Office of the Historian

740.00119 Control (Austria)/2–2646: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Political Adviser for Austria (Erhardt)

top secret
u.s. urgent
Washington, March 21, 1946—1 p.m.

277. After consideration of problems raised in urtel 296 Feb 26 and Gen Clark’s P–3605 Feb 26 and War 99140 Mar 1,65 Dept and War Department recommend that Gen Clark present to AC as soon as possible a statement of US policy on Austria and draw together into a comprehensive program various proposals already made by US. Identical communications, repeated to you, have been sent to Moscow, [Page 319] Paris, and London informing governments that comprehensive US program for fulfillment of agreed objectives in Austria will be presented to AC for immediate agreement and requesting that appropriate instructions be sent to respective members to enable AC to function according to provisions Control Machinery Agreement.

Dept recommends that the presentation to AC be based on following considerations:

1.
US gravely concerned over failure of Allies to agree on basic policy for reconstruction of Austria and restoration of its national independence as stated in Moscow Declaration and in agreements providing for military occupation. Austria is regarded by US therefore as area liberated from Nazi rule and as an important element in whole process of European reconstruction which will effectively test ability of four powers to cooperate in achieving an agreed objective.
2.
Fulfillment of Moscow Declaration, however, has to date been made impossible by Soviet refusal to discuss in AC any concrete proposals designed to contribute to Austrian reconstruction. US wishes to make it plain that it has no intention of repudiating any international commitment designed to restore Austrian independence.
3.
US does not regard recent Soviet policy of refusing to discuss various proposals for Austrian reconstruction as consistent either with Moscow Declaration or with proclamation of Red Army of April 9, 194566 which stated that Soviet Govt did not seek to acquire Austrian territory or to change social structure and would carry out Moscow Declaration by assisting in reestablishment of democratic practices and institutions. Similarly, US considers that continued maintenance of unduly large military force constitutes a punitive measure against Austrian people which is not contemplated either in Moscow Declaration or in Soviet assurance at time of establishment of Provisional Government67 that Austrians had resisted Nazis and thus fulfilled conditions of Moscow Declaration.
4.
US has been forced to consider Soviet policy in recent months in refusing to agree to discussion in AC of concrete proposals for Austrian reconstruction as a progressive violation of the principles enunciated in Control Machinery Agreement. This policy has led to distinct feeling in US that Soviets seek exclusive rights in Austria by using method of unilateral action in attempting to deal directly with the Austrian Government on matters affecting Austria as a whole rather than through AC.
5.
US does not consider that reasons given by Soviet member AC in justification of Soviet policy as valid reasons for delaying common action in fulfillment of agreed objectives. US insists that all four powers have an equal concern in the establishment of an independent Austrian state. US policy has clearly stated that Austria shall be denazified and that Habsburg Monarchy has no place in Austrian national life. Similarly, US policy has clearly directed that pan-German influences should be eradicated. Consequently, US can not [Page 320] agree that Austria presents any security threat to the Soviet Union and that it is necessary for the Soviet Union to maintain their present troop establishment.
6.
US therefore sees in present outstanding issues nothing which can be considered incompatible with the enunciated aims of Soviet policy and considers that a full and frank discussion should take place in AC on a program for Austrian reconstruction lest charge be made that four powers can not cooperate to achieve an agreed end. US proposes that AC proceed to a discussion of the following points:
a.
Food supply, and relief and removal of all obstacles which hinder immediate inauguration of UNRRA program, such as Soviet requisitioning of Austrian land;
b.
Immediate and substantial reduction of occupation forces to relieve financial burden now placed on Austrian Govt;
c.
Economic rehabilitation and immediate establishment of a basis for the existence of an independent national economy by agreement on an interpretation of Potsdam which will enable Austria to exist as an independent state and to control her economic resources in a manner consistent with national independence;
d.
Agreement on recommendations to be submitted to respective govts on a new international agreement according to terms of Article 14 of Control Machinery Agreement.
7.
Please emphasize that on all points raised in 6 above, US has approached Soviet Union on an inter-governmental level requesting that appropriate instructions be sent to Soviet member AC.

Dept considers that each of foregoing points is adequately covered by instructions. If Konev refuses to discuss these questions, Dept will address formal note to Moscow requesting statement on Soviet intentions in Austria and will propose similar action to British and French. This note as well as US proposals in AC might subsequently be made public.68

Byrnes
  1. Telegram War 99140 not printed; in this telegram the War Department informed General Clark that the problems raised by him in telegram P–3605 were being considered in the State Department and that the Department recognized the serious nature of the problems he faced (Department of the Army Files).↩
  2. For text of proclamation, see Red-White-Red-Book (Austrian State Printing House, Vienna, 1947), First Part, p. 201.↩
  3. April 27, 1945.↩
  4. The statement on United States policy in Austria came before the Allied Council for discussion on April 25. The minutes of discussion are filed under ALCO/M (46)21.↩