863.014/6–346
The United States Political Adviser for Austria (Erhardt) to the Secretary of State
No. 1270
[Received June 12.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Department’s telegram No. 488 of May 16, 1946, commenting on the prominence given by the Austrian Government to the South Tirol issue and expressing the view that the Austrian Government should more properly direct its efforts toward the development of realistic plans for national reconstruction and toward such action as is possible within the limitations of Austria’s present situation. The substance of the Department’s telegram has been brought to the attention of Dr. Gruber.17a
I share the Department’s view that the return of the South Tirol is not in itself essential to Austrian national reconstruction. The Austrian Government’s vigorous campaign for it is doubtless intended, as the Department points out, to foster national patriotism and to strengthen the Government’s own position by means of a popular local issue. It is believed that another motive may be to increase the relative importance of the conservative western portion [Page 346] of the country. The economic gains hoped for from a return of the South Tirol are minor though by no means negligible.
The real importance of the South Tirol issue is to be found in its emotional or symbolic aspects. The recovery of the South Tirol, in addition to being a goal desired by all political groups in Austria (including now the Communist Party), appeared originally to be one which the country could reasonably hope to attain, at a time when most others looked impossible. Especially it was felt that a settlement of this frontier question by means of a plebiscite would serve as a tangible demonstration to the Austrian people of the great powers’ sense of justice, good will, and desire to help Austria in the attainment of its legitimate aims.
It is quite true, as pointed out in the Department’s telegram under reference, that the Austrian Government has not so far produced comprehensive plans for economic reconstruction, couched in realistic terms. However, it would seem that this fact can hardly be attributed to the preoccupation of certain officials of the Government with the South Tirol issue; indeed I know of no way in which the Government’s sponsorship of that issue has interfered significantly with progress on other matters. Furthermore, it would seem that the Government’s failure to produce plans should be appraised in the light of several extenuating considerations. The latter will be reviewed briefly in the ensuing paragraphs.
There are several factors which have made long-range economic planning difficult or impossible up to the present. In the first place, most raw materials, fuel, and other factors of production have been obtainable only on a hand-to-mouth basis, with no scheduling possible even for period of a few months in advance. A second factor has of course been the division of Austria into zones of occupation. It is hoped that improvement in this regard may be attained in coming months, as a result of UNRRA’s assuming supply responsibility and as a result of the new control machinery agreement now awaiting approval at the governmental level, but up to the present it has not been possible to give the Austrian Government any assurances that the demarcation lines would be eliminated so far as the movement of goods in Austria is concerned. Another important factor has been the insecurity of property and the uncertainty of ownership of property. In the Soviet zone there have been massive removals of machinery and equipment as war booty, and some twenty or thirty key industrial plants have recently been taken over on the basis of the Potsdam Agreement; at the same time the presence of considerable numbers of troops, not always adequately disciplined, has interfered with normal economic activity and created an atmosphere of insecurity. In all zones an important portion of all industrial property is subject [Page 347] to claims on account of reparations and restitution, and the resulting uncertainties preclude both definite planning and financing in a normal manner.
An important reason why the quality of realism has been wanting in the Austrian Government’s official approach to the problem of national reconstruction is the simple one that Austrian officials are not permitted to express themselves in realistic terms on what is perhaps the largest problem confronting the country, namely, the question whether Austria should resign itself to the fact of expanding Russian power in the East and submit to the economic domination which the Soviet Union plainly seeks to establish, or whether, for the sake of safeguarding its political freedom, it should attempt the almost impossible task of developing its economy in such a way that no foreign power could dominate it. This choice, difficult and painful to make, and fundamental to all long-range plans, cannot be debated by the Austrian Parliament or Government, or by editorialists, without bringing down upon themselves accusations of attempting to spread anti-Allied propaganda or to incite enmity among the Allied powers.
When conditions are favorable to the development of comprehensive economic plans, it should be possible for the Government to develop such plans within a fairly short period, since Austria is a small country with a relatively simple economy; and the value of comprehensive economic planning will increase considerably as production rises above the present very low levels. Meanwhile, much preparatory work is being done. Notably, surveys of industrial facilities in all four zones have been in progress for several months and are approaching completion. The survey for the United States zone may be available within a few days. These surveys, or summaries of them, will be forwarded to the Department promptly upon receipt.
Up to the present the Austrian Government has been burdened and bedeviled by demands from the occupying authorities, for innumerable reports, questionnaires, and forms, and for appearances at meetings. This is a natural and inevitable result of any military occupation and of any establishment of a governing authority superior to a country’s own government, though the difficulties have naturally been increased in this case by the fact that the occupying authority is a cumbersome quadripartite body operating in three foreign languages. Although there have been instances of a desire on the part of one or more of the occupying powers to embarrass the Austrian Government, the burdens placed upon it have for the most part not been due to any ill will.
The Government offices are short of experienced and capable personnel, largely as a necessary result of de-Nazification measures. [Page 348] They are also grievously lacking in transportation facilities, office equipment, and supplies.
The vigor of efforts by the Government and the population as a whole to plan and carry out national reconstruction is undoubtedly sapped somewhat by the consciousness that, for a country as small as Austria and in Austria’s geographic and political position, developments in the future will be conditioned less by their own efforts than by actions of the great powers and relationships among the great powers.
That portion of the Austrian population, probably a good majority, which is genuinely inclined toward democracy and libertarian principles is disillusioned and disheartened by the fact that after liberation from eight to twelve years of dictatorship, Austria is subject now to extensive Allied controls and faces in the future the prospect of probable domination by an authoritarian foreign government.
Finally, the Department will not overlook the profound effect of hunger, which has become critical in Austria in recent months, upon the vitality of government officials and employees as well as the population in general.
In view of the foregoing, it is not surprising to an observer stationed here that the present Austrian Government and the population as a whole have both reacted to the present situation with some degree of passivity and skepticism, and that they tend to look backward toward their past (the South Tirol issue itself contains a trace of nostalgia) rather than forward. It may be that a government and a people more energetic and dynamic than those of Austria might react to their difficulties not with comprehensive plans for economic reconstruction but with violence.
Respectfully yours,
- Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs.↩