851.00/10–2946: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State
[Received 9:57 a.m.]
5419. The grave financial, economic and food crisis described in my 5415 and 5418, October 28,74 has had a most depressing effect on French morale, which has steadily deteriorated since the middle of September till at present it is probably lower than at any time since the liberation. The depths of this psychological depression are unquestionably accentuated by the fact that in July and August there was a widespread feeling that while difficult days still lay ahead, the corner had been turned and French economy was on the upgrade. [Page 469] This unfounded optimism was in part caused by belief that the Communist threat had been averted as the result of the May referendum and June elections, by the advent of warm summer weather with adequate food supplies and an abundance of fruits and vegetables at reasonable prices, by an increase of consumers’ goods and a general feeling that things were better. By mid-September, however, the rose tinted lenses through which the French public viewed developments had turned to gray. France was faced with another cold and critical winter. The wage index had increased but the price index had risen even more and and the inflationary spiral was in full progress. Perhaps even more important from the psychological point of view was the increasing belief in the Government’s inability to cope with the vital problems of finance and economy on which the well-being of every Frenchman depends. The nation’s resources were being frittered away. The French public could perceive not the slightest indication that its Government had any definite program. Each political party in the Government appeared to spend its time in horse trading with other parties and furthering its own political ends, rather than in courageously attacking the country’s fundamental problems. The opposition, composed of the Right-Center and Right, was equally sterile. While criticizing the tripartite government it showed little leadership or understanding of the aspirations of the people.
As a result there is at present a profound “malaise” in France. The repercussions on the elections of this deep psychosis of worry and disillusionment are difficult to evaluate. It is unquestionably true that “democracy” as it has been practiced here since the liberation is greatly discredited and the public fails to see how the present elections can improve matters. The people are fed up with “too much politics” and many Frenchmen are not even sure for what party they should vote. For example, the majority is still opposed to the Communists. But the Socialists, on whom many voters pinned their hope immediately after the liberation, are divided and have followed a vacillating course (because of their inferiority complex towards the Communists) with no constructive or dynamic program. The MRP, which after the rejection of the first constitutional project became the hope of persons who wished to bar the Communist march to power, has been a disillusionment. It has lacked strong leadership and has even gone along with the Communists on critical issues, such as the very unpopular electoral law, when it thought that by so doing its chances in the November elections would be enhanced. Its divergence with De Gaulle over the constitution caused further confusion in the ranks of its voters. The Rassemblement des Gauches suffers [Page 470] from the fact that it is the natural successor to the old Radical–Socialist leadership which many people still hold responsible for the disastrous French policy in the thirties. The PRL is too far to the Right to be in tune with the present Left-of-Center tendency in France.
Thus the French voter who wishes in the coming elections to cast his vote for a party which can best reconstruct France is puzzled and bewildered. He knows that no party, and probably no two parties, can have a working majority. And yet he fears the continuation of a tripartite or coalition government which he believes will be unable to adopt a constructive program because of the concessions which each party will demand as a condition for its participation in the Government.
Out of this welter of mental confusion a very disquieting trend of thought is developing among at least some thinking Frenchmen of different political views. They are beginning to feel that for the present at least, since democracy in France does not appear to produce results, some form of authoritarian government is needed. Actually they profess to see only two possibilities—a dictatorship by the Communist Party or an authoritarian regime under De Gaulle. The majority of Frenchmen, if faced with only these two alternatives—which is certainly not a foregone conclusion—would unquestionably pick De Gaulle. Many would do so with the greatest misgivings and with the feeling that France was being launched on an unknown adventure which might lead anywhere, but in the belief that such a “Gaullist” experiment would be preferable to a Communist dictatorship which once installed would put France behind the iron curtain.
It is not my intention to be alarmist, nor do I wish to exaggerate the present strength of the above sentiment. Nevertheless it does exist and should conditions further deteriorate resulting in a major political crisis it might have to be reckoned with. The sad but true fact remains that with less than 2 weeks remaining before France goes to the polls to elect a permanent government, the French people are worried and confused to a point where clear thinking about political parties and what they stand for has become difficult if not impossible.
- Neither printed. Telegram 5415 described problems of agriculture and the distribution and rationing of food (102.78/10–2846); telegram 5418 reviewed financial developments in the 9 months since devaluation of the franc and various proposed economic measures (851.01/10–2846).↩