894.011/8–1346

Memorandum by the State Department Member of the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee (Hilldring) to the Committee

Subject: Consultation by the Far Eastern Commission with SCAP on the Text of the Constitution

It is requested that the Committee consider, as a matter of urgency, the enclosed draft paper on the above subject.

J. H. Hilldring
[Annex]

Draft Paper for the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee

Consultation by the Far Eastern Commission With the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on the Text of the Constitution

the problem

1. The problem is to determine the policy of the United States with respect to General MacArthur’s request that the Far Eastern Commission amend its policy requiring that the Prime Minister and a majority of Cabinet members belong to the Diet.

facts bearing on the problem

2. See Appendix “A”.

conclusions

3. It is concluded that:

a.
The United States member of the Far Eastern Commission should request the Commission to amend its policy in reference to qualifications for Cabinet members.
b.
If the Commission votes formally to refuse to reconsider its policy, the United States member should refrain from voting and should not veto the motion.
c.
If a formal statement is presented to the Commission to the effect that the Commission adheres to its previous policy decision that the Constitution should contain a provision requiring the Prime Minister and a majority of the Cabinet to be members of the Diet, the United States member of the Far Eastern Commission should agree to such a statement.

recommendations

4. It is recommended that, after their approval by the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee, the State Department transmit the [Page 293] conclusions in paragraph 3 to the United States member of the Far Eastern Commission for his guidance.

[Subannex]

Appendix “A”

Facts Bearing on the Problem

[Here follow excerpts from correspondence between the Far Eastern Commission and General MacArthur in regard to a policy statement on the new Japanese constitution, already printed.]

5. At its 27th meeting on August 8, 1946, Committee No. 3: Constitutional and Legal Reform, the United States member brought General MacArthur’s request74 to the attention of the Committee but the Committee refused to reconsider this point and approved, with the United States member reserving his position, the following statement for inclusion in a consultative message (SC–012/15):

“(a) Cabinet. In reference to the policy decision of the Commission that “the prime minister and ministers of state, all of whom shall be civilians and of whom a majority, including the prime minister, shall be selected from the Diet, shall form a Cabinet collectively responsible to the legislature” (FEC–031/19), the Commission desired to strengthen the dependence of the executive upon the Diet and to ensure that the executive would not be composed entirely of persons without direct obligations to the electors.

“The Commission has considered this point very carefully, and during the course of its discussions took note of the fact that most countries, where parliamentary systems are in operation similar to that envisaged for Japan, have adopted either in practice or in their Constitutions the principle that all of the ministers of state should be members of the legislature.

“The following is a brief summary of the principal reasons why the Commission inserted in it the provision referred to:

  • “(i) In the parliamentary system of government the direct responsibility of the Cabinet to the legislature is fundamental. This is best secured if the ministers of state are members of the legislature.
  • “(ii) It is essential to provide, within the limits of possible action under the Potsdam Declaration and other controlling documents, safeguards against the regaining of power by bureaucrats and reactionary elements. This situation would be much less likely to occur if a majority of the cabinet ministers were themselves answerable to their electors.
  • “(iii) Furthermore, in the particular case of Japan, where the Diet has been traditionally subordinate to the executive, it is [Page 294] essential to provide a framework which enhances the influence of the Diet and ensures its control over the executive.

“Some members of the Commission were strongly of the opinion that all cabinet ministers should be members of the Diet, but the Commission realized the particular relevance to Japan of the point made by the Supreme Commander, namely, that such a limitation ‘would deprive the Japanese Government of the services, in ministerial capacities, of many men of possibly higher qualifications than might be found in the legislative body.’ Hence the Commission decided as a matter of policy that only a majority of the ministers of state need be members of the Diet and considers that this requirement gives sufficient freedom of choice and at the same time enhances the essentially democratic structure of the Constitution. In view of the fact that Japan has not followed this practice in the past, it is impossible to rely upon established procedure to ensure that it will be followed in the future, and the Commission adheres to its previous policy decision that the Constitution should contain a provision on this point.”

  1. See telegram of August 2, p, 289.