864.811/4–1846
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of
State (Clayton) to the Secretary of State
[Washington,] April 18,
1946.
Subject: Danube Negotiations
Problem
The British and French Governments have requested that the Danube
problem be placed on the agenda at the Foreign Ministers meeting in
Paris41 and that the United States take the
initiative in proposing the establishment of a provisional regime
for the Danube composed of the USSR, the UK, France, the US and the
riparian states. In this approach, the UK and France have
recommended that the United States not base its claim for
participation on its position as an occupying power as this
principle might prejudice British and French participation in a
permanent regime.
Discussion
The policy of the State Department with respect to the Danube has
been set forth in CC–93a attached hereto as Annex I. The
Department’s position with respect to a provisional regime for the
Danube is set forth in CC–94 attached as Annex II. The Department’s
position with respect to treaty provisions for the Danube is set
forth in the Department’s telegram 2760 of March 28 to London for
Mr. Dunn attached as Annex III.42
[Page 238]
In these documents the Department’s position has consistently been
that:
- (1)
- US claims participation in a provisional regime for the
Danube on the basis of our position as an occupying
power.
- (2)
- US supports the reestablishment of permanent international
river commissions to guarantee the general principles of
freedom of commerce and navigation for international
waterways but does not seek permanent membership on specific
river commissions on which the United States is not a
riparian country.
- (3)
- US should seek to implement this long-range policy and
support the commercial interest of non-riparian states in
general through the United Nations machinery.
- (4)
- US should state its long-range objectives without
prejudice to the Anglo-French claim for participation on
European waterways commissions as non-riparian
states.
In light of the above policy, this Government has been unwilling to
take the initiative with respect to the establishment of any
particular river commission although at Potsdam and again at the
Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in London last September, the
US delegation did propose the acceptance of general principles to
govern waterway regimes and proposed the establishment of emergency
regimes for European waterways.
It is clear from the above statements and from the positions taken by
the British and French that there is a difference in the long-range
objectives of the United States on one hand and the British and
French on the other with respect to European waterways and also that
these positions might vary even with respect to the establishment of
provisional regimes which might very well set precedents for
permanent regimes.
In light of these fundamental differences between the United States
and the Anglo-French positions it would be most unwise for the
United States to take the initiative in proposing the solution to
either the provisional or the permanent regime questions prior to
the establishment of a full and complete agreement with the British
and French as to details of the proposed principles to cover both a
provisional and a permanent regime. Since the United States does not
intend to seek permanent membership on the operating commissions,
our taking the initiative on the waterways commissions could easily
put this country in the position of being the champion of the
British and French position vis-à-vis the Soviets over an issue in
which this Government itself is not the directly interested
party.
In light of the above considerations, it is believed that the United
States should actively advocate the principle of the establishment
of international waterway regimes and should indicate its desire to
participate in any provisional regimes in which our interests as an
[Page 239] occupying power are
concerned. It should not take the initiative on behalf of the
British and French for proposed specific arrangements. Thus by
giving support to the principles and avoiding taking sides on the
riparian vs. non-riparian issues, the United States might well be in
a position to effectuate a compromise agreeable to both the Soviets
and the British and French.
Recommendations
It is recommended that:
- (1)
- The British and French Governments be informed that we are
not in a position to take the initiative on the Danube
question in the forthcoming Paris meetings.
- (2)
- We should carefully explain to the British and French the
reasons for this decision and indicate a willingness to
discuss with them the fundamental differences in our
positions with a view towards endeavoring to reconcile such
differences and work out the possible proposals which might
be acceptable to all four major powers.
[Annex I]
February 18, 1946
CC–93a
The Policy of the United
States Regarding International Regulation of the Danube
River
(Approved by the Coordinating Committee on February 18, 1946 with
the understanding that no instructions with regard to this
policy statement should be sent from the Department without
prior approval of the Committee.)
