740.00119 Control (Austria)/4–1546: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Political Adviser for Austria (Erhardt)

secret

385. Urtel 523 Apr 12. Report on change Soviet attitude welcomed as first indication of possibility of reaching four-power agreement to complete reestablishment of Austrian independence as well as solving immediate problems of Austrian rehabilitation. Change of attitude all the more impressive in view of impasse in four-power relations created by Soviet refusal to discuss any constructive proposal in AC as reported in urtels 296 Feb 26, 423 Mar 23, and Gen Clark’s P–3605.

Dept hopes that new Soviet approach can be utilized to push forward proposals stated in section 6 Deptel 277 Mar 21 which US views as minimum program necessary to carry out agreed commitments to Austrian people.

Dept considers that real test of new Soviet attitude will lie in obtaining discussion and possible agreement on such basic questions as military occupation, creation of independent economic life, and establishment of complete sovereignty of Austrian state. Although change in attitude may possibly be explained by new instructions to Konev, it is not clear what specific long-range results may be obtained in Austria. Dept would appreciate your evaluation of following points in light of general conclusions in urtel 523:

1.
Does Soviet willingness to discuss Brit draft proposal new control machinery agreement indicate desire to proceed to final settlement of Austrian question, or do Soviets envisage that criticism of their [Page 333] policy may be met by accepting an agreement which changes existing control machinery but which will also retain measure of Allied control over Austrian Govt?
2.
Does dropping of rebuke to Austrian Govt on inadequacy of program indicate Soviets will agree to draft interim constitution? Do Soviets continue to denounce 1929 constitution as undesirable in spite of its acceptance by Nationalrat (urtel 538 Apr 1588)?
3.
Did change in Soviet attitude come in sufficient time to have noticeable effect on enthusiasm of Apr 13 celebration of anniversary Vienna’s liberation? US press reports that parade of Vienna workers was listless and colorless due to extensive malnutrition among Austrian population.
4.
If Soviets have replied to Gen Clark’s inquiry concerning extraterritoriality (War Dept CM-Out 84376 Apr 1289 and Deptel 377 Apr 15), can reply be reconciled with four-power objective of creating independent Austria? Similarly, will Soviet policy with regard to German assets result in creation of completely independent national economy, and leave Austrian Govt in full control of economic resources?90

Dept urges that full advantage be taken of change in attitude to obtain maximum results in four-power agreement, even if results have only short-term significance, but hopes that stage has now been reached making possible complete restoration of Austrian sovereignty and termination of Allied controls.

Sent to Vienna as 385; repeated to Moscow as 730; to London as 3340, and to Paris as 1745.

Byrnes
  1. In this telegram Erhardt reported that “Vice Chancellor Schaeff in name of Socialist Party at April 12 meeting Nationalrat presented resolution whereby this body reiterated its December 19, 1945 approval 1929 constitution as provisional law of the land and requested Federal Govt to communicate this view to Allied Commission. Resolution enthusiastically adopted by vote of all present excepting four Communist Deputies.” (740.00119 Control (Austria)/4–1546)
  2. In this telegram General Clark was informed that the State Department took a “grave view of Soviet demand for extra-territorial rights and of claim of right to acquire land under terms of Potsdam agreement.” He was asked to “inquire of Soviet representative what the Soviets envisage by the term ‘Extra Territorial Rights’ in Austria”.
  3. In telegram 610, April 25 from Vienna, Mr. Erhardt commented in detail on the points raised by the Department. According to his observations, “Russians are willing to pass a little more authority to Austrian Govt but still wish to retain basic Allied control with supreme authority vested in AC. … Soviets are not especially interested in substance of constitution but merely desire to postpone turning over authority to present govt. … More favorable Soviet attitude has had little direct effect on Austrians. … In short Soviets plainly hold that time has not yet come for complete restoration of Austrian sovereignty.” (740.00119 Control (Austria)/4–2546)