740.00119 EW/10–2346: Telegram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Durbrow) to the Secretary of State
[Received 4:23 p.m.]
3944. Berlin’s 2392, October 16, 8 p.m. to Department; repeated Moscow 324 penultimate paragraph. While we fully share Murphy’s view that American bargaining position, vis-à-vis Russians on German reparations removals is a valuable asset which should be used to utmost advantage, we feel we should express our earnest doubts regarding possibility of obtaining any lasting political concessions from them in Germany in return for economic ones (last paragraph reftel).
It is characteristic of Kremlin practice to sacrifice an economic position rather than a political one whenever faced with necessity of making such a choice. An equally important consideration in our view is fact that in American relations with Soviet Government there has yet to be experienced phenomenon of Russian implementation of a political agreement involving a third state which even approached objectives of the undertaking. Whether this fact reflects differences of interpretation or purposeful evasion or a combination of both is in last analysis only of relative importance since results in any case constitute non-fulfilment. We believe recent experience of American endeavors to aid establishment of “free and democratic” regimes in eastern Europe and Balkans under specific agreement with Soviet Government is instructive in this connection.
We do not mean that Soviet MG might not for tactical reasons permit short period of relative political freedoms in its zone, but [Page 629] there could be no assurance of permanence. They would be withdrawn overtly or covertly, as circumstances indicated, the moment Soviet long term strategy required.
Finally as a general consideration, we would urge that any agreement with Russians based on an exchange of concessions in Germany, whether economic or political, be played in such a manner as to preclude giving away our hand only to be faced with non-fulfilment by the other party. Soviet political stakes in Germany are high and there is nothing in Leninist-Stalinist book to justify a hope that Kremlin might approach this problem with other than its well established and proven revolutionary technique.