The Problem
The problem of the policy of the United States regarding
international regulation of the Danube is three-fold in
character:
- 1)
- Should the United States, in conformity with its
traditional policy as to international waterways in the
Western Hemisphere, seek to re-establish the principle
of freedom of commerce and navigation on the Danube
River in the satellite peace treaties, relying on its
position in UNO to
implement the general principle; or,
- 2)
- Should the United States, as a participant in the
affairs of Europe after the withdrawal of military
forces (assuming this to be the Department’s policy)
favor the establishment of a Danube Commission or
Commissions with non-riparian as well as riparian
representation, implying, as this does, a similar
position for the international waterways of the Western
Hemisphere;
- 3)
- Should the United States be concerned in the conflict
between the policy of the Soviet Union as to riparian
control of the Danube River and Anglo-French treaty
rights?
[Page 240]
Recommendations
- 1.
- The United States should support the re-establishment of
the general principle of freedom of commerce and navigation
on the Danube River in the satellite peace treaties.
- 2.
- The United States should use this policy as to the Danube
River, in so far as possible, to promote the principles of
freedom of commerce and navigation in East-Central Europe
and to support the political independence of the peoples of
this region.
- 3.
- The United States should not seek permanent membership on
a Danube Commission, but should state its position without
prejudice to the Anglo-French position, which rests on
treaty rights (1856, 1878, 1919, 1921), to which the United
States is not a party.
- 4.
- The United States should seek to implement this long-range
policy and to support the commercial interests of
non-riparian states in general through its position on the
Economic and Social Council of UNO, which is to coordinate the specialized
agencies of the United Nations, and through UNO itself.
- 5.
- In addition to its long-term interest under Paragraph 1
above, the United States should seek immediately, on an ad hoc basis, freedom of navigation
on the Danube River, either through a temporary commission,
or through U.S. membership on the Allied Control Council, or
through direct government-to-government negotiations, in
view of its role as an occupying power in Austria and
Germany.
Discussion
A. Implications of the Recommendations
The question now before the United States, essentially, is
whether this Government should seek permanent representation on
a Danube Commission involving, as this does, the principle of
non-riparian membership, to which the Soviet Union is opposed.
The question may be considered as a part of the larger issue of
the participation of the United States after the withdrawal of
the occupational forces, or it may be considered as an aspect of
the policy of the United States regarding all international
waterways. The two larger policies are not necessarily
contradictory. Active participation by the United States in the
management of post-occupation Europe might imply our
representation on such an important regulatory body as the
Danube Commission, although not necessarily so. Such
representation, however, would be in direct conflict with the
traditional policy of the United States, which has favored
riparian representation on the international waterways of this
hemisphere.
Would the United States be justified in agreeing to a temporary
commission composed of representatives of the riparian states
(Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania and the
Soviet [Page 241] Union) and one
representative each of the United States, Great Britain and
France as members of the Allied Control Councils for Germany and
Austria? In such a commission Great Britain, France and the
United States would have no national representation as such, but
would secure protection of their military interests on the
Danube for the occupation period.
If Great Britain and France insist on the principle of
non-riparian representation, either on the short or long term
view, on the basis of their treaty rights, it is probable that
the Soviet Government will continue to oppose it and, in fact,
to control the Danube River in cooperation with Rumania,
Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, as under the
reorganized Danube Commission of 1940. It is in connection with
this conflict between Soviet and Anglo-French policy that the
United States may be forced to take a position. In the course of
negotiations concerning the ownership of Danube ship lines in
Austria, for example, this issue may lie implicit throughout,
and may become explicit in the final stages. The issue is even
more directly involved in the Balkan peace treaties. The
Department may wish to formulate what it regards as an equitable
and stable resolution of this conflict, if necessary after
consultation with the British and French Governments, and be
prepared to play a constructive part in its settlement. This may
merely be a question of appropriate strategy in presenting the
Departments views to the other governments.
