740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–1146: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 12—12:32 p.m.]
3413. It is still too soon accurately to judge the reaction of either the French Government or the French people to Molotov’s declaration on Germany yesterday35 in which he stated that Moscow opposed dismemberment or political detachment of the Ruhr, and advocated a central German Government with an expansion “within certain limits” of German “peacetime industry”. It is certain, however, that the Russian position as stated will come as a blow to many Frenchmen who had been counting on Russian support for the separation of the Ruhr because of the recent stand taken by the French Communist Party ostensibly supporting Bidault’s policy.
Discussing Molotov’s statement yesterday, several Foreign Office officials dealing with German affairs expressed great concern and said, “This is development of major political importance”. They believe that Soviets who have heretofore made no long range policy statement have now decided to pose as the champion of German rehabilitation and nationalism in hope of discrediting the policy of the other three powers and facilitating Communist penetration into the other three zones with the view eventually to establishing a Soviet dominated Germany. At the same time by blocking the designation of deputies and hence a discussion of German problems, Moscow leaves the door open for a different approach to the German problem at some future CFM meeting (presumably 6 or 7 months hence) at which time it will be in a better position to judge the progress of its penetration, its chances of ultimate success and to act accordingly.
These French officials do not believe that Soviet’s desire to continue extracting reparations from Germany by moving capital equipment and production to the east is primary reason for Soviet policy decision since stripping of Soviet Zone is very far along. In this connection, they point out that if Soviets had wished, they could have blocked German question in CFM and continued stripping without defining their policy toward Germany. Therefore, they are convinced decision is one of major importance based on long-range Soviet policy [Page 577] toward Germany with important developments anticipated in next 6 months.
By taking a line which in many respects is contrary to that of the French Communist Party, there is little doubt that they have placed Thorez36 and company in a difficult position. The French are speculating on whether this may mean that the Kremlin believes that Germany rather than France is the pivot for Sovietizing Europe. But they feel that it is far too soon to reach any such conclusion—particularly since Moscow has left itself a possible avenue for a change in policy when the German question eventually comes up for discussion before the CFM. We were reliably informed that Molotov saw Thorez yesterday before the meeting and undoubtedly explained the reasons for Soviet German policy. It is also reported that subsequently Thorez saw Bidault and allegedly suggested a postponement of yesterday’s CFM meeting until today, possibly to give the French Communists a slightly longer period to trim their sails to Moscow’s policy (as late as July 9, Humanité was still calling for “the economic and political detachment of the Ruhr”).
What exact line the French Communists will now follow remains to be seen. While they can unquestionably—as they always do—find some “logical” explanation for Moscow’s latest move, it should be more difficult for them actively to plug it at this time, particularly in view of their apparent previous position supporting Bidault and the violent opposition of the majority of French to a resurgent centralized Germany which retains Ruhr and Rhineland. (For press reaction see my 3411, July 1137).
Sent Dept 3413, repeated to London as 528, Moscow 286, and Berlin as 273.