Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The British Commonwealth, Western and Central Europe, Volume V

501.BC/4–1246: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)

secret

Washington, April 12, 1946—7 p.m.

16. From Hiss.⁶⁰

Background Information and Guidance for the United States Delegate

Our position with respect to Spain is clear.⁶¹ Our dislike for the Franco regime has frequently been made plain in public statements by high officials of the Government. Moreover, we have joined with other governments, at San Francisco, at Potsdam and at the General Assembly in February 1946 in saying that Spain under its present regime was not eligible to join the United Nations. At the same time we are equally desirous of sparing the Spanish people from the horrors of further civil war which would almost certainly have serious international repercussions.

We feel that the interests of the Spanish people and of the international community would be served by the prompt elimination of the Franco Government which was initiated with the support of the Axis.

We have been conducting diplomatic conversations for months past in an endeavor to accomplish these two objectives. We are glad to have a discussion of the Spanish situation by the Council, feeling confident that the other members of the Council share our two objectives. We will be glad to consider action within the Charter or independent national action which may facilitate the attainment of these two objectives.

In France hostility towards the Franco regime in Spain is widespread and the parties of the Left, notably the French Communist Party, have taken advantage of this feeling to press the Government for vigorous action against Spain. Foreign Minister Bidault (Chief representative of the right-center Party, MRP, in the Cabinet), has long resisted this pressure, insisting that the Spanish question should be handled by common action with the United States and Great Britain, and not by unilateral French action. This pressure on him for action has assumed domestic political significance which threatens the position of the MRP in the forthcoming election, through their obvious vulnerability in appearing to protect or support Franco by inaction. Therefore, after discussion in the French Cabinet, Bidault agreed to unilateral action by France and, without prior consultation with the United States or the United Kingdom, the French-Spanish border was closed on March 1 and economic relations were suspended entirely. At the same time, to rid himself of an embarrassing problem which he had precipitated and could no longer control, Bidault proposed to the United States, Great Britain and the USSR that the Spanish question be passed on to the Security Council. In so doing, he brought the USSR officially into the question for the first time and received their immediate support.

The country which will derive most satisfaction from a discussion of Spain in the Security Council, and from any action which results, will probably be the USSR. This will provide a distraction from other questions more embarrassing to the Soviets; and it will meet their keen desire to press for international interference in the Spanish situation in the hope that during the resulting confusion a new regime will emerge which will be more satisfactory to Soviet ambitions.

A number of notes have been exchanged with the French Government on the subject of possible Security Council action and a summary of these notes is attached to this memorandum.⁶²

We have refrained from encouraging the French, but now that the question has been raised by the Polish Delegate, we will welcome a thorough discussion of the Spanish situation in the Security Council, as we would welcome such a discussion in any authoritative body.

Quite apart from the question of what, if any, action the Council may under the Charter be in a position to take when all the facts have been developed, we feel that the Council furnishes a useful forum for the discussion of the whole Spanish situation and we hope that the discussion will be free and untrammeled and not limited by technical considerations as to the possible action that the Council may feel warranted in taking.

The United Kingdom Government believes firmly that a solution to the Spanish question will not be aided by any active attempts from outside to force the pace of evolution which must, in their view, be allowed to develop inside Spain. They feel that attempts at intervention will only serve to strengthen General Franco’s position. Moreover, the British are emphatic in believing that the continuance of General Franco in power offers no threat to peace and security.

The British feel that the Spanish question as it now exists is clearly an internal Spanish matter, to which Article 2, paragraph 7, applies and they will probably oppose placing the matter on the agenda on the grounds that it is not Security Council business. We do not share their view that Council consideration is precluded by Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter and believe that such a determination of the merits of a question before it is on the agenda would be a bad precedent and, in fact, would be contrary to views previously expressed on the Security Council by the American and British delegates, that any member should be given a hearing. If the British persist in this position we are prepared to express a contrary view and vote against them on the agenda question.

On the basis of our present information, we are not convinced that international peace is threatened by the continuance of the present situation in Spain—provided other states exercise restraint in their relations with Spain and refrain from efforts to precipitate matters by outside pressure. We regard it as unrealistic to consider the war-making power of Spain as, in itself, a threat to international peace.

Accordingly the United States is of the opinion that, on the basis of the information now available, there does not now exist a threat to the peace (Article 39) requiring action under Chapter VII.

At the present time, the United States believes that it would be wiser to avoid a vote on a determination in the Council, as to whether there exists a situation whose continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security (Article 34). If the Council voted against such a determination, there would be obvious propaganda advantages for the Spanish Government. If the Council voted for such a determination there would be continuing pressure for further action by the Security Council and by individual member states and we believe that such drastic action would in the long run lead to political and economic chaos in Spain and endanger our own interests as well as those of the Spanish people.

Under these circumstances and in the absence of new and compelling reasons, we believe it preferable to effect a disposition of the Spanish matter which would avoid a vote on whether or not such a threat to the peace or such a “situation” exists, and yet would receive the approval of a sufficient number of Security Council members, whose governments are under more or less pressure to do something about Spain.