B. Arguments in Behalf of
Recommendations
The interests of the United States in the promotion of peace and
the economic development of the Danube region, in this
particular instance, should rest on the re-establishment of the
principle of freedom of commerce and navigation not on the
permanent participation of the United States in a Danube
Commission, insistence on which would merely stimulate
difficulties with the Soviet Government, without achieving any
desirable objectives.
The historic policy of the United States in the Western
Hemisphere, as well-illustrated in the instances of the Great
Lakes–St. Lawrence Waterway and the Rio Grande, has been to
accept international waterway commissions composed only of
riparian states. While tradition need not be a determining
factor, departure from the historic American policy as to
riparian control of international rivers in the Western
Hemisphere might logically give some justification for a
possible Soviet demand for a quid pro quo
in the Western Hemisphere. Although the traditional policy of
the United States precludes this government, in principle, from
supporting the Anglo-French position, it would not prejudice the
case of the United Kingdom or France or [Page 242] prevent the United States from playing a
constructive role in resolving the conflict.
There is no fundamental reason, however, why the United States
should become a permanent member of a Danube Commission, any
more than a member of other European international river
commissions, even though it might desire temporary participation
as an occupying power. For example, the United States has joined
the Central Commission of the Rhine on a temporary basis,
although it was not a member of this Commission before the war,
and does not expect to be a member after the withdrawal of the
occupation forces. The primary interest of the United States in
the organization of such a commission at this time is to promote
the reestablishment of free navigation and the orderly
utilization of the Danube River. In this connection it is well
to recall that the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet
Union at the Yalta conference in February 1945 jointly declared
“their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period
of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three
governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the
domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis
satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their
pressing political and economic problems.”
Withdrawal of direct participation after the period of military
occupation and failure to insist on permanent membership in a
Danube Commission do not imply in any way withdrawal from the
affairs of East-Central Europe or any other part of Europe. The
United States can exercise its influence concerning the Danube
River through the instrumentality of the United Nations and
through the appropriate specialized agencies with which it is
assumed the Danube Commission would be affiliated.
C. Pertinent Data
- 1.
- History of International Regulation of
the Danube.—Since 1856 the Danube River has been
subject to international regulation in which both riparian
and non-riparian powers have participated. A European
Commission was established for the purpose of freeing the
Danube mouth and adjoining seas from various obstacles as a
preliminary to reopening Danube navigation. When the
European Commission had finished its work, its duties and
powers were to be transferred to the Riparian Commission to
be established for the entire navigable Danube. Russia was a
party to these arrangements until 1918 when, through the
loss of Bessarabia, it ceased to be a Danube riparian power
and was excluded. The Treaty of Versailles of June 28, 1919
gave to non-riparian states broad privileges of navigation
in the particular rivers recognized as having an
international character. However, the acquisition by certain
non-riparian European [Page 243] powers of a right to participate in
the administrative control of rivers was merely an incident
in the attempt of the Principal Allied Powers to
re-establish, in essence, the situation which had obtained
since 1856, so far as the Danube was concerned. In August
1938, however, Rumania obtained a virtual sovereign control
over the maritime Danube and the European Commission, to all
intents and purposes, became purely advisory in character.
In March 1939 Germany and Italy adhered to the August 1938
arrangement concerning the Danube. In the fall of 1940,
following the reacquisition of Bessarabia, the Soviet Union
joined with Germany and Italy, and the riparian states, in
the abolition of the International Commission of the Danube,
which had been established in 1919–21, and in reorganizing
the European Commission to the exclusion of Great Britain
and France, and the European Commission was restricted, in
principle, to the riparian states.
- 2.
