740.00119 EW/9–646: Telegram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Durbrow) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 7—8:32 a.m.]
3405. Deptel 1552, August 26, 6 p.m.62 Sokolovsky’s suggestion to Clay that reparations from current production be added to German reparations program and dismantling of plants postponed up to 10 years seems to us logical development in light of present condition of Soviet economy and what appear to be Soviet intentions for Germany. Although it may be principally maneuver to unblock stalemate caused by American stop order on dismantling of German plant, nevertheless, we believe following considerations probably entered into Soviet thinking:
- 1.
- Crying need for producers and consumers goods here outweighs Russian urge to bring home immediately as much industrial plant as possible. Relative inefficiency and interminable delay involved in transportation and installation of such machinery in Soviet Union, as contrasted with possibility of more or less immediate operation by skilled German personnel, makes this a most attractive plan. As reported in Embtel 3075, August 2, 9 a.m.63 (repeated Paris 277, Praha 27) we believe this was element in Soviet decision to “give” certain factories to Czechoslovaks which were German by Soviet definition and thus deemed subject to removal from Czechoslovakia.
- 2.
- Under this plan Russians will receive for 10 years far greater quantity of goods than it could produce with the same machinery and would still retain title to the plants. Effect of this operation would be to give a considerable portion of German industry in the western zones an eastern orientation.
- The obligation to provide regular share of current production to Soviet Union would presumably subject the individual industries concerned to measure of Russian interference and control. Far-reaching implications of this aspect as regards labor, management and factories tasks need not be spelled out. The economic tactic would no doubt follow classic Soviet pattern observable in Finland, Central Europe and Balkans. In short it would be powerful lever in support Soviet economic and political position throughout Germany. Sokolovsky’s suggestion is probably related to recently revealed Soviet move to tie up economy in its own zone by means of Soviet controlled joint stock companies.
- 3.
- At end of 10-year period Soviet Union would have right to remove plants, but it would in fact have alternative possibility of leaving them in place should that prove advantageous. Disposition of plants would at that time constitute most valuable trump to play in support of Soviet political objectives in Germany, just as today Russians appear to hold a similarly valuable card in the possible revision of the Oder–Neisse line.
- 4.
- Finally it should be observed that from long term point of view as well, the plants are more productive and valuable in Germany than in Soviet Union. An extension of Soviet political influence into Western Germany during the intervening 10 years sufficient to guarantee output of these factories, would indicate as most practical action from purely economic standpoint, definitive abandonment of any plans for their removal to the east.
Paris for DelSec.