740.00119 Control (Germany)/4–246: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 2—10:58 a.m.]
1012. From Smith. Dept may be interested in the following impressions gained during my short visit to Germany after 3 months’ absence.
I agree with Clay that a reduction in the calory value of the German ration is very likely to have serious results. Obviously the Russians do not intend any corresponding reduction of the ration in their occupational zone, and they will certainly use the food shortage in the western zones to further their political program in Germany. It will be 3 to 4 months before the effect of this season’s crop is felt, and meanwhile a further reduction in the ration, already too low for sustained heavy work, may well produce a condition which will justify all of Clay’s apprehensions.
I sincerely believe that, except for France, there is no place in the world where we could expend exportable food stuffs to greater advantage, both to ourselves and to the world, than in western Germany.
Everyone with whom I talked seemed to agree that we should proceed toward our announced objective of a central government for Germany by organizing from the bottom up. We might proceed by first forming in each of the three western zones a central governmental agency with a permanent secretariat, as has already been done in the US zone. The next, and intermediate step, would be to form a temporary government for the three western zones with the ultimate idea of combining this with the Soviet sponsored govt of the eastern zone as the central govt of Germany. My personal belief is that this final step may never be taken.
I agree with Kennan’s estimate of March 6 (No. 672) that it is probably the Soviet policy to create in eastern Germany an antifascist republic as a preliminary to a Soviet socialistic state, or at least a state oriented directly toward Moscow. Undesirable as this is from our point of view, we may be unable to prevent it, and we should adopt a line of action which, while proceeding in the direction of our ideal of a central govt, will on the way produce a western Germany oriented toward western democracy.
Recent information seems to indicate that progress in industrial and economic reorganization in the Soviet zone of occupation is more rapid and effective than in western Germany, presumably because the Russians have no inhibitions whatever in retaining competent Nazis [Page 536] in key positions as long as their services are required. From the long view this may prove to have been a political mistake, and resistance to Russia’s efforts in the direction of a communist-socialist coalition will, I believe, be greater than they anticipate. However, their apparently determined efforts in this direction, and our acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line as the future boundary of Germany in the east confirms the opinion I have held for many months that our immediate objectives should be the integration of the western zones of Germany into a political unit oriented toward western Europe and western democracy. Kennan’s message, previously referred to, gives the reasons which brought him to the same conclusions, and needs no elaboration.