- The Position of the Soviet
Union.—Like Imperial Russia, the Soviet Union attaches
great importance to the Danube River and closely identifies
its position concerning the Danube with its policy in the
Black Sea and the Turkish Straits. The Soviet Government
takes the position that the pre-war International and
European Commissions of the Danube, re-establishment of
which is advocated by the United Kingdom, were founded upon
treaties framed after the defeat of Russia in 1856 or the
exclusion of Soviet Russia in 1919. Following a conference
of riparian states on September 5, 1940, in Vienna, which
did not include a representative of the Soviet Government,
Germany announced the abolition of the International
Commission of the Danube. The Soviet Government, which had
advised the German Government in September 1940 that it must
participate in the decision of all Danube questions, on
joining the new Danube Commission stated categorically that
the Danube Commission should be composed exclusively of
riparian states and that neither Great Britain nor France
should, therefore, have any place on such a commission.
Failure of Germany and the Soviet Union ultimately to agree
concerning the nature of Soviet control at the mouth of the
Danube in December 1940 brought the first fissure in
German-Soviet collaboration based on the nonaggression
treaty of August 23, 1939.
- The Soviet authorities indicated unpreparedness to discuss
the problem of the Danube at the Potsdam Conference in July
1945. At the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in
September 1945 at London, Foreign Commissar Molotov
presented a proposal that regulation of the Danube (as well
as that of the Elbe and Oder) should be lodged with the
supreme commander or commanders having jurisdiction over the
river during the period of military occupation. A firm stand
was taken at this time against a civilian commission which
might interfere with military plans.
- At the present time the Soviet Union has de facto control over the Danube from Linz to
Constanza. There is no reason to believe that the Soviet
Union has changed or is inclined to alter its position
either as to non-riparian representation on a Danube
Commission or as to control at the mouth of the
Danube.
- 3.
- The Position of Great Britain and
France.—Although France was unable to make its
voice heard in the fall of 1940, Great Britain vigorously
protested on October 27, 1940, against the organization of a
new Danube Commission and advised the Soviet Government that
it could not recognize any agreement whatever which might
violate existing treaties and that it would reserve all its
rights. Both France and Great Britain are now reasserting
their rights to participation in the control and
administration of the Danube River, based on the treaties of
Paris (1856), Berlin (1878) and Versailles (1919) and the
Paris Statute of 1921.
- 4.
- The Policy of the United States.—At
the Potsdam Conference President Truman expressed the desire
to see temporary international commissions established for
the Danube and other European international rivers. At the
London Council of Foreign Ministers in September 1945
Secretary of State Byrnes proposed establishment of a
temporary Danube Commission to provide cooperative action in
opening the river for movement of relief supplies. This
Commission was to be made up of Danube riparian governments,
including the U.S.S.R., and the states participating in the
military occupation of Austria—Great Britain, France and the
United States. In an address in New York on October 28,
1945, President Truman stated his belief “that all nations
should have freedom of the seas and equal rights to the
navigation of boundary rivers and waterways and of rivers
and waterways which pass through more than one country.”
This statement was repeated in the annual message to the
Congress on the State of the Union on January 21, 1946. It
should be noted that the President has never taken a stand
on the issue of riparian or non-riparian representation with
regard to the permanent international river regimes in
Europe. It is precisely the latter issue which is before the
Coordinating Committee for recommendation.
[Annex II]
March 12, 1946
CC–94
Resumption of Navigation on
the Danube
On February 18, 1946, the Coordinating Committee approved
Document CC–93 [GC–93a] (The Policy of
the United States Regarding International Regulation of the
Danube River) with the understanding [Page 245] that no instructions with regard to this
policy statement should be sent from the Department without
prior approval of the Committee. On February 21, 1946 the
Secretary’s Staff Committee approved a telegram for Mr. Dunn
quoting the policy statement in CC–93a. In accordance with the
understanding reached by the Coordinating Committee in approving
CC–93 [CC–93a], this document (CC–94)
presents for the Committee’s approval a draft reply (Annex II)
to a British aide-mémoire (Annex I)43
requesting a joint United States-United Kingdom approach to the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the subject of resumption
of navigation on the Danube.
