842.20 Defense/10–2646
Memorandum by the Acting
Secretary of State to President Truman
top secret
Washington, October 26, 1946.
Subject: Joint Defense Measures with Canada
When Prime Minister Mackenzie King of Canada calls on you on October
28 at 2:30 p.m. it is hoped that you will emphasize that you
consider that the time has now come for the basic decisions in this
field to be made by yourself and the Prime Minister. The Permanent
Joint Board on Defense and the planning authorities in our
respective Armed Services have defined the problem and made
recommendations but it is now up to the statesmen of both countries
to direct the carrying out of joint defense measures with minimum
disturbance to the two peoples and maximum advancement of world
security through the United Nations.
The foregoing is suggested as the highlight of your conversation
because Mr. King is reluctant to reach any decision until events
have made it imperative to do so. We understand, moreover, that some
in authority in Canada think that our military sometimes proposes
more extensive plans than are necessary. It will be doubly helpful,
therefore, to assure Mr. King that our non-military authorities are
convinced that the program is necessary and also that you and they
are watching to prevent any over-extension of military plans.
The former Canadian Ambassador, Mr. Pearson, with whom you talked
recently, has remarked to Ambassador Atherton in Ottawa that it
would also be helpful if you wished to provide Mr. King with some
written document on this problem. Accordingly, there is attached a
memorandum which you may wish to hand to him. …
These problems which we now ask Mr. King himself to decide are the
most important problems currently before the Canadian Government.
The following quotation from my memorandum to you of October 1
suggests why this is so:
“In view of Canada’s traditional close association with the
United Kingdom, the shift to an even closer association with
the United States armed forces is a matter of great moment
in Canada and one which involves considerable political risk
for the present Government. Some Canadians fear we would
encroach on their sovereignty and some fear that Canada
might ultimately have to withdraw from the British
Commonwealth.”
Now that General Eisenhower6 and Field Marshal Montgomery7 have discussed standardization
and the United States and British [Page 58] Navies have agreed to continue to make their
facilities reciprocally available, it should be somewhat easier for
Mr. King to approve similar steps proposed in the 35th
Recommendation of the Joint Defense Board.
Outside the joint defense field we do not have any particular
questions to raise. We do not know if Mr. King has any. Our
relations with Canada continue excellent. We have, however, been
disappointed by the Anglo-Canadian wheat agreement, a long-term bulk
purchase deal, which we consider to be somewhat at variance with our
proposals for liberalizing trade. On the other hand, the Canadians
are troubled about our customs administration which they consider to
be unduly restrictive in its effect on Canadian exports.
Mr. King’s Government has lost three by-elections over the past few
weeks but, while his majority in Parliament is narrow, the
opposition groups are split. One of the by-elections was fought and
lost on the issue of the Anglo-Canadian wheat deal.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by President Truman to the Canadian Prime
Minister (Mackenzie King)
Oral Message
The Government of the United States is grateful to the Government
of Canada for the favorable consideration which the latter has
given to proposals relating to joint defense. In no case has any
military project which this Government considered urgent been
delayed by any lack of cooperation on the part of Canada.
Because of the extreme importance in an unsettled world of
continuing and reinforcing measures of joint defense it is
believed that the consideration of these matters, hitherto
primarily in military hands, should also now be taken up
directly by the governments. In suggesting this course, the
Government of the United States is determined that the actions
taken shall in no way be inconsistent with commitments under the
Charter of the United Nations,8 full support of
which is the cardinal point of United States policy. The
decisions which the governments take and the further advancement
of North American security through the recommendations of the
Permanent Joint Board on Defense must always accord with the
framework of the United Nations.
[Page 59]
Early in 1946, pursuant to views expressed by the Joint Board,
the two Governments decided to collaborate as partners in
drawing up a basic security plan for the United States and
Canada. A Joint Appreciation9 of the situation was prepared and planning
has progressed satisfactorily. It may, however, not be
practicable to proceed much further without assurances of
support from the highest authorities of both Governments. Such
assurances could take the form of concurrence in the
Appreciation. Meanwhile, events at Paris10 and in the
international field generally have not lessened the anxiety of
those charged with assuring the security of the United States.
Moreover, in the opinion of this Government, those events have
demonstrated that decisions in the field of home defense should
be taken now and implemented as rapidly as practicable. Only by
being secure at home can Canada and the United States strengthen
the United Nations and discharge their responsibility for
contributing to world order and security.
