740.00119 EW/10–2546: Telegram
The United States Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy) to the Secretary of State
[Received 11:30 p.m.]
2456. Reference Moscow’s 244, October 23.88 We do not doubt validity of Durbrow’s views on need for extreme caution in making agreements with USSR looking towards exchange of economic for [Page 632] political concessions. We also agree that odds may well be against Russians accepting political conditions in partial exchange for economic concessions. However, assuming that we do not just make economic concessions without a quid pro quo, we believe that there is nothing to be lost in participating in negotiations along lines of our telegram. In addition there are several points in current German situation which require special examination.
First, we would stress that “concessions” that we propose attempting to gain along both economic and political lines are nothing more in our view than an honest implementation of Potsdam Agreement in toto, i.e., something to which USSR is already committed. We consider this continuous attempt to be one of our major functions here and even though we acknowledge serious obstacles which we have steadily pointed out to Department and Moscow Embassy, we still feel we can point to some cases of limited success. For example, Berlin election October 20 was carried out in democratic manner.89 These elections, results of which constitute heavy blow to Soviet aims and prestige, did not just happen to occur in free and orderly fashion. They were preceded by many months of difficult negotiations during which Western powers put up all effective proposals and forced reluctant Russian authorities to agree to them.
Second, agreement to reparations out of current production in exchange for compliance with political provisions of Potsdam would by its very nature not “give away our hand only to be faced with nonfulfillment by other parties”. We would be in a position to cut off such reparations from our zone whenever convinced that Soviets were not living up to their part of agreement. Admittedly, this would require vigilance and rapid decisions on our part to avoid giving away something for nothing.
Third, while we agree that Soviet actions elsewhere in Europe are of significance and relevance to problems here, we believe too close parallel should not be drawn between our position in Germany and that in eastern Europe. We are part of occupation of Germany and intend to continue such participation. Thus we are in position within Germany in which our views cannot be ignored and where we can take direct action along certain lines when necessary.
In addition to above we would stress dynamic aspects of our position in Germany. American policy has been to press for economic and political unification of Germany and not to be satisfied with unification of western zones. At some time test will come for all Germany and thus we are forced to gamble on whole rather than to fall back to defensive position in western zones alone. Accordingly, we believe [Page 633] that we must attempt to exploit any and all possibilities of opening up Soviet zones.
Sent Department; repeated Moscow 338; Paris as 349; London as 362 and Brussels for Dorr as 116.