Problem
To reply to a British Aide-Mémoire (see
Annex I) requesting a joint United States-United Kingdom
approach to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
subject of resumption of navigation on the Danube.
Recommendations
- 1.
- That United States should join with the United Kingdom in
instructions to their respective ambassadors at Moscow
urging the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to agree to:
- a.
- The re-establishment of the general principle of
freedom of commerce and navigation on the Danube for
the nationals, the vessels of commerce, and goods of
all members of the United Nations; and
- b.
- The establishment of a provisional international
Commission for the Danube.
- 2.
- Specifically, that the attached proposed reply to the
British Aide-Mémoire (see Annex II)
be approved and
- 3.
- That the attached proposed instructions to the United
States Ambassador to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(see Annex III) be approved.
Discussion
Subsequent to the Coordinating Committee approval of document
CC–93 [CC–93a] on February 18, 1946,
(“The Policy of the United States for International Regulation
of the Danube River”), the Department received the attached Aide-Mémoire, February 22, 1946 from the
British Embassy.44 In accordance with the Coordinating
Committee’s request that no instructions with regard to this
policy statement should be sent from the Department without
prior approval of the Committee, the proposed reply to the
British Aide-Mémoire is submitted for
Coordinating Committee concurrence.
[Page 246]
A paraphrase from General Clark’s (United States representative
on the Allied Council for Austria) most recent communication to
the Department indicates that local approaches to the solution
of this problem through the Allied Council have been
exhausted.
Following is paraphrase of the appropriate sections of General
Clark’s P–3605, February 26, dealing with the Danube
question:45
The Soviets have acquired control of the Danube in Hungary and
Rumania through recent agreements concluded with those countries
establishing joint shipping interests. Soviet intention to
extend this control of the Danube to include Austria is made
evident by their recent seizure of the property of the DDSG in their zone in Austria
except for the funds deposited in the Vienna bank and the boats
and docking facilities in Linz and Passau. The Soviets control
the north bank of the Danube between Enns and Passau and have
full control of the river in Austria from Enns to the Hungarian
border. They have already effectively blocked the river at Enns,
but the United States has no way of blocking the river between
Enns and Passau. Consequently, the Soviets have nominal control
of the Danube from Passau through Austria, Hungary and Rumania
to its mouth in the Black Sea.
All efforts to date to bring about any settlement of traffic on
the Danube have been blocked by the Soviets. I am convinced that
no progress can be made on this subject inasmuch as this
waterway is too vital to the economic life of the Danubian
countries.
In this telegram General Clark reviews the whole situation
existing in Austria and concludes that little can be
accomplished toward discharging the responsibility of the United
States toward Austria until the four powers represented in the
Allied Council adopt a uniform policy to carry out their agreed
intentions. At the present time, the efforts of the United
States, Great Britain and France are blocked by the Soviet veto
power in the Allied Council, and the three states can do nothing
to oppose any policy which the Soviet Government chooses to
adopt, even though it may be contrary to the policy of the three
Western states. General Clark concludes that this does not
increase the prestige of the Allied powers, and it certainly
does not contribute to the fulfillment of our international
objectives.
The government-to-government approach appears to be the next
logical step. Inasmuch as the United Kingdom has approached the
United States and France for united representations at Moscow,
is believed desirable to cooperate.
It is, of course, the Department’s policy not to seek permanent
membership on a Danube Commission, and the United States
proposed reply stops short of this step which is mentioned in
the British Aide-Mémoire
Aide-Mémoire
[Page 247] but is not directly
tied to the immediate request for joint action.
While it is unrealistic to expect a favorable reply on the part
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, it is believed
important to continue to press for the principle of freedom of
navigation and commerce on rivers of international concern in
accordance with point 7 of the President’s Foreign Policy
Statement to Congress in his message of January 21, 1946:
“We believe that all nations should have the freedom of
the seas and equal rights to the navigation of boundary
rivers and waterways and of rivers and waterways which
pass through more than one country.”