Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The British Commonwealth, Western and Central Europe, Volume V

740.00119 Control (Germany)/5–1046

Memorandum by Mr. George F. Kennan to Mr. Carmel Offie⁷

secret

Paris, May 10, 1946.

Subject: Russian Policy in Germany

1. What the Russians want in Germany is the dominant power over the life of the country: power both to control internal affairs and to govern Germany’s international behavior.

2. It is not of vital importance to Moscow what form this power takes, except that it must be without direct responsibility, beyond what the Russians have already assumed in their zone of occupation. In other words, it must be through puppet agencies of one sort or another. It will be a long time before the Russians will want even a Communist-controlled Germany to be part of the USSR. Meanwhile a “People’s Republic”, along the lines of Poland or Yugoslavia, would hold out the best prospects.

3. It is idle to ask whether Moscow is seeking this power over Germany for offensive or defensive purposes. The ends to which it would be used, if attained, would depend entirely on circumstances.

4. Moscow can hope to achieve this power only if the German Communists succeed in penetrating, paralyzing and bending to their will the German Social-Democrats and bringing about the suppression of the bourgeois parties.

5. At the moment, the Russians are exploiting the French opposition to central agencies in order to let the Communists pose safely as the champions of German unity, with a view to gaining strength outside the Russian zone. At the same time, they are profiting from the occasion to complete political preparations within their own zone and to prepare that zone as a spring-board for a Communist political offensive elsewhere in the Reich. This state of affairs suits them very well.

6. The Russians place tremendous value on Communist success in Germany. To obtain it they would probably be willing, if necessary, to undertake even a revision of the Oder-Neisse line, which—in those circumstances—would probably mean a renewed partition of Poland. But they would not undertake such a revision unless they were sure that it would mean Communist victory, and that only in that way could such victory be obtained.

7. I doubt that for us there is any satisfactory approach to the German situation within the framework of the Potsdam agreement. The Oder-Neisse line was a grievous mistake and as long as it stands, the French have a real case for Rhineland and Ruhr. We can hardly assent to dismemberment in the east and oppose it in the west. For this reason, among others, I think that we must declare our independence of the Potsdam agreement. We could find plenty of justification for doing this.

8. My own feeling is that our best move at this time would be to announce that we could no longer be bound by Potsdam and to propose the economic unification of Germany not only within the Oder-Neisse boundary but also generally within the old boundaries, excluding East Prussia. This should disarm French objections and put the matter squarely to the Russians. If they accept it, they cut the ground out from under the Polish Communists. If they decline it, they lose the possibility of posing as the champions of a united Germany. And we would then be free to proceed to the organization of western Germany, independently of the Russians, without being pilloried as the opponents of a united Germany.

7. Mr. Kennan was at this time returning to the Department for reassignment upon completion of a term of duty as Counselor of Embassy in Moscow. Mr. Offie was on the staff of the U.S. Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy).