by plane from Washington and immediately conferred at length with Nai Direck. A special meeting of the Cabinet, which Nai Pridi was invited to attend, was convened the next day. The French proposals and the position the Government should take with respect thereto were considered at this Cabinet meeting, which lasted all day Sunday. [Page 1090] I was informed the next day by Nai Direck that some members of the Cabinet were of the opinion that the Government should voluntarily resign in view of the fact that retrocession of territories was involved. However, Nai Pridi, Prime Minister Dhamrong, the Foreign Minister and one or two of the senior members of the present Cabinet argued that this was a national matter and therefore a responsibility which the Government should not shirk. These views prevailed and it was agreed that a special session of the Assembly would be called on Monday, October 14, at which the Government would present the whole problem to the Assembly and ask authority to nullify the 1941 agreement and retrocede these territories to Indochina.
At the special meeting of the Assembly the Prime Minister made a lengthy opening statement reviewing the history of the acquisition of these territories, the conclusion of the agreement of 1941, the decision of the Pridi Government which was ratified by the Assembly to present this dispute to the Security Council, and the proposals which had now been received from the French calling first for retrocession of these territories by Siam and the subsequent establishment of a conciliation commission to consider Siam’s complaints. The Foreign Minister read the text of the French proposals, the Department’s memorandum of October 4 to the Siamese delegation and the oral comments made by the French Ambassador at Washington. He pointed out that, while retrocession of these territories was naturally highly distasteful to the Government and the people, the United States and Great Britain felt this step was necessary in view of the fact that these territories had been acquired during the course of Japanese aggression and that retrocession was a prerequisite to effecting a settlement of this dispute. The Foreign Minister was followed by Nai Sutchit who, as Secretary of the Siamese delegation, read a prepared statement setting forth the views of the delegation with respect to the French proposals and indicating they believed the proposals should be accepted by the Government. He also emphasized the Department’s endorsement of the proposals, referring to the Department’s memorandum on the subject.
There then ensued approximately four hours of debate which, as indicated in my telegram No. 1154 of October 15,1 was marked by a good deal of patriotic fervor, references to the abandonment of “a million people” and advocacy of a resort to arms as the most honorable method of settling the dispute. Virtually all speeches made opposing retrocession of the territories were delivered by members of the Opposition Party and so-called “Independents.” Vice Consul Bulkley, who was present and whose memorandum concerning [Page 1091] the debate and speeches is enclosed,1a noted that none of the members of the Government parties, the Constitutionalist Party and the Sahacheep Party, spoke in support of the Government’s position. No attempt was made by the Government at that session of the Assembly to force a vote, the Prime Minister apparently feeling it would be well to permit members to talk themselves out.
Debate was resumed the following morning and continued throughout the day. Opposition to the course proposed by the Government continued to be voiced by members of the Opposition, and in this connection it may be of interest to record that Nai Chavalit Aphaiwong from Battambang, who is a relative of Nai Khuang, bitterly denounced the Government’s contemplated course of action and the retrocession of Siamese territories, particularly the Battambang area. After considerable debate Seni Pramoj, who is one of the leaders of the Opposition, delivered a speech which he said represented his personal views. The speech was characterized by a broad grasp of world problems and Siam’s responsibilities in the maintenance of world peace. He stressed his belief that Siam should make this “sacrifice” of territories as a contribution to world peace. He paid a great tribute to the United States and to the many manifestations of our country’s friendship for and interest in Siam and the Siamese people. Mr. Bulkley informs me that Seni Pramoj’s speech visibly impressed the Assembly and no doubt greatly lessened the force and impact of the more fervid speeches made by other members of the Opposition. Shortly before six p.m. the Government decided to force a vote on this issue. After some debate it was agreed that ballots would be cast in secret. I was informed later that evening by the Minister of Foreign Affairs that the outcome of the balloting was 91 to 27 in favor of giving the Government the authority it was seeking to annul the 1941 agreement and retrocede the territories.
During the course of these debates it was evident that several problems were causing concern. Frequent reference was made to the “fate” of Siamese people in the areas to be returned, whether they would be permitted freely to withdraw from those territories with their belongings if they should choose to do so. The treatment of those who elected to remain was also discussed, the fear being expressed that the French might mete out harsh treatment. There was also debate concerning the insistence of France that she is in a state of war with Siam and apprehension that this insistence would be used as a basis for the presentation of large claims against the Siamese Government. With reference to this latter point the Minister of Foreign Affairs informed me that his Government’s position would [Page 1092] continue to be that Siam was not at war with France and that diplomatic relations between the two countries had merely been suspended. This point, the question of reparations, the speedy establishment of a conciliation commission and the treatment of Siamese nationals in the retroceded territories are, it is understood, to be included in the instructions being prepared for the use of the Siamese delegation in further negotiations with the French.
Of both significance and importance to us is the fact that the majority of those who participated in the debates referred repeatedly to the views of the Government of the United States as embodied in the Department’s memorandum of October 4. It was very evident that the Department’s endorsement of the French proposals had great influence upon the members of the Assembly. It was equally evident from statements made by many of the members that they as the representatives of the Siamese people look to the United States to ensure that an equitable settlement will be achieved and that fair and just treatment will be accorded by the French to the people of the retroceded territories. These same sentiments were very clearly expressed to me by both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. In other words, the French proposals have been accepted by the Government und the Assembly largely because we urged that they be accepted as a basis for effecting an amicable and lasting settlement of the matters in dispute between Siam and France and, furthermore, because they believe that we will see to it that justice is done to Siam. I need not emphasize the fact that the good will now entertained by the people of Siam towards the United States and the prestige that we enjoy in this country at the present time will suffer harm, perhaps irreparable harm, if the settlement of this dispute should be inequitable in nature. Furthermore, if the attitude and actions of France toward Siam and particularly the people in the retroceded areas should be harsh and overbearing serious unrest and uprisings may be anticipated, thus nullifying the earnest efforts made to ensure peace and stability in this part of Southeast Asia.
Respectfully yours,