740.00119 Control (Germany)/11–2746: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State

secret

4237. Embtel 4035, November 1.10 Oleshchuk’s reference to “possible emergence of Soviet-German alliance” at a Moscow lecture was as far as Embassy could determine not reported anywhere in Soviet press (Deptel 2015, November 21, 4 p.m.11).

Although this is first instance Embassy has encountered of public (i.e. official) expression of this idea, it does not strike us as surprising. As seen from here Soviet policy in Germany, despite vicissitudes of certain of its political and economic aspects, has maintained constant characteristic of working for perpetuation of Soviet control in first instance over Soviet zone, to be eventually extended if possible over Germany as whole. We have sought in vain for any evidence of tendency on part of Russians to permit Germany to rehabilitate itself in [Page 750] some way other than according to Orthodox Soviet plan. Constant reiteration by Soviet officials and press of necessity to complete “democratization” of Germany can have but one meaning to the initiated. Russian opposition to development of federalism in Germany and highly centralized unitary character of new Soviet draft constitution12 is adequate proof that Kremlin has not yet given up thinking in terms of controlling all of Germany. In Soviet experience, time is on their side and setback they encountered in recent elections is from their point of view just that and no more. In addition, ever-growing strength of French CP cannot but constitute an encouragement for further persistence.

An alliance between Moscow and a Sovietized Germany would follow pattern already established for satellite states bordering Soviet Union and would simply be extension in depth of evergrowing Soviet constellation. It is logical next step to follow upon “democratization” of Germany. The complementary character of the two economies and present Soviet interest in raising level of German industry make conclusion of an alliance of satellite pattern potentially most attractive. Use of term “possible” in reference quotation must be read to indicate a reasonable measure of uncertainty as to successful outcome of this Soviet program, but one could hardly have expected a less qualified assertion regarding something, no matter how desirable, which is at best still on far side of horizon.

It seems most improbable that present Soviet thought of an alliance with Germany could envisage anything comparable to balanced cooperative relationship following First World War. The situation is so utterly different. But an alliance with Sovietized eastern Germany would be logical product of failure of more ambitious Soviet plans to control whole of Germany through establishment of now familiar Soviet controlled unity front type of totalitarian government.

Smith
  1. Not printed; this telegram reported on a speech by F. N. Oleshchuk, Assistant Chief of the Administration of Propaganda and Agitation, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In his speech, Oleshchuk analyzed the Paris Peace Conference in relation to postwar trends. He indicated that the United States and Great Britain were seeking to establish an opposing regime in the western zones in Germany to combat the democratization program in the Soviet zone and the possible emergence of a Soviet-German alliance. This, Oleshchuk asserted, was a continuation of the western Allies’ wartime policy of seeking to forestall Germany’s complete defeat (740.00119 EW Peace/11–146).
  2. Not printed; this telegram requested verification and comment by the Embassy on the reference to a possible Soviet-German alliance (740.00119 EW Peace/11–146).
  3. Presumably the reference is to constitutions being drafted at this time by the Landtage in the Soviet zone for approval and promulgation by the Soviet Military Administration.