894.011/11–446
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Hilldring)
to the Chairman of the Far Eastern Commission
(McCoy)
[Washington,] November 7, 1946.
With reference to the consultative message of the Chairman of the Far
Eastern Commission to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, dated
October 29, 1946,39 regarding the time and
manner of issuance of the Far Eastern Commission policy decision on the
Provisions for the Review of a New Japanese Constitution, there is
enclosed a copy of a message from the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers dated November 1, 1946.
It is requested that the Chairman make this message available to the
members of the Far Eastern Commission.
[Annex]
Reply by General of tine Army Douglas MacArthur
on November 1
I have received the suggestion of the Far Eastern Commission that its
policy decision [regarding Provisions for the Review of a New
[Page 353]
Japanese Constitution]
might be made public. The purpose underlying such a suggestion is
obscure. As the policy decision in reference merely provides that
some time after 18 months and before 30 months “The situation with
respect to the new constitution should be reviewed by the Diet”;
that the Far Eastern Commission shall review the constitution within
the same period; and that the Far Eastern Commission may require a
referendum or some other appropriate procedure for ascertaining
Japanese opinion with respect to the constitution; it prescribes no
action whatsoever for at least 18 months or until the new
constitution has been in effect for one year. It is unrealistic in
its failure to recognize the inescapable facts that by its very
terms the constitution is constantly before the Diet from its
effective date for any change or amendment that experience may
suggest or otherwise may be proposed, and that the power of review
or alteration of the instrument, or the enforcement of any measure
to subject it to additional tests of public opinion, is inherent in
the power of occupation itself, and will so remain as long as the
Allied Control of Japan is maintained.
Throughout the development of the new constitution, action has been
largely avoided which might be construed as compulsory process in
order that nothing might negate or compromise the free character
essential if the instrument is to live. The publication of
referenced statement of policy on the other hand would inevitably
result in just what we have thus scrupulously tried to avoid. And
for what purpose? It would instantly be viewed in the public mind as
a display of force by the Allied Powers. It would destroy the free
character of the Charter and its expression of the popular will by
the coercive threat of external force thereby implied. It would
reduce the very essence of durability upon which the instrument has
been built to a frail skeleton of temporary expedience overshadowed
by the threat of forced abrogation or revision at the point of
Allied bayonets, with an open and continuing invitation to the
forces of reaction to conserve and extend their political strength
against the time that, taking advantage of its very terms, pressure
might be brought upon the Diet or the people direct to destroy the
constitution and restore the old order which Allied policy seeks
permanently to suppress.
As the harmful effect of such publicity is as patently clear as any
benefit therefrom to the Allied case is obscured, I most strongly
recommend against any such procedure at least until the proposed
year of experience has passed and the Far Eastern Commission feels
that the situation then existing calls for affirmative action.
