864.00/7–1146: Telegram

The Minister in Hungary (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

secret
us urgent

1282. Government’s reply to Sviridov letter was made prior to receipt urtel 664, July 9.48 Fact, however, that action requested by Soviet is required under article 15, would necessitate full ACC consultation in accordance with post hostilities period statutes as matter of major political importance.

Balogh stated yesterday Government decided to accede to majority of Sviridov recommendations because political issues in Hungary had in reality been lifted onto international plane by intervention of Soviets. I learn that Cabinet Council yesterday considered them made in name of ACC. Balogh said Government had considered alternatives of civil upheaval prior to a peace which would provide pretext for retention Soviet troops in Hungary and acceptance of Soviet desires. [Page 323]Cabinet had concluded that under present armistice regime and notwithstanding diplomatic recognition Government does not have full sovereignty.

Nagy doubtless realized his political position as being powerless in the face of intervention by Allied authority. He may also have been influenced by impression he is understood to have received during Washington visit that American interest in Hungary’s political and economic affairs is rather of long-range than of short-term character. Consequently, his actions suggest that he and Tildy as foreshadowed in last paragraph mytel 977, May 25 have come to conclusion Soviets are indeed resolved to interfere in internal affairs of Hungary. Substantial compliance also seems to mean Prime Minister and President hope to preserve latent power of their party’s resistance by giving no cause for open suppression at this time and that Smallholder leaders are convinced there is no prospect of success in fundamental conflict with Leftist minority enjoying Soviet support if showdown is precipitated at the moment.

I see no reason for approaching Prime Minister now that answer has already been given Soviets. If matter is raised by Gen. Weems in ACC by inquiring why he was not consulted, it may, of course, have some effect on Soviets’ acceptance of Hungarian reply which does not fully comply with Soviet recommendations even such limited intervention may awaken suggestion on part of Soviets that US is interested in encouraging Catholic movement here and in certain reactionaries who may be proved to have been plotting against Soviets and present Government. If question is raised in ACC, purpose should be to set record straight and to indicate again we are not being consulted on armistice matters of acknowledged importance under article 15 of agreement.49

Sent Dept, repeated Paris for USDel CFM as 243, Moscow 243, London 256.

Schoenfeld
  1. Not printed; it requested that Schoenfeld endeavor to obtain a copy of the Sviridov letter and asked for his comments regarding a possible protest to Soviet authorities on the matter (864.00/7–346).
  2. Telegram 1287, July 12, 1946, from Budapest, reported that the British Political Representative, Helm, concurred with Schoenfeld’s opinion that matter ought to be raised in the Allied Control Commission (740.00119 Control (Hungary)/7–1246).