740.00119 Control (Japan)/11–1846
Memorandum by Mr. Robert A. Fearey of the Division of Japanese Affairs40
The attached despatch from Mr. Atcheson,41 which I suggest you read in full, reports growing concern on the part of General MacArthur and his staff over the increasingly hostile attitude of the Chinese Government toward the occupation, as evidenced by the attitude and activities of official Chinese representatives in Japan and the official or semi-official Shanghai press. Members of the Chinese Mission appear engaged in a concerted attempt to undermine American prestige and policies in Japan and to increase Chinese prestige and influence, and there is indication that the Chinese member of the Allied Council is partly responsible for the misrepresentations and misstatements of fact upon which the Shanghai press accounts have been based. General MacArthur has expressed puzzlement to Mr. Atcheson a number of times over the noticeable lack of Chinese cooperation and support, especially in the light of the far-reaching diplomatic and material assistance which the United States has so long provided and is continuing to provide China.
The attached press comment of November 1 by Tillman Durdin to the New York Times, together with a memorandum of conversation October 25 between Mr. Barnett, American member of the FEC Reparations Committee, and Dr. Wang, Chinese member of that committee,42 afford a fairly clear idea of the factors behind this regrettable trend in Chinese thinking and policy. Tillman Durdin states that “growing concern over the economic revival of Japan and the extent of the rapprochement between Japan and the United States is one of the most pronounced trends in China. Hardly a day passes in Shanghai without a critical Chinese press reference to developments in Japan and American relations with the Japanese.” Chinese, he relates, suspect that in the game of Russian-American power politics the United States has come to consider Japan a potentially stronger and more reliable bulwark against the Soviet Union than China, and now favors Japan over China as the stabilizing force in the Far East. There is alarm that American occupation policies will result in Japan recovering its position as the leading manufacturing and trading nation in Asia, the position China had hoped to take.
[Page 355]Mr. Barnett records that Dr. Wang, too, expressed the view that China is beginning to wonder where American sympathies and interest actually lie. He stated that the Chinese Government has become profoundly concerned over the assumptions which seem to underlie American calculations of the “minimum peacetime economy” which is to be assured Japan—a level which the Chinese people could consider a luxury level for their own country. His particular charge, however, was that American reparation policies have acted to deprive China of the “just reparation” due it under Potsdam Declaration. He then, in a quite contrary vein to the complaints voiced in the Shanghai press, which protests SCAP efforts for the revival of Japanese industry and trade, proposed that Japanese economy be deliberately revived so as to permit reparation from current production for export to China. The complaint in both instances, however, is the same, that American policy has tended to favor Japan over China.
Paralleling, and in part, at least, a corollary of this anti-American trend, have been indications of an increasingly friendly attitude toward the Soviet Union. The attached New York Times despatch of November 2 relates that “Chinese press comments on the recent United Press interview with Premier Stalin approve the Russian’s views. All see proof of the Premier’s peaceful, constructive intentions …43 Some journals depict Russia virtually pleading for peace in the face of provocations from the United States and Great Britain.” The author of the despatch believes that these newspaper reactions reflect the official view to a considerable extent and states that virtually no criticism of Russia has appeared in the pro-Government press in recent months. One official Kuomintang organ states that “the Stalin statements indicate how hard Generalissimo Stalin has tried to dispel distrust of the United States and Britain, how sincerely and warmly he has extended his hand of friendship waiting to be shaken by American and British authorities.” The paper ads obliquely that “If only MacArthur can revise his over-liberal policy there should be no insurmountable obstacle when it comes to discussing the draft peace treaty with Japan”.
Full and objective appraisal of American occupation policies and programs in Japan to date provides little basis for belief that we have transferred our confidence and favor from China to Japan. The maintenance of cooperative working relationships between the occupation authorities and the Japanese Government and people, and encouragement and assistance to the beginnings of a revival of Japanese industry and trade, have been essential prerequisites for the success of the program of reorientation and reform of the Japanese people to which China no less than ourselves is committed. Our reparation [Page 356] policy has sought maximum feasible reparation to China without deliberately restoring Japan to the position of industrial and trading preeminence in the Far East which it previously enjoyed and in which we hope to see it replaced by China.
However, the fact that current Chinese views and attitudes on the occupation derive to so large an extent from misunderstanding of United States, and Soviet, objectives does not detract from their significance. Unquestionably it is in United States interest that Japan be on the side of the United States rather than the Soviet Union if, as seems probable, it is unable to maintain equally friendly relations with both. The occupation authorities have of necessity had to bear this factor in mind, and, quite naturally, have been unable to conceal the fact from other nations that they do have it in mind. There would seem definite advantage, however, in attracting as little attention to this feature of our occupation policy as possible. Should Soviet apprehension regarding the long-range purposes to which the United States may be planning to turn its advantageous position in Japan become sufficiently great, there is danger it may lead to counter-measures by the Soviets on the continent not to our advantage. Anti-American and pro-Soviet sentiment in China may be expected to increase the likelihood of such countermeasures, and to add to their effectiveness if adopted.
In sum, it would seem important in the determination and implementation of Japanese occupation policy that every attempt be made, on the one hand, to disabuse China of the idea that we have forsaken it or in any way mitigated our stern policy toward Japan, and, on the other, to avoid giving the Soviets cause for concern that Japan under our control or influence may constitute a threat to the security of the Soviet Far East. The proposed 25 (or 40) year Four-Power Demilitarization and Disarmament Treaty for Japan should, if accepted, go far toward allaying Soviet suspicions, but positive assurance by word and deed would seem necessary at an early date to dispel the growing impression in China that the United States is fostering Japanese economic revival at the expense of Chinese trading and security interests.
- Approved by the Chief of the Division and addressed to the Director and Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent and Penfield). Copy transmitted by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) to Mr. Atcheson on November 21.↩
- Despatch 692, November 7, 1946, not printed.↩
- Post, p. 584.↩
- Omission indicated in the original.↩