Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East, Volume VIII

740.00119 Control (Japan)/8–1946

The British Embassy to the Department of State⁷⁵

His Majesty’s Government have studied the proposal made by the Chairman of the Allied Council for Japan on 13th August that the Council should invite representatives of the eleven Allied powers which now have missions in Tokyo to sit with the Council, informally and unofficially, and contribute their views. They note that the matter is tabled for discussion by the Council on 21st August and they accordingly wish to inform the United States Government of their reasons for considering the proposal as unacceptable. These are as follows:—

(1) Participation in the discussions of the Council, even on an informal and unofficial basis, by representatives of nations other than those specified in paragraph 2 of the Moscow Agreement establishing the Council (the United States of America, The U.S.S.R., China and a member representing jointly the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and India) would appear to be clearly contrary to the provisions of that agreement. This agreement provides for the establishment of a consultative and advisory body with membership limited as above and no provision is made for the participation, informal or otherwise, of the representatives of other powers; although the four named members are entitled to have staffs of military and civilian advisers.

It would appear therefore that the Chairman of the Council would be acting ultra vires in inviting the attendance in consultation, even on an informal basis, of Allied representatives other than the four members provided for by the terms of the agreement and their military and civilian advisers.

(2) An extension of representatives on the Council, even on the informal basis proposed, would tend to confuse the nature of the authority of the Far Eastern Commission, on which all eleven nations are represented, and which must remain the official organ, as approved by the Moscow agreement, for the formulation of Allied occupation policy and the review of action taken hi accordance with that policy.

(3) Informal participants in Council discussions could have no authority to reflect the views of their Governments, for which latter purpose the Far Eastern Commission has been created. As regards informal assistance, by discussion and consultation, towards the solution of the many problems confronting the Allied occupation authorities on the spot, there have been set up in Tokyo missions representing most of the interested powers whose officers are surely available for cooperation of this nature outside the Allied Council chamber.

(4) So far as the representation of the British Commonwealth on the Allied Council is concerned, it is felt that, in accordance with the Moscow agreement, the Commonwealth should continue to be represented by one man. The Commonwealth representative has attached to him advisers representing the United Kingdom, Australia, India and New Zealand who provide the necessary liaison between him and the missions representing those countries in Tokyo. He is therefore supported, in advice to, or consultation with, the Supreme Commander, by the resources in knowledge and experience of these missions. It is felt that it would detract seriously from his position as the recognised representative of the British Commonwealth on the Council if the heads of these missions were also sitting at the Council table, even in an “informal” capacity.

(5) It is considered that the addition of seven further participants in discussion would complicate procedure and thus hamper the efficiency of the Council as advisory and consultative machinery.

(6) The Supreme Commander’s desire to avail himself of all Allied resources in knowledge and experience in the discharge of the onerous responsibilities which he is shouldering and for the furtherance of Allied objectives is appreciated and welcomed by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom who are most anxious to respond by assisting the Supreme Commander in every way. For this purpose, they have established a Liaison Mission in Tokyo, which is in close and friendly relationship with General MacArthur’s Headquarters and through which it is hoped and expected that the Supreme Commander will feel free to draw upon for all resources of knowledge or of personnel that the Government which it represents can contribute. General MacArthur also has access through the military and diplomatic establishments of His Majesty’s Government, to the full cooperation in every respect of the other countries of the Commonwealth who are united in their desire to support him. It is hoped therefore that he will not feel that His Majesty’s Governments are lacking in the desire, or in the ability, to assist him in his task for the reason that, as stated above, the present proposal is unacceptable.⁷⁶

[Washington,] 19 August, 1946.

75. Handed by Mr. Graves, Counselor of the British Embassy, to Mr. Vincent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs.
76. In a separate statement handed to Mr. Vincent by Mr. Graves, the latter asked if Mr. George Atcheson in Tokyo could not be asked to say at the next meeting of the Allied Council that, having found his proposal to be not generally acceptable, he was withdrawing it (740.00119 Control (Japan)/8–1946).