840.4016/7–1846: Airgram

The United States Political Adviser for Austria (Erhardt) to the Secretary of State

secret

A–152. On June 28 proclamations appeared in the Russian Bezirke of Vienna and elsewhere in the Russian zone announcing the expulsion of Reichsdeutsche and Volksdeutsche.

[Page 173]

The order was singularly unspecific. The Austrian Government promptly protested, basing the protest on the need of the affected persons for taking in the harvest and on the fact that many occupy key positions in industry and the bureaucracy. The Russians demanded registration lists, and these were supplied—a Reichs- or Volksdeutscher. On 30 June Chancellor Figl obtained a one week’s postponement, in which time he hoped to obtain an increase in the exemptions granted from 6,000 to 12,000. He was, indeed, promised that the increase would be granted. On 7 July, however, the movement of repatriables was ordered begun. This left the Chancellor, still lacking any precise definition of who was affected, no recourse other than to inform the public by radio that he insisted on exemption of “those who were resident in Austria prior to 13 March 1938, who were essential to Austrian economy or who had achieved Austrian citizenship”.

The Russian censor first tried to block the above announcement, but it was broadcast despite his objection, which was subsequently withdrawn.

The news of the movement was given wide publicity, chiefly through US press sources. Late in the afternoon of 10 July, the Russians ordered the movement postponed. Repatriables already gathered in railroad stations and on trains were dismissed and told to return to their homes until harvest and Chancellor Figl was assured that no further movement from rural areas would take place until the harvest was in. It was hoped in the meantime to clarify the categories of those involved and to raise the exemption figure. There seemed little doubt that the Russians’ impulsive action was related to Order No. 17,82 regarding the seizure of German property in the Russian zone, since the repatriables were to be allowed only 15 kilograms of baggage and Russian transport was reported to be ready and waiting to gather up what they left behind. Indeed, it was widely reported that repatriables who returned to their homes found them already stripped.

The leftist press, and particularly the Red Army’s Oesterreichische Zeitung, inveighed heavily against the handling of the affair by the Austrian press, especially blaming the American News Service. The Russians insisted that they had never intended to move the 54,000 persons reported affected by the Austrian officials and subsequently by the American News Service. The fact remained, however, that the order, as written, technically affected that number, and if the Russian intentions were less sweeping they failed to specify the limitations.

The incident illustrated anew the Russian sensitivity to publicity and the power of publicity to dissuade them from undertakings which they are accustomed to carry through in areas where they have the press effectively muzzled.

Erhardt
  1. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, July 21, 1946, p. 123.