We would consider action along either or both of the following lines at an appropriate stage of the proceedings:

1. The U.S. would recognize that the situation is one which should have the continuing attention of the Security Council. The Council might, therefore, keep the matter on its continuing agenda and to that end it could appoint a subcommittee of the Council which would he charged with the responsibility of receiving any information relating to the Spanish situation which the members of the United Nations might supply. The subcommittee would have the responsibility of examining such information and reporting to the Council at periodic intervals and whenever information which, in its opinion, warrants the attention of the Council.

2. The United States would support a recommendation by the Council to the General Assembly that it exercise its jurisdiction of considering and recommending measures of peaceful adjustment under Article 14 of the Charter. Under that Article, the General Assembly is empowered to “recommend measures for a peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare of [or] friendly relations among nations.” This resolution would recognize the interest taken in the Spanish situation by the General Assembly at its first meeting and would recommend that if, when the Assembly reconvenes, the situation in Spain still continues to be of concern to the international community the Assembly which is the most representative of all the United Nations bodies consider the possibility of making recommendations.

In the event that no new information or other reasons develop making desirable a different course, and it is decided that a vote shall be taken on the question of whether or not the Spanish matter is a threat to the peace, within the meaning of Chapter VII of the Charter, a statement of the United States position should be made in the Council and the United States delegate should vote against such a determination. Under similar circumstances, the United States should not vote in favor of any resolution recommending to member states that they change their diplomatic relations with Spain or individually apply partial or total economic sanctions such as France has done. Apart from any jurisdictional question the United States is not convinced that such sanctions would be helpful to meet whatever potential dangers there may be in the Spanish situation. [Hiss.]

Byrnes

[On April 15 the Security Council included the Polish request on its agenda, and discussion of the Spanish question began on April 17” with the introduction by the Polish delegate of a draft resolution calling on all members of the United Nations who maintained diplomatic relations with the Franco Government to sever such relations immediately (United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2, p. 167; hereafter cited as SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2). In meetings from April 17 to April 29 the Security Council discussion centered on the question of whether the activities of the-Franco regime did in fact endanger international peace and security. During this period the United States Representative made two major statements of the United States policy regarding the Franco Government, and in both he was guided by this background paper or by instructions based thereupon (particularly telegram 17, to New York, April 12, 7 p.m.; telegram 26, to New York, April 16, 7 p.m.; and telegram 32 to New York, April 20, 5 p.m., in File 501.BC/4–1246, 4–1646, and 4–1746, none printed.)

In a statement on April 17, one of several which Security Council delegates made in response to the Polish resolution, Mr. Stettinius stated that “My Government has two broad objectives with regard to the situation in Spain. The first is that the Franco regime … be removed from power by the Spanish people. … Our second objective is … that this change in Spain be accomplished by peaceful means and that the Spanish people be spared the horrors of a resumption of civil conflict, which would almost certainly have serious international repercussions. … We will give sympathetic consideration to action in conformity with the Charter or to any independent national action which will afford a reasonable prospect of achieving these two objectives. …” (SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2, pp. 178 and 179, or Department of State Bulletin, April 28, 1946, pp. 709 ff.)

In a second statement on April 25, in support of an Australian proposal to establish a subcommittee of the Security Council to ascertain the facts, Mr. Stettinius declared:

“My Government … have been closely following the entire Spanish problem and have accumulated information based upon first-hand observations of our representatives in Spain. Our information on many of the specific points brought forward by the Polish representative is quite different from his and does not support many of his conclusions.

“On the basis of our own information and the information so far developed here in the Security Council, we cannot agree with those of his conclusions which seem to suggest that there is a situation in Spain requiring action under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter. …

“We believe that there should be a committee of the Council charged with the responsibility of obtaining facts relating to the situation in Spain, so that the Council may, on a sound basis, meet its obligation to determine whether or not continuance of the situation is truly likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.” (SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2, pp. 217 and 218.)

The above remarks of Mr. Stettinius were based specifically upon Department’s telegraphic instruction 32, April 20, not printed.

On April 29 the Security Council adopted a resolution which led to the establishment of a subcommittee to determine whether the situation in Spain had led to international friction and did endanger international peace and security (SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2, pp. 244 and 245). The United States excluded itself from the subcommittee on the grounds that other powers had “a more direct interest than ourselves” (telegram 32, April 20). The United States cooperated closely with the subcommittee during the period the subcommittee was in operation from April 29 to June 1, furnishing it with the great bulk of the documentary evidence with which it worked (IO Files, document SD/S/926, “Summary of the Spanish Case before the Security Council April-June 1946”).]

60. Alger Hiss, Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs.
61. The Security Council phase in the consideration of the Spanish question began when the Polish delegate on the Security Council addressed letters on April 8 and 9 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations alleging that activities of the Franco Government were causing international friction and endangering international peace, and requesting that the matter be placed on the agenda of the Security Council (United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council 1st year, 1st series, Supplement No. 2, pp. 54 and 55, annexes 3a and 3b); hereafter cited as SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., Suppl. No. 2.
62. Summary not printed.