Under these circumstances, it appears to the Government of the
United States that close collaboration in defense matters with
the Government of Canada must be carried forward actively. It
believes this for the following reasons:
Two world wars have demonstrated that an aggressor must destroy
the power of North America or be defeated.
Due to post-1945 technological advances, North America is no
longer adequately protected by geography.
Canadian and United States military advisors agree that in five
years North America must be prepared to meet major enemy
capabilities.
While the peaceful foreign policies and intentions of Canada and
the United States are clearly defined, there can be no guarantee
that the governing officials of the U.S.S.R. will make decisions
on the basis of a correct appraisal of the world beyond Soviet
borders, or that the long term policy of the U.S.S.R. is not one
of unlimited aggrandizement.
For the foregoing reasons North American nations henceforth must
be prepared at home just as less fortunately placed nations have
had to be in the past. Furthermore, under conditions of modern
technology, defenses must be as far out from Canadian and
American industrial centers as possible.
[Page 60]
If within only five years another major power will be capable of
jeopardizing North American security, action should be based on
realization:
That Canada and the United States lag in cold weather knowledge
and experience,
That, because of this lag and because of the expense involved,
defense plans will take years to implement.
That, to be efficient in an emergency affecting North American
territory, the Canadian and American forces should have the
experience of working together, experience of the north, and
increasing uniformity of equipment and methods.
The United States Government realizes that close collaboration
with Canada in basic defense matters presents both governments
with new problems of great complexity and difficulty. The
responsible United States officials are aware of the special
problems that face Canada, a member of the British Commonwealth
of Nations. They have been instructed that the sole purpose of
close military collaboration is defense, that every precaution
must be taken to protect the traditional relations of the two
countries and the position which each, respectively, enjoys.
The United States Government is also aware that the question of
the financial cost of defensive measures is most serious for
both Governments. It must not, however, be permitted to delay
the planning of security at home and should not delay the
attainment thereof. While no final commitments can yet be made
by either Government, it seems clear that the Joint Defense
Board should recommend and the two Governments should negotiate
some equitable means of sharing the financial burden of any
defenses agreed to be necessary around the northern perimeter of
the continent. Possibly the United States might agree to assume
an equitable proportion of the cost of any facilities jointly
found to be necessary on Canadian soil if the Canadian
Government were to take into account that United States
expenditures in Alaska and Greenland, for instance, contribute
to Canadian as well as United States security.
Although many problems remain for future determination, the
United States Government believes for the reasons set forth in
this memorandum that decisions by the Canadian Government on the
following existing problems would be timely and would enhance
the security of the Canadian and American people:
- 1.
- Further Canadian Government endorsement of joint
planning now in progress would assure the United States
authorities of continuing Canadian cooperation and an
adequate measure of joint action between Alaska on the
west and Greenland on the east.
- 2.
- Approval of the 35th Recommendation of the Permanent
Joint Board on Defense would help to define the
relations between the armed forces of Canada and the
United States and would provide authoritative guidance
as to the nature and limits of the collaboration desired
by both Governments.
- 3.
- It is hoped that the Canadian Government, with
Newfoundland concurrence, will permit the stationing of
certain United States Army Air Force units at the
Canadian 99-year leased base at Goose Bay, Labrador.
Reciprocally, (as soon as the present congestion can be
relieved), the United States authorities will be
agreeable to a similar arrangement at United States
bases in Newfoundland proper. While remaining an
important feature of the defenses of the northeastern
approaches to the continent, these latter bases are,
however, too close to Canada and the United States to
provide adequate protection against ultra-modern high
speed aerial attack. Moreover, they do not afford as
would Goose Bay, a highly favorable situation for the
acquisition by United States and Canadian Air Force
units of the experience of training together under cold
weather conditions, of testing northern equipment and of
coordinating their respective methods and tactics.
Finally, arrangements of this kind at Goose Bay and the
other bases would be consistent with the joint
responsibilities which the two Governments have
discharged in the past for the defense of
Newfoundland.
In conclusion, the United States Government reiterates that it
has been gratified by the cooperative attitude of the Canadian
Government and by the informality, frankness and mutual trust
which have prevailed during discussions of the delicate and
momentous problems of joint defense. It believes that final
decisions, not only on the three points just mentioned, but also
on others in this field can be reached without necessity of any
more formal documentation than has been customary since
establishment of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense in 1940.
There is no doubt that public opinion firmly supports effective
collaboration with Canada and, in the view of the United States
Government, this is a strong and satisfactory basis for joint
action.
